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INTRODUCTION
THE YEAR 1990 has been marked by the usual assort-
ment of court decisions, some lucid and some abstruse,
on the various issues that make aviation law constantly in-
teresting. This extensive survey covers those 1990 and
late 1989 aviation law decisions that are considered most
significant, along with some other decisions that may indi-
rectly affect aviation law.
I. GENERAL LEGAL ISSUES
A. In Personam Jurisdiction
In Charlie Fowler Evangelistic Association v. Cessna Aircraft,
Inc. ,' the plaintiff Association instituted a diversity action,
in a Florida federal district court, against the Cessna Air-
craft Company and Dean Aircraft Service, Inc. (Dean), a
Mississippi airplane repair facility, seeking damages aris-
ing from the crash of the plaintiffs' Cessna aircraft in
Florida.
Charles A. Fowler flew the Association's Cessna air-
plane on a business trip from Florida to Key Field in Me-
ridian, Mississippi. While preparing the aircraft for the
return trip, Fowler discovered that the starboard engine
would not start. Fowler was referred to Dean, and Dean
repaired the engine so that it would operate. On the re-
turn trip, the starboard engine quit while Fowler was at-
tempting to land at Bay County Airport in Panama City,
Florida, and the Cessna crashed. The plaintiff alleged
that Dean's negligent repairs caused the crash.
Dean was a Mississippi corporation with its principal
place of business in Mississippi. It had no offices, employ-
ees, or agents in Florida and did not conduct any business
in that state. Nevertheless, the plaintiff contended that
, 911 F.2d 1564 (11 th Cir. 1990).
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Dean was subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida be-
cause Fowler told Dean that he was from Florida and that
the aircraft was heading back to that state and also be-
cause Dean was listed in "The Aviation Telephone Direc-
tory" for the Southeastern and Gulf States, which includes
Mississippi and Florida.
The district court dismissed the action against Dean for
lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court held that
these two contacts were not enough to show that Dean
"purposely directed" activities at Florida residents. Plain-
tiff appealed Dean's dismissal.2
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Dean. In
so doing, the court noted that Dean's limited contacts
with Florida were principally the result of Fowler's actions
and stated that, "unilateral acts by the plaintiff cannot
supply the necessary minimum contacts, or show that a
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the benefits
and protections of the forum state's laws.' 3
In Macario v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. and Beech Air-
craft Corp. ,4 plaintiff instituted a federal diversity action in
Pennsylvania against Pratt & Whitney (Pratt) for breach of
contract and against Beech Aircraft (Beech) for inten-
tional interference with contractual relations. The plain-
tiff was the administrator for the estate of Matthew
Macario, who was killed when his Beech King Air crashed
in Cedarville, New Jersey.
This action was the third commenced against Pratt as
the result of the crash. The first lawsuit, a wrongful death
action, was settled after Pratt agreed to pay plaintiff
$6,000,000 and to issue a service bulletin informing own-
ers of aircraft equipped with PT-6 engines of the potential
for engine rollback due to contamination of the automatic
fuel control, along with the availability of filters that
would prevent or reduce the likelihood of such contami-
nation. In the present action, the plaintiff claimed that
2 Id.
3 Id. at 1566.
4 No. 90-3906 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist File).
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Pratt had breached its obligation to issue a service bulle-
tin.5 Plaintiff also alleged that Beech had persuaded Pratt
to renege on the settlement agreement and to refrain
from issuing the service bulletin by threatening that
Beech would inform owners of Beech aircraft equipped
with PT-6 engines that the service bulletin would impair
the operation of the aircraft.
Beech moved to dismiss, claiming that the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over it because it did not do business
in Pennsylvania. Beech claimed: (1) it was a Delaware cor-
poration with its principal place of business in Wichita,
Kansas; (2) it was not authorized, registered, or qualified
to do business in any state other than Kansas and Colo-
rado; and (3) it did not maintain any place of business in
Pennsylvania or have any officers or employees in Penn-
sylvania. Beech also argued that the sale of its airplanes
and parts is negotiated, completed, and performed in
Kansas and that the delivery of all airplanes and parts oc-
curs there. Finally, Beech contended that any contacts
that it had with Pratt regarding the service bulletin in
question occurred outside of Pennsylvania.
The plaintiff argued that the court had both specific and
general jurisdiction over Beech because Beech did busi-
ness in Pennsylvania and because the cause of action
arose, or the harm occurred, in Pennsylvania. In support
of his position, the plaintiff submitted several affidavits
showing that Beech had continuous and substantial con-
tacts with Pennsylvania sufficient to bring him within
Pennsylvania's long-arm jurisdiction.
The district court agreed with the plaintiff, and denied
Beech's motion to dismiss. The court held that it was not
necessary to determine whether the court had "general"
jurisdiction over Beech because there were sufficient facts
to support "specific" jurisdiction. The court stated:
The essence of plaintiff's (third) lawsuit is that Pratt has
breached a settlement agreement entered into before this
- Id. at 2.
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court in the first lawsuit, and Beech acted improperly in
inducing Pratt to breach that agreement. The settlement
agreement was made in the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, the harm caused by Beech's alleged inducement
of Pratt to breach that contract occurred in Pennsylvania
and affects the plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania. Accord-
ingly, this Court clearly has personal jurisdiction over
Beech pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5322 [Pennsylvania's
long-arm statute] if Beech has minimum contacts with this
Commonwealth.6
The court found that Beech had "minimum contacts"
with Pennsylvania because the plaintiff's affidavits estab-
lished that Beech sent its employees and aircraft into
Pennsylvania for sales demonstrations and maintained an
aviation center in Pennsylvania that sold and serviced
Beech aircraft. Moreover, Beech admitted in an affidavit
submitted by one of its officers that Beech had done busi-
ness in Pennsylvania for over ten years. Based on these
facts, the court determined that submitting Beech to per-
sonal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania would not offend due
process .'
In Nolan v. Boeing Co. ,8 an action arising out of an acci-
dent in a England, the district court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana addressed the issue of whether a state
could assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion on the basis that it held the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) type certificate for the engine, which was
also used in the United States.
The plaintiff in this wrongful death action was the per-
sonal representative of a foreign passenger killed in the
crash of a British Midland Airways B-737-400 at
Kegworth, England in January, 1989. The aircraft was on
a domestic flight between two cities in the United King-
dom, and no U.S. passengers were on board. The Boeing
aircraft involved in the accident was equipped with CFM-
6 Id. at 7-8.
7 Id. at 8-9.
8 736 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. La. 1990).
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56 series engines that were manufactured jointly by the
General Electric Company (G.E.) and SNECMA, a French
aircraft engine manufacturer. General Electric and
SNECMA marketed the engine to Boeing through a
jointly owned company known as CFM International, Inc.
(CFMI Inc.).
The action was instituted in Louisiana state court
against G.E. and Boeing. There was diversity of citizen-
ship between plaintiff and these defendants, so, in an at-
tempt to prevent removal of the action to a federal court,
the plaintiff named as an additional defendant CFM Inter-
national, S.A. (CFMI, S.A.), a French corporation that
held the FAA Type Certificate for the CFM56-3C engines
that were installed on the accident aircraft. The plaintiff
contended that CFMI, S.A. was subject to personal juris-
diction in Louisiana, and was thus a proper defendant, be-
cause of its status and responsibilities as the holder of the
FAA Type Certificate for the CFM56-3C engine. Argua-
bly, the presence of CFMI, S.A. as a defendant in the law-
suit destroyed federal subject matter jurisdiction over the
action because both the plaintiff and CFMI, S.A. were
aliens. The defendants nevertheless removed the case to
federal court on the ground that CFMI, S.A. had been
fraudulently joined in that it was not subject to jurisdic-
tion in Louisiana.
After the case was removed, CFMI, S.A. moved to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction because it did not
conduct business in Louisiana. CFMI, S.A. contended
that the mere fact that it was the FAA Type Certificate
holder for the CFM56-3C engine was insufficient to sub-
ject it to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana.
After finding that CFMI, S.A. had absolutely no con-
tacts with the State of Louisiana, the district court held
that CFMI, S.A. was not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Louisiana and granted the motion to dismiss. In dis-
missing CFMI, S.A. from the action, the court specifically
noted that, by itself, the holding of an FAA Type Certifi-
cate is insufficient to subject the certificate holder to per-
1991]
8 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
sonal jurisdiction in a particular U.S. forum. Moreover,
the court stated that a defendant must have some sort of
presence in the forum in order to be subject to jurisdic-
tion, either by doing business in the forum, by directing a
product to the forum, or by such other conduct that indi-
cates that the defendant purposefully availed himself of a
forum's benefits and privileges.9
In Cronin v. Eipper Aircraft, Inc. ,10 a Rhode Island federal
district court was faced with the issue of whether a succes-
sor corporation, which did not transact any business in
the forum state (Rhode Island), could be subjected to per-
sonal jurisdiction in the forum because its predecessor
purposely availed itself of doing business there. The case
was pending before a U.S. Magistrate for Findings and
Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
In July, 1984, Walter Cronin purchased an Eipper
Quicksilver MX ultra-light aircraft manufactured by de-
fendant Eipper Aircraft, Inc. Cronin purchased the air-
craft from a local authorized dealer in Rhode Island. In
September, 1986, Cronin was operating the aircraft at an
altitude of 3000 feet when the fabric of one of the wings
tore and gave way, causing him to lose control and crash.
Cronin and his spouse subsequently brought a personal
injury action against Eipper, RPM Industries, and Quick-
silver Enterprises, Inc. The plaintiffs asserted claims for
product liability, negligence, and breach of contract.
At the time the plaintiffs filed suit, Eipper was a defunct
Texas corporation that had liquidated its assets in 1985
pursuant to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Eipper
maintained its principal place of business in Temecula,
California. Defendant RPM was a Nevada corporation
formed in 1985, with its principal place of business in
Temecula, California. Defendant Quicksilver was a Dela-
ware corporation formed in 1988, with its principal place
of business in California. Quicksilver purchased all of
RPM's stock after its formation and thus became RPM's
Id. at 127-28.
No. 89-04838 (D. R.I. July 17, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
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parent. Lyle Byrum, the president of Eipper, was, at the
time of the plaintiffs' suit, the president of both RPM and
Quicksilver. Bruce Wilbanks, the majority stockholder of
Eipper, purchased Eipper's assets following bankruptcy
and continued to use these assets to manufacture the
same ultra-light aircraft with Byrum through corporations
that were eventually merged into RPM. Based on these
facts, the plaintiffs alleged that Quicksilver and RPM con-
tinued to use the assets acquired from the Eipper bank-
ruptcy in the continuous manufacture of ultra-light
aircraft and were thus liable as successors-in-interest to
Eipper.
The three defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of their motion,
the defendants argued that Eipper was no longer in exist-
ence, and that RPM and Quicksilver lacked sufficient
''minimum contacts" to support the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over them because they never transacted any
business in Rhode Island.
The Magistrate rejected the defendants' arguments that
they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Rhode
Island. In reaching this conclusion, the Magistrate first
found that, based on the facts, RPM was the "alter-ego"
of its parent, Quicksilver. As such, the corporations were
the same corporation for jurisdictional purposes. The
Magistrate then determined that, despite the general rule
that a corporation acquiring all or part of the assets of
another corporation does not assume the predecessor's li-
abilities, the facts of this case came within both the "prod-
uct-line" and the "mere continuation" exceptions to this
rule. The Magistrate determined that, because RPM and
Quicksilver continued to manufacture the same ultra-light
aircraft as Eipper, using the same designs, equipment, ad-
vertising, and research and development as Eipper, these
companies were essentially the same company as Eipper.
As a result, the Magistrate ruled that personal jurisdiction
existed over RPM and Quicksilver as the successors-in-in-
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terest to Eipper." 1
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Von Anhalt v. Delta Airlines Inc. ,12 the Princess Zsa Zsa
Von Anhalt (a/k/a Zsa Zsa Gabor)(Gabor) brought a state
court action for negligence, defamation, and assault and
battery against Delta Airlines, Inc. The case was removed
to federal court by Delta on the basis of diversity of
citizenship.
The lawsuit arose out of another kind of removal, the
involuntary removal of the plaintiff from Delta Flight 462,
which originated in Los Angeles, California, and termi-
nated in West Palm Beach, Florida, on January 6, 1989.
After she refused to allow a flight attendant to stow away
her carry-on bag, Gabor was escorted off the aircraft dur-
ing an intermediate stop in Atlanta, Georgia, and denied
permission to reboard. Gabor sought compensatory and
punitive damages from Delta in excess of $10,000,000 for
her alleged wrongful ejectment.
Following removal of the action to federal court, Delta
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Delta argued that
plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by federal law,
particularly section 1305(a)(1) of the Federal Aviation
Act. Section 1305(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:
[N]o state.., shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regula-
tion, standard, or other provision having the force and ef-
fect of law relating to rates, routes or services of any air
carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chap-
ter to provide air transportation.'3
Based on the "savings clause" of the Federal Aviation Act,
49 U.S. App. § 1506, plaintiff argued that her claims were
not preempted.14
After reviewing the law on the issue of federal preemp-
, Id. at 13.
21 735 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
15 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
14 Von Anhalt, 735 F. Supp. at 1031.
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tion, the district court held that § 1305(a) "unmistakably
manifests the intent of Congress to preempt such state
common law tort claims as related to the services of air-
craft and the safety of passengers." Rejecting plaintiff's
argument that her claims fell within the Federal Aviation
Act's "savings clause," the court concluded that the clause
only saves state law remedies and not state law claims.
However, in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, the court
noted that the plaintiff could re-assert a claim against
Delta under 49 U.S.C. App. § 1511(a), challenging the
reasonableness of Delta's actions.' 5
In Halmos v. Pan American World Airways, 16 the plaintiff, a
New York citizen, instituted a personal injury diversity ac-
tion in a New York federal court against Pan American
World Airways (Pan Am). The plaintiff alleged that he be-
came ill due to the food served by Pan Am on a flight from
New York to Paris.
Pan Am moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. Pan Am argued that, since both
the plaintiff and Pan Am were citizens of New York (Pan
Am maintains its principal place of business in New York
City), complete diversity was lacking.
The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. In so doing, the court restated the general rule
that, "[w]here there is not complete diversity, the court
does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action,
and the complaint must be dismissed."'' 7
In RLI Insurance Co. v. United States Aviation Underwrit-
ers," RLI Insurance Company (RLI) brought a declaratory
judgment action against United States Aviation Under-
writers, Inc. (USAU), as Aviation Manager for the United
States Aviation Insurance Group (USAIG), arising out of
an aviation accident.
15 Id.
16 727 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
,7 Id. at 124-25.
il 739 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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In September, 1989, a small aircraft piloted by John
Haag crashed, killing Haag and his five passengers.
USAIG insured the owner of the aircraft, the owner's em-
ployees, and permissive users of the aircraft. Haag's em-
ployer, Air Sinclair, Inc., was insured by RLI. RLI filed
the declaratory judgment action in order to determine the
priority of coverage with respect to wrongful death claims
resulting from the crash.
The issue of the court's subject matter jurisdiction was
first raised by USAU during a status conference. As a re-
sult, the court requested the parties to submit memoranda
addressing the issue. RLI argued that the court possessed
jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship of the
named parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. RLI claimed that
it was a citizen of Illinois and that USAU was a New York
citizen; therefore, diversity existed.
USAU argued that USAIG, and not USAU, was the real
party in interest because USAU was only the managing
entity for USAIG, an unincorporated association of insur-
ance companies. USAU argued that diversity was lacking
because two of the member companies of USAIG were in-
corporated and had their principal place of business in Il-
linois. In support of its argument, USAU relied upon the
rule that the citizenship of each and every member of an
unincorporated association must be considered for diver-
sity purposes.
Based upon an analysis of the insurance policy issued
by USAIG, the district court determined that USAIG was
the real party in interest and that, therefore, the citizen-
ship of USAIG, not USAU, was controlling. The court
stated:
From the facts on the record, it is obvious that USAIG,
and not USAU, is the entity that actually issued the insur-
ance policy in question. In fact, the plain language of the
policy indicates that, despite the fact that USAU plays a
role in the administration of the policy, the obligation to
pay or perform under the contract rests solely with
USAIG. Therefore, we find that USAIG is a real party in
interest whose citizenship must be considered forjurisdic-
DEVELOPMENTS
tional purposes.' 9
Because the court deemed it necessary to consider the cit-
izenship of USAIG, the court held that diversity of citizen-
ship was lacking and dismissed RLI's claim.20
In Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd. ,2 the Fifth Circuit addressed
the issue of whether a federal district court, in considering
a motion to remand, may disregard a partial assignment
made for the purpose of destroying diversity jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs obtained a default judgment in a Texas
state court against Ciba-Geigy PLC (Ciba-PLC) for per-
sonal injuries they sustained following the release of for-
maldehyde gas from urethane foam insulation,
manufactured by Ciba-PLC, that had been installed in
their home. After plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried to enforce
the judgment against Ciba-PLC, the plaintiffs instituted a
collection action in a Texas state court against Ciba-PLC's
parent corporation, Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., a Swiss corporation.
The plaintiffs alleged that Ciba-Geigy, Ltd. was liable to
plaintiffs because it was the "alter-ego" of Ciba-PLC. On
the same day that plaintiffs commenced the action against
Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., plaintiffs had assigned a 2% interest in
their claim to IRI Internacional Limitada (IRI), a Costa
Rica corporation with its principal place of business in
San Jose, Costa Rica. The plaintiffs alleged that the as-
signment was in consideration for investigative and col-
lection work to be performed by IRI in relation to the
judgment and award.
Ciba-Geigy removed the plaintiff's collection action to
federal court, alleging diversity of citizenship between the
plaintiffs and Ciba-Geigy. The plaintiffs subsequently
filed a motion to remand. Plaintiffs alleged that IRI's in-
terest in the suit destroyed diversity jurisdiction because
complete diversity is lacking where aliens are parties on
both sides of the litigation. The district court denied the
motion to remand, finding that IRI had no legitimate and
19 Id. at 1221.
20 Id.
21 894 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990).
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independent interest in the litigation because the assign-
ment was essentially designed to prevent removal of the
action to federal court.22 The plaintiffs sought an imme-
diate appeal of the district court's denial of the motion to
remand, and the district court granted leave to appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 3
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that longstanding
Supreme Court precedent prohibited inquiry into the mo-
tives behind assignments that defeated diversity jurisdic-
tion. The defendants contended that recent federal
decisions stood for the proposition that inquiry into the
factors motivating partial assignments, as opposed to
complete assignments, was not impermissible, particularly
where the motive was to deprive the federal court of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the action.
The Fifth Circuit, after reviewing recent federal deci-
sions evincing a trend against diversity-destroying de-
vices, held that "federal district courts have both the
authority and the responsibility, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332
and 1441, to examine the motives underlying a partial as-
signment which destroys diversity and to disregard the as-
signment in determining jurisdiction if it be found to have
been made principally to defeat removal."' 24 The court
found that the plaintiffs' assignment was designed princi-
pally to defeat removal because: (1) the interest assigned
was very small; (2) before the assignment, IRI had no in-
terest in the litigation; (3) both the plaintiffs and IRI were
represented by the same attorney, with the plaintiffs con-
trolling the conduct of the litigation; (4) the assignment
occurred shortly before the collection action was filed;
and (5) the assignment to IRI was essentially a contin-
gent-fee arrangement for collection work that could have
been effectuated without an assignment. Consequently,
the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand.25
22 Id. at 182.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 185.
2- Id. at 186.
[57
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C. Venue and Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens gives courts dis-
cretionary power to decline to exercise jurisdiction when
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice would
be better served if the action were tried in another forum.
In Nolan v. Boeing Co. ,26 the district court granted the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens in an action arising out of the crash of a U.K.
aircraft during a United Kingdom domestic flight. 7 This
motion to dismiss was conditioned upon reinstitution of
the action in the United Kingdom by the plaintiffs. No
Americans were on board the aircraft. Plaintiffs, through
personal representatives, brought suit in Louisiana state
court against the airframe manufacturers and engine man-
ufacturers. The plaintiffs did not sue the British airline
that operated and maintained the accident aircraft. As de-
scribed in more detail in Section VI.B below, a third-party
defendant engine manufacturer removed the action to
federal court based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA).
The court applied the forum non conveniens analysis as
set forth in In Re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, Lou-
siana,'2 and also as set forth in Piper Aircraft v. Reyno.2 9 Af-
ter finding that the United Kingdom was an adequate
alternative forum, the court balanced the private and pub-
lic interest factors.3 0
At the outset of its consideration of the private-interest
factors, the court noted that a foreign national's choice of
forum is given less deference than that of a resident or
citizen plaintiff. The court also recognized the similarity
of the Nolan case to Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, but found that
the connection to the plaintiff's chosen forum was more
attenuated in Nolan than in Reyno.
2c No. 89-3657 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 1989) (LEXIS Genfed Dist File).
2 Id. at 17,815.
28 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987).
29 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
3o Id. at 247-61.
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After determining that most of the relevant evidence
was located in the United Kingdom, the court recognized
that it was necessary for the defendants to obtain compul-
sory process over unwilling witnesses and to join potential
third-party defendants. Since the airline had operated
and maintained the accident aircraft were located in the
United Kingdom and many of the witnesses were located
in the United Kingdom, the court found that defendants'
interests would be impaired if the case were to continue in
Louisiana. After considering these and other private in-
terest factors, the court concluded that the case should be
dismissed.
Similiarly, the court reached the same conclusions with
respect to the public interest factors. The court could
find no reason to impose the burden of litigation on the
courts of Louisiana because the action had no connection
to that forum. In addition, the court determined that the
United Kingdom had a great interest in the case because
of the number of contacts the action had with the United
Kingdom. The court also found that the interest of the
United States in deterring the production of defective
products did not outweigh the burdens that would be im-
posed on the United States judiciary and on United States
citizens who would be called for jury duty if the cases were
to proceed in this country. After determining that foreign
law would probably govern the action through the opera-
tion of the Louisiana choice of law rules, the court held
that the public-interest factors also weighed in favor of
dismissal.
To safeguard plaintiffs' interests, the court conditioned
its forum non conveniens dismissal on defendants' waiver
of any objections to service of process in the United King-
dom, of any statute of limitations defense on defendants'
agreement to satisfy any final judgment rendered by the
United Kingdom court, and on defendants' agreement to
make available in the United Kingdom all witnesses and
documents within their control.
The plaintiffs appealed, but the forum non conveniens
DEVELOPMENTS
dismissal was affirmed in all respects by the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit confirmed that federal law of forum non
conveniens, not Louisiana law, was to be applied to this
case even though it had been instituted in Louisiana state
court. This case's genesis in state court also led plaintiffs
to argue that, if the federal forum is inconvenient for this
removed case, then the federal court should not dismiss
this case on the ground of forum non conveniens but, in-
stead, remand the case to state court. Rejecting this argu-
ment, the Fifth Circuit explained that dismissal was
proper because it would be anomalous to remand the case
to a state court forum that would be at least as inconve-
nient as the federal forum.
Louisiana has long been reputed to be one of the states
that narrowly applies the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens. But an appellate court in northern Louisiana
reached a different conclusion in Fox v. Board of Supervi-
sors3 1 . The Fox case arose out of an injury to a St. Olaf
College rugby player during a rugby match at Louisiana
State University (LSU). The rugby player and his parents
instituted suit against LSU, St. Olaf College, and their re-
spective insurance companies.
The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment
in favor of LSU and its insurer. The trial court also dis-
missed the action against St. Olaf's College and its insur-
ers for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Plaintiffs appealed
these decisions.
The Louisiana Court of Appeals for the First Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims
against LSU, its insurer, and St. Olaf's College. The ap-
pellate court also dismissed the claim against St. Olaf's
insurers, but for reasons other than those underlying the
trial court's dismissal. The appellate court found that a
stipulation entered into by one of St. Olaf's insurers pre-
vented a finding that there was no personal jurisdiction
over the insurer. However, the Court of Appeals held
31 559 So. 2d 850 (La. Ct. App. 1990), cert. granted, 565 So. 2d 930 (La. 1990),
aff 'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 90-C-1260 (La. March 11, 1991).
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that the case against that insurer should be dismissed on
the ground of forum non conveniens.
In order to support its position that the doctrine may be
applied by Louisiana state courts, the court listed a
number of Louisiana cases that had previously dismissed
cases on that ground. The court then applied the Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert factors to find that the doctrine of forum
non conveniens mandated dismissal of this case. This
case was appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which
reversed the forum non conveniens issue.
In another important state decision dealing with the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, the Texas Supreme
Court, in Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro,32 held that the
doctrine had been statutorily abolished by the Texas State
legislature in wrongful death and personal injury actions
arising out of an incident in a foreign state or country.
In Alfaro, the named plaintiff and eighty-one other
Costa Rican employees of the Standard Fruit Company
brought suit against Dow Chemical and Shell Oil for inju-
ries incurred as a result of their exposure to a pesticide
manufactured by the defendants and supplied to Standard
Fruit in Costa Rica.
The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
on the ground of forum non conveniens. Plaintiffs ap-
pealed, and the Texas Court of Appeals reversed. The
defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court of Texas af-
firmed. In its decision, the Supreme Court noted that
Section 71.031 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Codes
provides that:
(a) An action for damages for the death or personal in-
jury of a citizen of this state, of the United States, or of a
foreign country may be enforced in the courts of this state,
although the wrongful act, neglect, or default causing the
death or injury takes place in a foreign state or country, if:
(1) a law of the foreign state or country of this state gives
52 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 671 (1991).
DEVELOPMENTS
a right to maintain an action for damages for the death or
injury;
(2) the action is begun in this state within the time pro-
vided by the laws of this state for beginning the action;
and
(3) in the case of a citizen of a foreign country, the coun-
try has equal treaty rights with the United States on behalf
of its citizens.
The court, after examining the legislative history of
§ 71.031 and its predecessors, concluded that the legisla-
ture had statutorily abolished the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in suits brought under section 71.031. The
court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded the case to trial for further proceedings.
The court issued a total of seven opinions, including
four dissents. One dissenting judge expressed his fear
that Texas would now become the courthouse for the
world. The only current limitations on bringing an action
in Texas are supposedly that it must be commenced
within the Texas statute of limitations, the plaintiff's
country of citizenship must grant equal treaty rights to
United States citizens, and the court must have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
In Myers v. Boeing Co. ,34 the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton upheld the forum non conveniens dismissal of the
damages portion of a bifurcated cause of action. The My-
ers case arose out of a Boeing 747 accident in Japan in
which five hundred twenty people died, most of them Jap-
anese nationals. Through personal representatives, plain-
tiffs instituted eight actions against Boeing and Japan
Airlines, in Washington state court. These actions were
later consolidated for pretrial purposes. Boeing moved to
dismiss these consolidated actions on the ground of fo-
rum non conveniens. In its motion papers, Boeing stated
that, if the cases were dismissed and refiled in the dece-
33 Tex. Civ. Pract. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.031 (Vernon 1989).
34 115 Wash. 2d 123, 794 P.2d 1272 (1990).
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dents' own countries, Boeing would agree not to contest
liability.
Based on this motion, the trial court bifurcated the lia-
bility and the damages issues in these cases. The court
ruled that the issue of liability would be resolved in Wash-
ington and that the issue of where the damages portion of
the trial would be held would be reserved pending resolu-
tion of the liability issues. During a pretrial conference,
Boeing made admissions that led to the trial court's sub-
sequent entry of a judgment against Boeing on the issue
of liability. After the judgment was entered, JAL was dis-
missed from the suits on a motion by the plaintiffs. Boe-
ing then renewed its motion to dismiss the suits of the
Japanese nationals on the ground of forum non con-
veniens, which was granted by the trial court, subject to
Boeing's compliance with the "usual" forum non con-
veniens conditions. Plaintiffs appealed from this decision,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the dismis-
sal. However, the analysis used by the Supreme Court of
Washington was notable. First, although Washington
state courts follow the federal forum non conveniens law
laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gulf Oil v. Gil-
bert,3 5 the Myers court expressly declined to follow the sub-
sequent United States Supreme Court decision in Piper
Aircraft v. Reyno." Second, the court expressly rejected
plaintiff's argument that dismissing the cases involving
Japanese nationals constituted a violation of a treaty
granting "most favored nation" status to Japan.
In Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp.,3 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit approved the
forum non conveniens dismissal of an action brought by a
commercial airline pilot for wrongful discharge. The em-
ployment contract on which the pilot's cause of action was
based specified that all disputes would be resolved by the
35 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
s6 454 U.S. 235 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
37 885 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Labor and Settlement of Disputes Committee in Saudi
Arabia and that the laws of Saudi Arabia would apply.
The plaintiff never attempted to sue the defendant in
Saudi Arabia but filed a petition in Texas state court.
Based on its status as a foreign state under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),38 defendant airline re-
moved the action to federal court and then moved to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. In a supplemental
motion, the airline moved for dismissal on the ground of
forum non conveniens. The district court granted the de-
fendant's motions and entered a final judgment dis-
missing Forsythe's case on the alternative grounds of
FSIA immunity and forum non conveniens. Plaintiff ap-
pealed from this decision.
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the case, the
court of appeals noted that, because it could dispose of
the case on the basis of forum non conveniens, it would
not review the district court's determination that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. In its review
of the district court's forum non conveniens analysis, the
court of appeals noted that a forum non conveniens dis-
missal may be reversed only for clear abuse of discretion.
In considering the district court's analysis of the private
interest factors, the court of appeals found that Saudi Ara-
bia was an adequate alternative forum for plaintiff to liti-
gate this claim, noting that the parties had agreed in their
contract to bring all disputes before the Labor and Settle-
ment of Disputes Committee in Saudi Arabia. The court
further stated that, although a court should be deferential
to an American plaintiff's choice of home forum, that fac-
tor cannot be given dispositive weight.
After briefly weighing the Gulf Oil private interest fac-
tors, the court discussed public interest factors and found
that the choice-of-law provision in the contract dictated
that Saudi Arabian law be applied and the case be tried in
so 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
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Saudi Arabia. The court concluded that the contractual
clause provision was not only a choice-of-law provision
but also a choice-of-forum provision. Further, because
Saudi Arabian Airlines is a corporation wholly owned by
the Saudi Arabian government, the court found that pub-
lic interest was served by having the case tried in Saudi
Arabia.
After considering all of these factors, the court found
that the district court was neither unreasonable nor arbi-
trary in dismissing the case on the alternative basis of fo-
rum non conveniens. Nevertheless, the court remanded
the case to district court so that the district court would
condition its judgment on the plaintiff's ability to reinsti-
tute the action in the Saudi Arabian forum.
In Wright v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co. ,39 the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's forum
non conveniens dismissal of an Australian plaintiff's neg-
ligence, product liability, and breach of warranty action
against the manufacturer of a helicopter that crashed in
the Philippines. The helicopter had been manufactured
in California and was owned and operated by Philippine
entities. After the lawsuit was filed and prior to the forum
non conveniens motion, the helicopter manufacturer had
moved its principal place of business.
Rejecting plaintiff's argument that Australia was not an
adequate alternative forum because plaintiff's wife could
not recover for loss of consortium under Australian law,
the appellate court nevertheless found that the trial court
had underestimated California's interest in having the liti-
gation proceed in that forum. In this connection, the
court stated that California has a great interest in regulat-
ing defective products manufactured in the state even if
the defendant no longer had its principal place of busi-
ness there. The court concluded that the trial court had
not balanced the interests properly and that reversal was
appropriate.
39 No. B045105 (Cal. Ct. App. May 9, 1990) (LEXIS, All States library, Cal.
file) No. 3078 (Cal. July 18, 1990)(LEXIS, All States library, Cal. file).
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In Grunke v. Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp. ,40 the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals affirmed the forum non con-
veniens dismissal of an action instituted by Singaporean,
Australian, and British plaintiffs against the Indonesian
owner of an aircraft and other defendants. The cause of
action arose out of an air crash that occurred in Indonesia
after the aircraft had taken off from Singapore.
In considering private interest factors, the Court found
that the California courts could not exercise jurisdiction
over the Indonesian owner of the aircraft or the Indone-
sian air traffic controllers. In addition, the Court affirmed
dismissal despite the fact that some defendants main-
tained corporate offices in California.
In Gazis v. John S. Latsis (USA) Inc. ,4 a Greek citizen died
from injuries sustained in the course of his employment
on board a Greek flag vessel. The vessel was owned by a
Panamanian corporation and was operated jointly by the
Panamanian corporation and a United States corporation.
The ship was managed by a Greek corporation, John Lat-
sis Inc. Because John Latsis owned both the Panamanian
corporation and the United States corporation, plaintiff
contended that Mr. Latsis was the "beneficial owner" of
the vessel.
Plaintiff instituted suit in New York federal district
court against the Panamanian corporation, the United
States corporation, and John Latsis Inc. based on the
Jones Act 42 and general maritime law. Defendants moved
to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens, alleg-
ing that Greece would be a more convenient forum, and
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Further, defendants re-
quested a stay of the action pending the outcome of a de-
claratory proceeding commenced by the Greek
corporation in Greece.
4o No. A045269 (Cal. Ct. App. May 8, 1990) (LEXIS, All States library, Cal.
file), review denied, No. 5016091 (CaI.July 18, 1990) (LEXIS, All states library, Cal.
file).
4 729 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
42 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
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In reaching its decision to deny the defendants' forum
non conveniens motion, the court made several important
determinations. Rejecting plaintiff's contention that dis-
missal would be improper because Greece would not ap-
ply the Jones Act, the court stated that courts in the
Second Circuit no longer had to make a choice-of-law de-
termination before dismissing a case on the grounds of
forum non conveniens. In this connection, the court also
noted that under Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno 43 the mere fact
that the alternative forum would apply a substantive law
less favorable to the plaintiff should not be given substan-
tial weight.
The court used this rule to justify its finding that
although the Jones Act contains a specific venue provi-
sion, cases brought under the Act may be dismissed on
the ground of forum non conveniens. The court sup-
ported its finding by citing the Second Circuit's declara-
tion that Congress did not intend to override the common
law doctrine of forum non conveniens when it enacted
statutes with specific venue provisions. Thus, the court
held that it did have the authority to dismiss the case on
forum non conveniens grounds.44 Nevertheless, the court
denied defendants' motion to dismiss the case, holding
that further discovery was required before it could deter-
mine whether the public interest factors outlined in Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert overcame the strong presumption in
favor of plaintiff's choice of forum.45
In Ginsberg v. Robinson Helicopter Co., 46 the Appellate Di-
vision of the Supreme Court of New York reversed the
trial court's denial of defendant-appellants' motion to
change venue. The case arose out of the crash of a heli-
copter in which the pilot and sole occupant of the aircraft
was killed. Plaintiff brought suit in New York County.
The defendants invoked CPLR 509, 510(3), and 511 to
43 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
44 729 F. Supp. at 988.
45 Id. at 988-90.
46 160 A.D.2d 237, 553 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
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change venue from New York to Dutchess County, where
the accident occurred, where the witnesses resided or
were employed, and where the NTSB investigation took
place. The only contacts that the litigation had with New
York County was that the decedent resided there, his will
was probated there, and one of his estate's executors lived
there.
Reversing the lower court's decision, the Appellate Di-
vision employed the rule that transitory actions should be
brought where the cause of action arose. The court noted
that defendant had met the change of venue requirements
of providing names and addresses of particular witnesses
and the nature of their testimony, and the court ruled that
a change of venue should have been granted.
D. Choice of Law Cases
In Ferens v. John Deere Co. ,47 a Pennsylvania farmer and
his wife instituted a diversity action for personal injuries
in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania. Because the Pennsylvania tort stat-
ute of limitations had already run, the plaintiffs' sole claim
was for breach of warranty. The farmer and his wife later
filed a second diversity suit raising tort claims against the
manufacturer in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi. The six-year statute of
limitations for tort claims under Mississippi law, which
governed the case under Mississippi choice-of-law rules,
had not run.
Under the assumption that the Mississippi statute of
limitations would still apply, the plaintiffs moved to trans-
fer the action to the Western District of Pennsylvania via
28 U.S.C. 1404(a). The motion was granted, and the
transferred suit was consolidated with the Feren's war-
ranty action pending in the transferor forum. The manu-
facturer then moved for summary judgment. Invoking the
two-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations, the District
47 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
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Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, ruling that a
transferor court's choice-of-law rules do not apply after a
§ 1404(a) transfer motion by a plaintiff.
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, holding that a
District Court to which an action has been transferred
pursuant to § 1404(a) must apply the law of the transferor
court, including the choice-of-law rules of the transferor
court, regardless of which party moved to transfer. The
Court held that the utilization of § 1404(a) transfers
should not deprive parties of state law advantages. More-
over, the Court noted that anti-forum-shopping policies,
convenience, and judicial economy favored the applica-
tion of the transferor law, regardless of which party initi-
ated the transfer.
The case of In Re Air Crash Disaster At Sioux City, Iowa on
July 19, 1989,48 arose from the crash of a DC-10 carrying
296 people in Sioux City, Iowa. The passengers on board
the DC-10 were from thirty states and two foreign coun-
tries. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation or-
dered that eighteen federal court actions pending in ten
states be transferred for pretrial purposes to the United
States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois.
In at least twelve cases originating in eight different states,
plaintiffs' asserted claims for punitive damages.
The defendants, the airline, airframe manufacturer, and
engine manufacturer, under Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6)
moved for dismissal of all punitive damages claims or, in
the alternative, for determination of the state law gov-
erning punitive damages in each of the eighteen actions
before the court. After denying defendants' 12(b)(6) mo-
tion, the court engaged in the choice-of-law analysis.
At the outset of its analysis, the court recognized that
when a case is transferred, the transferee court must apply
the choice-of-law rules of the state where the transferor
48 734 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. Il1. 1990).
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sits. 49 Further, the court enunciated the rule in the Sev-
enth Circuit that depecage applies for choice of law issues
in consolidated multidistrict litigation. The court then ad-
dressed plaintiffs' argument that the choice of law issue
was raised prematurely. After noting that the plaintiffs
had not complied with the court's order regarding brief-
ing of the choice-of-law issue and had not responded to
defendant's arguments on this point, the court rejected
plaintiff's contention, stating that the resolution of the is-
sue would promote settlement.50
After addressing these preliminary issues, the court ap-
plied the choice-of-law analysis of eight states with respect
to each defendant to determine the law governing the pu-
nitive damages claims against each defendant. For the
three California claims, the court used the "comparative
impairment analysis", under which the law to be applied
where a true conflict exists is the law of the state whose
interests would be more impaired were its law not ap-
plied. After applying this rule separately to the three de-
fendants, the court concluded that the law of the airline's
principal place of business governed the punitive damage
claims against it. 5' For the airframe and engine manufac-
turers, the law of the states where the defendants
designed and manufactured their respective products
governed.52
For cases originating in Colorado, Iowa, New York,
Georgia, and Illinois, the court applied the "most-signifi-
cant-relationship test" as set forth in § 145 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws. After applying this
rule to each defendant, the court reached the same result
as determined by California's choice-of-law rule: the law
of the home state of the defendant would govern plaintiffs
punitive damages claims.
The court then reviewed the choice-of-law rules used by
49 Id. at 1492 (citing Van Dusen v. Banack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)).
- Id. at 1429-30.
-' Id. at 1433.
I5 d. at 1434.
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the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania, which consist
of a combination of governmental-interest analysis and
the most-significant-relationship test. The court reasoned
that because both tests led to the same result in its previ-
ous analysis, there was no need to engage in an additional
analysis. Thus, the court reached the same conclusion us-
ing three different choice-of-law analyses. After summa-
rizing its holding, the court stated that the plaintiffs may
move to take expedited discovery as to any specifically
identified disputed fact material to the choice of law
analysis.
The case of In Re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Interna-
tional Airport, Denver, Colorado, on November 15, 1987,5"
arose from the crash of a passenger aircraft en route from
Denver, Colorado, to Boise, Idaho, during a snowstorm.
Plaintiffs from Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Jersey, and
Washington instituted personal injury and wrongful death
actions against the airline, whose principal place of busi-
ness was located in Texas. Plaintiffs brought suits in fed-
eral courts in Idaho, Colorado, and New Jersey. These
suits were later consolidated for pretrial proceedings in
Colorado by order of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel.
The parties petitioned the court to determine the state
whose law would apply to the issue of punitive damages.
In its choice of law analysis, the court recognized that
the choice-of-law rules of the various jurisdictions in
which the transferred actions were originally filed must
apply. Thus, the court compared New Jersey's "govern-
mental interest analysis" choice-of-law rule to the "most-
significant-relationship" test employed by Colorado and
Idaho. The Court stated that "because the latter test is a
more formalized approach to the interests considered in
the former", it would consolidate its analysis to identify
the state with the most significant relationship to the par-
ties and the occurrence. 54  The court also compared the
laws of Idaho, Colorado, and Texas. After finding that an




irreconcilable conflict existed among the punitive damage
laws of Idaho, Texas, and Colorado, the Court considered
the contacts associated with each jurisdiction. It consid-
ered the place of injury, the domicile and principal place
of business of the parties, and the center of the parties'
relationships. Notably, the court found that in air-crash
cases, the plaintiff's domicile and the center of the par-
ties' relationship are of little significance with respect to
the issue of punitive damages. Thus, the law of Idaho was
found not to apply to that issue. The court found that
Texas, the defendant's principal place of business, had
the most significant relationship to the parties and the oc-
currence because the place of injury in an air crash is
more fortuitous than the place of misconduct or the prin-
cipal place of business. 55 At the end of its decision, the
court urged Congress to enact a uniform federal statute
for air-crash and mass-disaster litigation in order to avoid
complex choice-of-law issues.
In In Re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metropolitan Airport on
August 16, 1987,56 the Eastern District of Michigan held
that an exculpatory clause in an agreement covering sale
of an aircraft would be construed according to the law of
the jurisdiction named in the agreement's choice-of-law
provision. The case arose out of the crash of an MD-80
shortly after take-off. The defendant airline cross-claimed
against the aircraft manufacturer for negligence, violation
of law, negligent misrepresentation, gross negligence,
breach of warranty, and strict liability. The manufacturer
moved for partial summary judgment on the basis of an
exculpatory clause within the agreement for the sale of
the aircraft, which provided that the agreement was to be
construed and performed according to the laws of the
State of California.
The court applied Michigan law which requires the en-
forcement of choice-of-law provisions where (1) there is a
reasonable relationship between the chosen state and the
- Id. at 1454-55.
56 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,063 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
1991]
30 JOURNAL OF AIR L W AND COMMERCE
transaction, and (2) enforcement of the choice-of-law pro-
vision would not offend public-policy considerations.
Finding both requirements of the test satisfied, the court
applied the law of California to construe the exculpatory
clause and held that only claims of gross negligence as-
serted by the airline against the manufacturer could sur-
vive. The court therefore granted the manufacturer's
motion for partial summary judgment against the airline,
noting that this could not impair the passenger-claimants'
rights to proceed against either defendant.5 7
With respect to personal injury claims arising from the
same accident, the court was faced with a complex choice
of law question.5 One hundred fifty-seven cases that
were originally filed in federal court in Michigan, Arizona,
California, or Florida were consolidated for trial in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. In general, these actions involved wrongful
death claims seeking compensatory and punitive damages
from the airframe manufacturer and the airline. The par-
ties claimed that choice-of-law issues existed with respect
to three issues: (1) the manufacturer's potential liability
for alleged design defects; (2) liability for punitive or ex-
emplary damages; and (3) plaintiff's individual claims for
compensatory damages.
After recognizing that a transferee court must apply the
law of the transferor forum, the court outlined the choice
of law rules for Michigan, Arizona, California, and Flor-
ida. In Michigan, where courts have refused to adopt an
established choice of law methodology, the test employed
questions whether there exists a "rational reason" to dis-
place the law of the forum in favor of that of another state.
California courts use the "comparative impairment test",
and Arizona and Florida use the most significant relation-
ship test as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flicts of Laws § 175 (1971). The court then applied these
-7 Id. at 18,070.
58 750 F. Supp. at 793.
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rules separately to the first two of the three issues listed
above.
The court concluded that the design-defect claims filed
against the manufacturer in Michigan would be governed
by California law because that was the state where the al-
leged misconduct took place.5" For similar reasons, the
court found that the "most significant relationship" test
adopted by Arizona and Florida compelled the same re-
sult, as did the "comparative impairment" approach of
California.60 Thus, California law governed all claims of
design defect and compensation damages.
With regard to the punitive claims asserted by plaintiffs
against the airline, the court recognized that Michigan,
the place of injury, and Minnesota, the airline's principal
place of business and place of alleged misconduct, were
the two states with contacts to these claims. After finding
a true conflict between the punitive-damage laws of these
two jurisdictions, the court found no rational reason not
to apply Michigan's law to those punitive-damage claims
that originated in Michigan. It reached the same result
for those punitive-damage claims originally brought in
Michigan against the manufacturer. The court reasoned
that the relevant jurisdictions' interests were equal, and,
therefore, the law of the place of injury should govern.
With regard to the punitive-damage claims filed in Ari-
zona and Florida, the court held that its Michigan choice-
of-law analysis in this case considered interests identical
to those that would be considered under the Restatement
approach. Thus, the court concluded that Michigan law
governed these claims with respect to both defendants.
For the California punitive damage claims, the court
found that the claims against the airline would also be
governed by Michigan law. Michigan's corporate-protec-
tion policy, which prohibits punitive damages against cor-
porations, would be more impaired if Michigan law did
not apply than Minnesota's interest in deterring negligent
5 Id. at 802.
- Id. at 803-804.
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behavior would be impaired if Minnesota law did not ap-
ply. The court found that the California punitive-damage
claims asserted against the manufacturer would be gov-
erned by California law because that state was the site of
the alleged misconduct. Because neither the law of Cali-
fornia nor the law of Michigan allowed punitive damage
claims in wrongful death cases, the court granted the de-
fendants' motion for partial summary judgment dis-
missing all punitive and exemplary damage claims. Since
the plaintiffs did not adequately brief the choice-of-law is-
sues concerning compensatory damages issues, the court
postponed the decision on this issue.
The only survivor of the air crash at Detroit Metropoli-
tan Airport was Cecelia Cichan, a four year old girl. In
Cichan v. Northwest Airlines,6' the court permitted plaintiff
Cichan to file separate papers regarding the choice-of-law
issues with respect to punitive damages and to the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss her punitive damage claims.
The court reasoned that because the Plaintiffs' Steering
Committee's (PSC) papers on these issues had focused
exclusively on the wrongful death claims, Cichan's legal
interests associated with her personal injury action were
not satisfactorily represented by the PSC.
The court first determined that the Michigan choice-of-
law rule would apply to the Cichan action because the
case was originally filed in the Eastern District of Michi-
gan. With regard to plaintiffs' punitive-damage claims
against the defendant airline, the court found that
Cichan's status as a personal-injury plaintiff resulted in a
choice-of-law analysis identical to that for the other par-
ties' wrongful-death claims. Thus, the court granted the
airline's partial summary judgment motion, holding that
Michigan law applied to prevent the survival of punitive-
damage claims against the defendant airline.62
With respect to the punitive-damage claims asserted
against the airframe manufacturer, the court's conclusions
61 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,010 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
62 Id.
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for the personal-injury claim differed from those for the
wrongful-death claims. Although the court found that the
law of California applied to both claims, that state's law
permitted personal injury claimants to assert punitive
damage claims. Thus, the court denied the manufac-
turer's motion for partial summary judgment.
Because the parties conceded that Michigan law gov-
erned Cichan's claim for exemplary damages, the court
easily disposed of these claims against the airline and the
manufacturer. The court found that the plaintiff's exem-
plary damage claim and' plaintiff's claim for compensatory
damages as a result of injury to her feelings to be redun-
dant and that the former claim could not be presented to
the jury under Michigan law. In conclusion, the court
granted plaintiff's motion to sever her claim for punitive
damages from the remaining issues at the joint liability
trial.
Burgio v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc. 63 arose out of an air-
plane accident at Barksdale Air Base in Louisiana that
killed plaintiff's decedent. Plaintiff initiated a wrongful-
death action in New York state court against the aircraft
manufacturer, and defendant removed the case to federal
court. Defendant conceded liability, leaving only the is-
sue of damages to be determined. Defendants moved the
court to determine which state's law should apply to this
issue.
The parties agreed that the wrongful death action was
controlled by the Federal Reservations Act of February 1,
1928,6 because the accident occurred on a federal mili-
tary base. In wrongful death actions this Act requires ap-
plication of the law of the state in which a federal enclave
is located or to which a federal enclave is adjacent. In this
case, the Act required that the law of the State of Louisi-
ana apply.
The court then considered whether to apply the whole
- 747 F. Supp. 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
- 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1988).
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law of Louisiana, including that state's choice-of-law rule,
or only the "internal" law of that state. Recognizing that
the purpose of the Federal Reservations Act was to put
tort victims injured on federal land on an equal footing
with those injured outside the boundaries of the federal
enclave, the court reasoned that this purpose would be
best served by applying the whole law of the adjacent state
to actions falling within the Act. It also found its interpre-
tation closely analogous to interpretations of the Federal
Tort Claims Act.65
The court then turned to the Louisiana choice-of-law
rule. After comparing the law of New York with that of
Louisiana, the court found that "true conflicts" existed
with respect to a number of issues. The next step in the
court's analysis was the application of Louisiana's "most
significant contacts" test to the facts of the case. The
court resolved the issue of the plaintiff's domicile by find-
ing that plaintiff had resided in Louisiana only because
her spouse was directed to do so by the U.S. government;
hence, she was domiciled in New York. The plaintiff's re-
turn to New York after the decedent's death supported
this result. Continuing its choice-of-law analysis, the
court further held that Louisiana had little interest in the
case because its only connection thereto was the fact that
the accident occurred there. Thus, the court concluded
that New York law should apply to plaintiff's damages
claims.
The case of Western Helicopter Services, Inc., v. Rogerson
Aircraft Corp.66 was instituted in Oregon federal district
court. The case arose from a helicopter crash resulting in
the death of the pilot. Plaintiff Western Helicopter Serv-
ices, the pilot's employer, along with decedent's estate, in-
stituted a product liability action against the sellers,
manufacturers and various component manufacturers, in-
stallers, and maintenance companies. Plaintiff Western
Helicopter Services sought damages for the loss of the he-
65 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988); Burgio, 747 F. Supp. at 869.
728 F. Supp. 1506 (D. Or. 1990).
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licopter, while the decedent's estate sought damages aris-
ing from the wrongful death of the pilot.
Five defendants moved for summary judgment against
plaintiff's claims. Two defendants contended that the law
of Oregon applied to the successor liability issue and
would relieve them of liability because they bought only
the assets of the corporation that allegedly manufactured
the defective helicopter. Plaintiffs contended that either
the law of California or the law of Washington applied
and that defendants were liable through operation of the
"product-line exception" to the successor liability doc-
trine. In the alternative, plaintiffs argued that the court
should find that the Oregon courts would adopt the prod-
uct-line exception.
After recognizing that a federal court sitting in diversity
must apply the choice-of-law rule of the forum state, the
court enunciated Oregon's choice-of-law approach for
tort actions. First, an Oregon court will determine
whether a true conflict of law exists. If so, it will apply the
law of the jurisdiction with the most significant relation-
ship to the action, as determined through utilization of
the analysis set forth in the Restatement (Second) Conflict
of Laws (1971).
After finding that Oregon's successor-liability law con-
flicted with that of California and Washington, the court
compared the contacts of Oregon (place of injury, resi-
dence of the decedent and decedent's representative, and
place of ownership and maintenance of the helicopter)
with those of California (place of helicopter manufacture)
and Washington (place of incorporation of the moving
defendants). The court found that in wrongful death
cases the most significant contact belonged to the place of
injury, especially where the decedent had a settled rela-
tionship to that state.68 Buttressing this conclusion was
67 Id. at 1510.
Id. at 1510. See also Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973)
(holding that where once states interests are vitally involved, and the interests of
the other state are minimal, then the law of the first state should apply).
1991]
36 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE .[57
the court's finding that the place of injury was not fortui-
tous in this case because the helicopter was owned and
operated by a resident of the State of Oregon. Consistent
with its choice-of-law determination, the court granted
the two defendants' motions for summary judgment be-
cause they were not liable under Oregon's successor lia-
bility law.69
E. Discovery
A district court in Colorado refused to grant a prelimi-
nary or permanent injunction that would direct the FAA
to permit inspection and copying of documents in the
possession of the FAA in Van Aire Skyport Corp. v. FAA.70
The plaintiff, a not-for-profit entity organized for the pur-
pose of promoting air flight, presumably into and out of
Van Aire Airport, was concerned about the impact that a
planned airport in Denver would have on the Van Aire
Airport. Plaintiff had requested documents from the FAA
under the Freedom of Information Act. The FAA com-
plied, but in the process it withheld approximately 214
documents. The documents in question were submitted
to the district court for review. After reviewing the docu-
ments in camera the court refused plaintiff's request to
see the documents because the documents were "deliber-
ative process" and "predecisional" types of information
which Congress did not intend to require federal agencies
to release to the public under the Freedom of Information
Act. 7'
In National Transportation Safety Board v. Hollywood Memo-
rial Hospital,72 the district court held that the NTSB was
not entitled to production of documents concerning the
psychiatric examination of a pilot involved in an airplane
crash. The case grew out of the strange circumstances
surrounding the crash of an airplane piloted by Thomas
69 Id.
10 733 F. Supp. 316 (D. Colo. 1990).
71 Id. at 318.
72 735 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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L. Root, who supposedly lapsed into unconsciousness
while piloting his airplane. The airplane, which had been
left on auto-pilot, crashed into the Atlantic after it ran out
of fuel. The crash created nationwide interest, and film of
the crash and Root's ultimate rescue received widespread
attention.
In furtherance of its investigation of the accident, the
NTSB subpoenaed all of the pilot's medical records from
the defendant. All of the records were produced except
those regarding the pilot's psychiatric treatment. The
NTSB brought suit to enforce the administrative sub-
poena, and the pilot intervened in the action. The NTSB
moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the pilot inter-
venor moved to quash the subpoena.73
In reaching its decision to deny the NTSB's motion for
judgment on the pleadings and to grant the pilot's motion
to quash subpoena, the court recognized that no psychia-
trist-patient privilege exists in federal court for criminal
cases where the patient relies on his condition as an ele-
ment of his claim or defense. 4 The court determined
that in civil cases, however, courts have recognized the
importance of the psychiatrist-patient privilege.
Because the communications that the pilot sought to
protect were not made in connection with a criminal case
filed against the pilot, the court applied the following
four-part test to determine whether the communications
were privileged:
(1) the communication must be one made in the belief
that it will not be disclosed;
(2) confidentiality must be essential to the maintenance
of the relationship between the parties;
(3) the relationship should be one that society considers
worthy of being fostered; and
(4) the injury to the relationship incurred by disclosure
must be greater than the benefit gained in the correct dis-
73 Id.
74 Id. at 423.
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posal of litigation.75
The court found that the first three conditions were
clearly met. In balancing the state and public interests as
required by the fourth prong of the test, the court held
that the specific injury to the psychiatrist-patient relation-
ship that would follow disclosure in cases of this type is
greater than the state's interest in determining the prob-
able cause of the accident.76
In Booker v. Helicopter Services ofJacksonville, Inc. ,77 a met-
allurgist employed by the NTSB was deposed in connec-
tion with two actions arising out of a helicopter crash.
The NTSB was not a party to either action. NTSB coun-
sel instructed the deponent not to respond to several
questions because they required him to give an opinion
regarding the cause of the accident which, in his view, was
prohibited by 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) and 49 C.F.R.
§ 835.3(b). Plaintiffs moved to reconvene the deposition
and to compel the deponent to respond to those ques-
tions left unanswered.
Following Kline v. Martin,78 the court concluded that
NTSB investigators are allowed to give testimony regard-
ing their opinions as long as the opinion does not encom-
pass the ultimate conclusion as to the cause of the
accident.79 Using this analysis, the court ordered the wit-
ness to answer six questions that dealt with facts of the
accident that were determined by the NTSB.
The court denied plaintiff's request to compel answers
to a series of questions that would be used to authenticate
the witness' Analysis Report that contained NTSB opin-
ion sections, holding that an Analysis Report need not be
produced, identified, or authenticated. 80  Thus, even
though the questions asked would not require improper
75 Id. at 424.
76 Id. at 425.
77 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,713 (D.D.C. 1989).
78 345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1972).
79 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,715.
mo Id. at 17,715-16.
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opinion testimony, answers to those questions were not
compelled by the court.
In Thomas Brooks Chartered v. Burnett,8 ' the Tenth Circuit
reversed a federal district court decision from Colorado.
The district court had held that the NTSB could not invite
the manufacturers of a plane and its component parts to
participate in an NTSB investigation without also allowing
a representative of the individual killed in the crash to
participate as an observer.
The case arose after the death of Thomas W. Brooks on
August 2, 1988. A Beech Musketeer airplane he piloted
crashed on takeoff from a farm near Cimarron, New Mex-
ico. After the crash, the NTSB initiated its examination of
the wreckage and named parties to participate in the in-
vestigation. The parties named included the aircraft man-
ufacturer and the engine manufacturer, but did not
include the decedent's corporation, the owner of the air-
craft. The NTSB decided not to include the decedent's
corporation after determining that Mr. Brook's records
sufficed for purposes of the NTSB study.
Thereafter, an attorney for the decedent's family made
a request to either be named a party or be granted ob-
server status at the NTSB proceedings. After the NTSB
refused this request the plaintiff sought, and was subse-
quently granted, a permanent injunction forbidding any
disassembly, dismantling, or destructive inspection of the
plane unless a representative of the plaintiff was present.
The NTSB appealed this order.
On appeal, the NTSB argued that the decision as to
who may attend an investigation is a matter entirely at the
discretion of the agency and is, therefore, unreviewable in
a district court. Furthermore, the NTSB contended that
its decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was
not an abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals first held that the NTSB decision
barring the plaintiff from the accident investigation is ju-
8, 920 F.2d 634 (lOth Cir. 1990).
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dicially cognizable and subject to judicial review by the
district court.82 In so holding, the court noted that, when
an agency acts to enforce its regulations, that action pro-
vides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency
must have exercised its power in some manner. Under
the Supreme Court's holding in Heckler v. Chaney,83 such
an action can be reviewed to determine whether the
agency exceeded its statutory powers.
The Burnett court held that the NTSB's decision to ex-
clude the plaintiffs' representative was neither arbitrary
nor capricious.84 In response to plaintiffs' assertions that
having the manufacturer present without the plaintiff
compromises the integrity of the NTSB factual report and
that the manufacturer actually runs these investigations,
the Court noted that NTSB reports are freely available; an
NTSB probable cause determination is forbidden from
being introduced as evidence in a related tort case, and
after the NTSB investigation the aircraft and its compo-
nent parts are returned to the owner so he may com-
mence an independent investigation.8 5
In In Re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metropolitan Airport on
August 16, 1987,86 during the discovery phase of an action
arising from the crash of a passenger jet, defendant airline
filed a motion to compel defendant airframe manufac-
turer to produce a nine-track computer tape of the Digital
Flight Guidance Computer Flight Director Simulation
runs. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan had previously granted the airline's request for
the manufacturer to produce documents relating to the
simulation runs that the manufacturer had conducted, and
the manufacturer complied with the court order by pro-
ducing the simulator material in hard copy printout form.
Finding it overly burdensome to enter these printed pro-
82 Id. at 641- 43.
as 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
84 Burnett, 920 F.2d at 643-47.
85 Id.
s 130 F.R.D. 634 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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grams and data in its computer system, the airline re-
quested the data and programs in tape format. In
opposition to the motion, the manufacturer argued that it
did not possess such a tape and that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require parties to create requested
material but only to produce existing materials.
Granting the airline's motion, the district court adopted
the rationale in National Union Electric Corporation v. Mat-
suhita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. ,87 which held that, while a
printout of information might be "reasonably usable"
within the meaning of Rule 34, the production of a party's
data in a form that is directly readable by the adverse
party's computers is the preferred alternative. The court
found that it would be more economically efficient for the
manufacturer to convert the information to tape form.
Because the computer tape did not exist, however, de-
fendant airline was required to pay all reasonable and
necessary costs associated with the manufacture of the
tape.
F. Evidence
In Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 8 a
collision between a tanker and a pier in San Juan Harbor,
Puerto Rico, resulted in the Ports Authority and the Pu-
erto Rico Electric Authority suing the vessel in rem for
damages to the pier. The owner of the tanker, in turn,
sued the tugs for damages to the tanker's bow occurring
during the crash. The court admitted an accident report
prepared by the United States Coast Guard into evidence.
The report drew three conclusions for the cause of the
accident: (1) improper speed used by the pilot; (2) failure
of the master of the tanker to take command of the vessel
from the pilot; and (3) the action of the tug in dropping
its lines.8 9
On appeal, the court held that, under Beech Aircraft Corp.
87 494 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
:8 897 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
89 Id. at 8.
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v. Rainey,90 the report was admissible because the Court of
Appeals had "no serious question as to the trustworthi-
ness of the report." 9'
Even if the report was inadmissible, the First Circuit
ruled that its admission was harmless error because the
District Court's opinion specifically held that the pilot was
negligent based on the trial evidence, not merely on the
report.9 2 The First Circuit accepted the District Court's
assertion, especially since the District Court's conclusions
regarding negligence differed from the Coast Guard re-
port except with regards to the pilot.
In re Aircrash Disaster at Stapleton International Airport, Den-
ver, Colorado, on November 15, 1987,93 involved the crash of
Continental Airlines Flight 1713 during a heavy snow-
storm. The DC-9 airplane overturned and crashed as it
lifted off the runway. The passenger compartment broke
into several pieces and a fireball moved through the cabin
from front to back. The accident killed 28 people, most of
whom were in the forward portion of the cabin, and in-
jured 54 others. Among the dead were the pilot, the co-
pilot, and a flight attendant. 94
The court addressed the question of the extent of the
admissability into evidence of the NTSB report, which in-
cluded conclusions on the probable cause of the disaster
and recommendations for preventing such accidents in
the future. The final report also included data collected
by investigators in public hearings on the crash, as well as
information contained in reports of investigative teams
established by the NTSB to look into specific areas that
might have caused the crash.
The court noted the statutory limitation on the admissi-
bility of NTSB reports as follows: "[n]o part of any report
or reports of the Board relating to any accident or the in-
488 U.S. 153 (1988).
9, Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 897 F.2d at 8.
92 Id.
720 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Colo. 1989).
Id. at 1495.
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vestigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used
in any suit or action for damages growing out of any mat-
ter mentioned in such report or reports."95'
The issue in In re Aircrash Disaster at Stapleton was
whether the Court would apply, as urged by defendant,
the complete bar to the admission of such government in-
vestigation reports as established by the Ninth Circuit in
Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. North Pacific Grain Growers,
Inc.96 and Huber v. United States.97 The Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed with the Ninth Circuit, holding that only the legal
conclusions in NTSB reports are inadmissible. The court
relied on Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison,98 Mullan v. Quickie
Aircraft Corp. ,99 and Murphy v. Colorado Aviation, Inc. 100
The issue of admissibility was not necessarily to be de-
termined by Tenth Circuit precedent, because In re Air-
crash at Stapleton was a multi-district litigation including
cases filed in the District of Idaho. Idaho, in the Ninth
Circuit, would have followed Protectus and completely pre-
cluded admission of the NTSB report.' 0' The Colorado
District Court decided that where the federal law of the
transferee forum conflicts with the law of the transferor
forum in a multi-district litigation, the transferee court is
"required to give careful consideration to the law of the
transferor forum, but is bound by the informed and rea-
soned opinions setting forth the law of its own Circuit."'10 2
The Court accordingly held that the Tenth Circuit rule
controlled the admissibility of the NTSB report and that
the legislative history of the statute showed it was
95 Id. at 1496 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 144 1(e) (1991)).
- 767 F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir. 1985).
97 838 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying Protectus to reports issued by the
United States Coast Guard).
569 F.2d 547, 549-51 (10th Cir. 1978).
797 F.2d 845, 848 (10th Cir. 1986).
,00 41 Colo. App. 237, 588 P.2d 877, 881-82 (1978) (state law applies rule in
Keen).
lo, 720 F. Supp. at 1496.
102 720 F. Supp. at 1496 (citing In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171,
1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. 490 U.S. 122 (1989), and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1404-1407 (1988)).
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designed to prevent usurpation of the role of the jury by
evidentiary use of the NTSB's conclusions on causa-
tion. 0 3 This holding did not result in a total prohibition
of all of the NTSB report. Instead, the Court decided to
distinguish between admissible facts and inadmissible fac-
tual inferences drawn by the Board or its staff.10 4
The Court then considered the public-records exemp-
tion to the hearsay rule contained in Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 803(8)(C) in light of Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey. 0 5
The issue was whether the NTSB Human Factors Report
annexed to the final NTSB report as an appendix was
"based principally on hearsay and so replete with inad-
missible conclusions that the entire report should be ex-
cluded under the hearsay rules outlined in Rainey."' 0 6
The Court used a four-factor test to determine whether
the Human Factors Report met the trustworthiness stan-
dard of Rainey:
(1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the special skill
or experience of the investigator; (3) whether a hearing
was held and the level at which it was conducted; and (4)
any possible motivation or bias in the preparation of the
Report. ' 0 7
The Court ruled that the Human Factors Report satis-
fied the trustworthiness rules of Rainey and was admissi-
ble, provided that, at trial, double-hearsay statements,
triple-hearsay quotations of statements, and procedural
and regulatory recommendations of the Board related to
the probable cause were deleted.'0°
In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia,'0 9 Pan American World
Airways appealed a jury verdict in a litigation stemming
from the crash of Pan Am Flight 812 in Bali on April 22,
1974, in which all passengers and crew were killed. Pan
,o, 720 F. Supp. at 1496.
- Id. at 1497.
os 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
720 F. Supp. at 1497.
107 Id. at 1498 (citations omitted).
o Id. at 1499.
1- 871 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Am contended that the admission of an FAA Report and a
Pan Am Report into evidence constituted reversible error.
The court applied the abuse of discretion standard, under
which reversal would be granted only if "the error af-
fected the substantial rights of the parties."" 0 The FAA
Report was deemed admissible under Fed. R. Evid.
803(8)(C), the public document exception to the hearsay
exclusion. ' I
Pan Am also argued that admission of a Pan Am Report
on safety was reversible error under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801(d) (2) (D) governing non-hearsay statements
such as admissions of a party opponent. Admissions are
defined as: "a statement by [the party's] agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or em-
ployment, made during the existence of the relation-
ship." ' 12 The court admitted the Pan Am report because
the authors were all Pan Am employees reporting on mat-
ters within the scope of their employment. The court also
concluded that Pan Am had not satisfied its burden of
demonstrating that the report was unduly prejudicial."i 3
As a third ground, Pan Am argued that the FAA and
Pan Am Reports were inadmissible under Federal Rules
of Evidence 407, which bars evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures to prove culpable conduct. The Pan Am
report, which was dated one day after the crash, was not
in response to the crash and therefore did not relate to
subsequent remedial measures. The FAA Report,
although a closer call, was deemed not to involve subse-
quent remedial measures because it was prepared by the
FAA without Pan Am's voluntary cooperation." 14
Jet Air, Inc. v. Epps Air Serv., Inc., 115 involved an action by
a lessor against a lessee for crash damage to a leased air-
craft. After a jury verdict for the lessee, the lessor ap-
,,o Id. at 816 (citation omitted).
It, Id.
112 FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D).
" 871 F.2d at 816.
114 Id.
" 194 Ga. App. 829, 392 S.E.2d 245 (1990).
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pealed. Plaintiff lessor argued in part that the trial court
committed reversible error by refusing to admit a portion
of an NTSB Report containing the entry "none" immedi-
ately after the heading "Part Failure/Malfunction.""1 6
One of the issues before the jury was whether a mechani-
cal malfunction caused the accident. The court of appeals
agreed with the trial court that, although the page at issue
was entitled "Factual Report," the notation reflected the
opinion of the preparer and was inadmissible without
qualifying the preparer as an expert. The Court distin-
guished situations involving admissibility of exhibits to an
official report that merely include data from the flight
recorder.' 7
In Abdulghani v. Virgin Islands Seaplane Shuttle, Inc. ,"8 the
district court for the Virgin Islands granted the defend-
ant's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the
plaintiff's business valuation expert after finding that the
proposed testimony was woefully inadequate and ex-
tremely speculative.
The plaintiff, a doctor, brought suit alleging physical
and psychological damage as a result of the crash of a sea-
plane owned and operated by the defendant. The defend-
ant had conceded liability prior to the trial, so the
remaining issue was compensatory damages. Prior to the
crash, plaintiff had been employed as an emergency room
physician by the Government of the Virgin Islands at an
annual salary of about $37,000. He earned another
$27,000 per year as a physician at a nursing home and
methadone clinic. In addition, he maintained a small pri-
vate practice. Plaintiff contended that, prior to the crash,
he had begun preparations for the establishment of a pri-
vate urgent care/walk-in clinic. Plaintiff hired an expert
witness who intended to present testimony that the clinic,
when opened, would have returned $260,000 in annual
earnings to plaintiff in its second year of operation, bring-
116 Id. at 248.
117 Id. at 249.
118 740 F. Supp. 371 (D. V.I. 1989).
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ing the value of his lost earnings from the clinic, reduced
to present value, to $8,458,012.
The district court, in granting the defendants motion,
held that the factual foundation for expert testimony as to
the valuation of the proposed clinic was inadequate, be-
cause the future success of the doctor's business plans
were too speculative.1 9 The expert doctor was not a hos-
pital administrator and did not keep records of the
number of patients admitted to any Island hospitals. Fur-
ther, the estimate of the fees to be charged for services at
the clinic and the expert's figure for the rate of collection
of fees were too speculative.
In Schultz v. American Airlines, Inc. ,120 the Seventh Circuit
held that the district court's jury instructions, that a com-
mon carrier has an enhanced duty to provide a safe flight,
do not preclude a directed verdict in the face of flimsy
evidence presented by the plaintiff.
In this case, the plaintiff brought a negligence action
against American Airlines for injuries suffered as a result
of turbulence. The plaintiff testified that the turbulence
was so severe that he was thrown repeatedly against his
seat belt partition, causing his spleen to bleed and eventu-
ally to rupture. The plaintiff's case was based almost en-
tirely on his own "vitally interested" testimony. 121
At trial, the district court judge denied American's mo-
tion for a directed verdict and allowed the case to go to
the jury. One-and-a-half days later the jury announced
that it was deadlocked. American's motion for judgment
in accordance with its earlier directed verdict motion was
then granted. The plaintiff appealed.
In affirming the district court decision, the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that a common carrier has an enhanced duty to
use due care and does not alter the standards under which
a directed verdict motion would be decided. The fact that
the plaintiff could provide virtually no corroboration for
119 Id. at 374.
120 901 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1990).
,2, Id. at 623.
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his claim was dispositive. The Court took note of a point
made in the oral argument that it would run contrary to
all scientific knowledge to believe that the kind of violent
turbulence claimed by the plaintiff would "strike only one
seat on an airplane."'' 22
A New York appeals court in Haggerty v. Moran Towing &
Transportation Co., Inc. 123 affirmed the decision of a trial
court excluding from evidence a Coast Guard report
which concluded there was no evidence of "actionable
misconduct, inattention to duty, negligence or wilful vio-
lation of law or regulation" on the part of a tugboat oper-
ator. Thus, the appellate court let stand a jury verdict
which concluded the defendant was negligent and af-
firmed a judgment for $200,000 plus post-verdict interest.
The court, noting that the action had been brought
under the Jones Act,124 concluded that courts would apply
federal laws of evidence and procedure when those mat-
ters are "outcome determinative" in order to provide a
uniform body of maritime law.' 25 Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(8)(C) provided the proper rule for determin-
ing the admissibility of an investigative report by the
United States Coast Guard. Federal Rule 803(8)(C) pro-
vides for the admission of "factual findings resulting from
an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law .... 126
The court, in affirming the decision not to admit the
Coast Guard report, held that the report stated legal con-
clusions and not factual findings. Therefore, the report
was inadmissible under the guidelines enunciated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey.'2 7
In United States v. Fortenberry,128 the Fifth Circuit held
122 Id. at 624.
123 162 A.D.2d 189, 556 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
124 46 U.S.C.a. app. § 688 (1988).
125 162 A.D.2d at 189, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 316 (citing Lerner v. Karageorgis Lines,
Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 479, 488 N.E.2d 824, 497 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1985)).
126 FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(c).
127 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
128 914 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1990).
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that the trial court's finding that the defendant had trans-
ported an undeclared firearm on a commercial airliner
was sufficiently supported by evidence that the gun was
found in his bag after he had deplaned in a foreign air-
port.' 29 The defendant was convicted of transporting an
undeclared handgun on a commercial airliner. This was
apparently carried out as part of the defendant's plan for
revenge against his ex-wife's family following a bitter
divorce.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his convic-
tion for transporting an undeclared gun on a commercial
airliner. The defendant argued that there was no evi-
dence to exclude the possibility that the gun found in his
bag was placed there after he arrived at his destination.
Noting that Fortenberry was under police surveillance
from the time he arrived at his destination, the court of
appeals held that a rational trier of fact was free to con-
clude that no one had an opportunity to place the gun in
his bag after his arrival. The court refused to overturn the
conviction.
In Palmer v. Krueger,13 0 the Tenth Circuit held that res
ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked until a plaintiff has estab-
lished what caused the accident in question. In this case,
a Beech Bonanza A-36, owned jointly by the husband/pi-
lot and the wife/passenger, crashed shortly after taking
off from Woodring Airport in Enid, Oklahoma. There
was no direct proof of the cause of the crash.
The wife's daughter asserted a claim grounded in negli-
gence against the husband/pilot's estate. Following the
trial, the trial court refused plaintiff's request for a res
ipsa loquitur instruction. The trial court proceeded to
enter a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the defend-
ant, and the plaintiff appealed. The Tenth Circuit, in af-
firming the decision, noted that the plaintiff failed to
introduce any evidence to establish causation and, there-
'I ld. at 674-75.
897 F.2d 1529 (10th Cir. 1990).
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fore, was not entitled to a res ipsa instruction.13'
II. LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS IN WARSAW
CONVENTION CARRIAGE
A. Exclusivity
The United States District Court in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida held that the Warsaw Convention,
although providing an exclusive remedy for actions aris-
ing out of injuries occurring during international air
transportation, did not supply an exclusive cause of action
for such claims in Calderon v. Aerovias Nacionales De
Colombia.'3 2
The plaintiff, the personal representative of a passenger
who died in the Cove Neck, New York crash of Avianca
Flight 52 from Medellin, Colombia, to John F. Kennedy
Airport, brought suit in a Florida state court under the
state's Wrongful Death Statute. Defendant airline re-
moved the suit to federal court, asserting that since the
action involved a death arising from "international trans-
portation" within the meaning of the Convention, it was
removable under the Court's federal question jurisdic-
tion. The plaintiff moved to remand.
The district court held that "the Warsaw Convention,
rather than supplying an exclusive cause of action, pro-
vides only an exclusive remedy for" actions of this sort. 33
A plaintiff, therefore, is free to state his cause of action in
terms of state law, without mentioning the Convention,
but is subject to the liability limits imposed by the Con-
vention. 34 The mere pleading of the Convention as a de-
fense will not be enough to remove the case to federal
court unless a federal cause of action appears on the face
of the complaint. The court proceeded to grant the plain-
tiff's motion to remand.
-, Id. at 1536-37.
1-12 738 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
, Id. at 486.
134 Id.
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The Southern District of Florida took a somewhat dif-
ferent approach five months later in Velasquez v. Aerovias
Nacionales De Colombia.13- This action also arose out of the
crash of Avianca Flight 52 from Medellin to New York.
The district court held that the Convention provided an
exclusive cause of action to victims of international air di-
sasters. 36 The court also held that, although a plaintiff
may file an action under the Convention in either a fed-
eral or a state court, a plaintiff who files his action in state
court provides the defendant the option of removal. The
court, therefore, denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand
to a Florida state court.13 7
In so holding, the court stated:
The rapid evolution of air travel has provided a unique
ability to quickly transcend national boundaries and the
laws which pertain therein. Such a reality necessitates the
existence of uniform regulation. To hold otherwise would
remove the cause of action available to the international
traveller from the rule of reason to the realm of mere
fortuity. '3 8
It concluded by noting that "[t]o hold that an interna-
tional treaty such as the Warsaw Convention provides the
exclusive cause of action in the context of international air
disasters yet actions brought thereunder are not remova-
ble to federal court would be nothing more than sheer
sophistry."'' 39
The Southern District of New York adopted the posi-
tion that the Convention provided an exclusive cause of
action in Eggink v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 140 The plaintiff
brought suit against TWA in a New York state court fol-
lowing the loss and misdelivery of videotapes, shirts, and
promotional materials en route from New York to Paris.
TWA removed the case, premising removal upon the fed-
,- 747 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
-s Id. at 675.
137 id. at 677.
-' Id.
'- id. at 679.
140 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,731 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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eral question jurisdiction of the district court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b). TWA argued that the plaintiff's
complaints stated a federal claim under the Convention.
However, the district court noted that the complaint did
not mention the Warsaw Convention. Nevertheless, the
court went on to consider whether it was a well-pleaded
complaint that did not implicate a federal cause of action
or simply an artful pleading intended to defeat removal by
clothing a federal claim in state garb.
The court concluded that the complaint alleged damage
to goods incurred during international air transport
under Article 18 of the Convention.14 The court pointed
out that to the extent that the plaintiff's damages oc-
curred during "transportation by air", the federal cause of
action provided by the Convention is the exclusive cause
of action. 142 Accordingly, removal to the federal court
was proper since the plaintiff had pleaded what must, of
necessity, be a federal claim.143
B. Injuries and Events Within the Scope of the Convention
The Second Circuit in Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. 144 held that TWA was not liable for the murder of a
passenger by terrorists while waiting in the public area of
da Vinci Airport in Rome since the murder did not occur
during any of the operations of embarking or disembark-
ing as contemplated under Article 17 of the Convention.
John Buonocore III was murdered during the course of
a terrorist attack at da Vinci Airport on December 27,
1985. He was travelling on a TWA flight from Rome to
New York scheduled to depart at 11:00 a.m. Buonocore
arrived at da Vinci Airport sometime before 9:00 a.m.,
pursuant to TWA's instructions. He checked his luggage,
and received a seat assignment, boarding pass, and bag-
gage claim ticket at the TWA departure counter. He then
,41 Id. at 17,733.
142 Id.
14 Id.
44900 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990).
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walked away from the departure counter, apparently to-
wards a snack cart in the main concourse area of the air-
port. As he neared the cart, the terrorist attack, consisting
of machine gun fire and hand grenades, began. Mr. Buo-
nocore was killed in the attack.
Buonocore's parents brought a wrongful death action
against TWA. They claimed TWA was liable under Article
17 of the Convention, which imposes liability on airlines
for injuries that occur in "the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking".
The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of TWA on the ground that Buonocore was not, as a mat-
ter of law, in the course of embarking and disembarking.
The parents appealed. In affirming the decision, the Sec-
ond Circuit expounded on its decision in Day v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. 15 In Day, the court looked to a number
of factors in determining whether a passenger was in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or dis-
embarking. These factors are "(1) the activity of the pas-
senger at the time of the accident; (2) the restrictions, if
any, on their movement; (3) the imminence of actual
boarding; and (4) the physical proximity of the passengers
to the gate.' '146
Based upon the facts, the court concluded that Buo-
nocore was not in the process of embarking. He had
checked his luggage and received his seat assignment, but
he had not gone through any security inspection. In addi-
tion, he had not gone through immigration and was not
under the immediate supervision of TWA, but in an area
not open to the public.
In De La Cruz v. Dominicana De Aviacion,'47 the Southern
District of New York held that a plaintiff who slipped and
fell while on the way to a baggage claim area was not in
the disembarkation process. The plaintiff had just arrived
145 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
146 Buonocore, 900 F.2d at 10.
147 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,639 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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on a Dominican flight from New York to Las Americas
Airport in Santo Domingo.
The plaintiff descended a flight of steps from the air-
craft to the ramp, entered the arrivals building, passed
through immigration control, and was then directed down
a hallway to the baggage claim area. While walking down
this hallway, the plaintiff slipped and fell. He testified that
he noticed a wetness on the floor that he contended was
"shampoo."
The plaintiff spent eleven days in a Santo Domingo hos-
pital and a month at his mother's house. When he re-
turned to New York, the plaintiff had part of his left leg
amputated. It was determined that plaintiff had been un-
dergoing treatment in New York for a tumor found in his
leg and had left for Santo Domingo against medical ad-
vice. The plaintiff alleged that the injuries he received at
the airport prevented him from returning to New York in
time to continue a limb-sparing course of treatment.
The plaintiff sought summary judgment on the grounds
that Article 17 of the Convention made Dominicana abso-
lutely liable for his injuries because they were incurred
while he was in the process of disembarkation of an inter-
national flight. The defendant also sought summary judg-
ment and requested that Rule 11 sanctions be imposed on
the plaintiff's attorney for failing to conduct a reasonable
inquiry into the facts and law of the case. The court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment but
denied the Rule 11 sanctions. In granting summary judg-
ment, the court noted that retrieving one's bags does not
place a person in the disembarkation process. The court
also noted that the plaintiff had left the aircraft, walked
into the terminal, entered the arrival gate, and had under-
gone passport control by government employees. Thus,
plaintiff was free to mix with any international travellers
who had not yet cleared customs. Further, plaintiff intro-
duced no evidence to contradict defendant's assertion
that the hallway in which the plaintiff fell was not leased,
occupied, or controlled by Dominicana. The court con-
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cluded that holding the airline liable based upon these
facts would make an airline an insurer for any injury oc-
curring in an airport.
In Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines,14 8 the Southern
District of New York held that a person walking from one
terminal to another, to catch a connecting flight on the
same airline, is not in the process of embarking or dis-
embarking from an aircraft.' 49 The plaintiffs were travel-
ling under an S.A.S. ticket from a flight from New York to
Copenhagen to Moscow to New York. The flight arrived
in Copenhagen, where the plaintiffs were to change to a
flight departing for Moscow. The plaintiffs claimed that
they were directed by an S.A.S. employee to take a mov-
ing sidewalk from Concourse C to Concourse B, where
their connecting flight was scheduled to depart. While on
the walkway, the plaintiff's foot became caught and was
injured as a result. This occurred approximately five min-
utes after their arrival at Copenhagen.
S.A.S. moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiff was not in the course of embarking or
disembarking under Article 17 of the Convention. The
District Court granted the motion. In concluding that Ms.
Rabinowitz was not in the course of embarking or dis-
embarking, the court noted that no S.A.S. employees had
accompanied the connecting passengers through the air-
port to the departing flight. Passengers were free to roam
freely within the terminal during the lay-over and could
mingle with other international passengers. Therefore,
the fact that an S.A.S. employee had directed the plaintiff
to the moving sidewalk was not an indication that S.A.S.
was in control of the plaintiff's movements. 50
Plaintiffs had attempted to distinguish those cases cited
by the defendant on the ground that in this case they were
transferring (i.e., disembarking and embarking) between
planes of the same carrier, thus predicating liability on the
,48 741 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
" Id. at 446.
-so Id. at 446-47.
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basis of a continuous trip between New York and Moscow.
The court held that the fact that a trip might be deemed
continuous was irrelevant to any statutory interpretation
of the Convention. To impose liability on an airline for
any injury that might occur in an airport terminal while en
route would contravene the terms and purpose of Article17. 151
In Denuna v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,152 a federal district
court in California held that the Convention was applica-
ble to an accident involving a passenger travelling on a
ticket indicating only a domestic flight with the point of
origin and final destination in the Philippines. The plain-
tiff was injured when an anxious fellow traveller opened
the plane's overhead storage bin before the plane taxied
to a complete stop at Los Angeles Airport.
The plaintiff had purchased two tickets for her trip from
a travel agent in the Philippines. One ticket contained an
international itinerary while the other one covered only
her domestic travel. The separate domestic ticket was
purchased separately as part of the airline's promotional
program which required that a domestic ticket be
purchased in conjunction with travel beginning and end-
ing outside of the United States.
Plaintiff made a motion for partial summary judgment
on the ground that the Convention was applicable to
plaintiff's claim for damages sustained on the domestic
leg of the journey. The district court granted the motion
and held that the Convention was applicable to an acci-
dent occurring during a domestic flight when the domes-
tic ticket was purchased in conjunction with an
international flight.
In Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp. ,'3 the Southern Dis-
trict of New York held that the Warsaw Convention did
not apply to a wrongful death action brought against an
-1 Id. at 447.
152 No. CV-89-5710-MRP (C.D. Cal. June 15, 1990) (LEXIS Genfed library,
Dist file).
,5 749 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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airline by the estate of an individual who was killed in the
crash of a cargo airplane on which he was traveling from
Singapore to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, because the indi-
vidual was an employee and not a passenger of the
airline. 15 4
The cargo. airplane, operated by Flying Tiger Line,
crashed in Kuala Lumpur. The pilot, co-pilot, and flight
engineer were killed, as was Leonard Sulewski, an aircraft
mechanic employed by Flying Tiger. The plaintiff
brought suit against Flying Tiger's successor in interest,
Federal Express Corporation, for compensatory and
wrongful death damages based upon the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The defendant moved for summary judgment, as-
serting that the decedent was not traveling as a passenger,
as defined in the Convention, but was traveling on a
scheduled flight pursuant to his contract of employment.
According to the defendant's analysis, the plaintiff's ex-
clusive remedy was worker's compensation.
The decedent was a fully qualified and licensed
mechanic authorized to perform maintenance on and re-
pairs to Flying Tiger aircraft. As a "maintenance repre-
sentative" the decedent was assigned to various flights in
order to perform necessary safety and maintenance work
at airports around the world where no station or ground
mechanics were employed by Flying Tiger. It was en
route to one of these assignments that Leonard Sulewski
died.
The court noted that the decedent was listed on the
flight manifest as part of the crew and not a passenger. In
addition, the carrier's employment contract with its
mechanics called for the mechanics to be available to con-
sult with crew members during a flight if the need arose.
Based on these facts, the court found that the decedent
was aboard the flight primarily to perform his employ-
ment obligations so that he was not a passenger. 55 The
1- Id. at 512.
,55 Id. at 512. The court refused to consider various definitions of "crew" from
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court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
C. Damages Recoverable
A dispute in the Second Circuit over the availability of
punitive damages under the Warsaw Convention was re-
cently settled by the Court of Appeals, which ruled that
these damages were not available.156 On January 3, 1990,
Judge Platt, of the Eastern District of New York, in In re
Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988 157
("Lockerbie 1 ") held that the Warsaw Convention does not
permit recovery of punitive damage claims.
On January 18, Judge Sprizzo, of the Southern District
of New York, in In re Hiacking of Pan American World Air-
ways, at Karachi Int'l Airport, Pakistan on September 5, 1986158
("Pan Am Karachi") held that the Convention does not
preempt recovery of punitive damages. Judge Sprizzo im-
plicitly criticizedJudge Platt's decision, issued just 15 days
beforehand. Consequently, the Lockerbie plaintiffs then
filed a motion for reargument, based, in part, on the rea-
soning in Pan Am Karachi.159
The Lockerbie and Karachi plaintiffs had made identical
arguments supporting the availability of punitive dam-
ages. The plaintiffs asserted that Article 24 of the Con-
vention, when read together with Article 17, permits the
recovery of punitive damage claims when it is permitted
by local law. The plaintiffs went on to assert that, even if
Article 17, when read in conjunction with Article 24, did
preclude the recovery of punitive damages under normal
circumstances, a finding of wilful misconduct under Arti-
maritime, immigration, labor and insurance cases since none of them dealt with
the Warsaw Convention provisions. Id.
1- Lockerbie, No. 90-7388 (2d Cir. March 22, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, US
App. LEXIS 4779). This opinion consolidated both of the conflicting cases, af-
firming one and reversing the other.
157 733 F. Supp. 547, 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
15s 729 F. Supp. 17, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
,so 736 F. Supp. 18, 19-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
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cle 25 would open the door for the recovery of punitive
damages.
The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff's arguments,
holding that the Warsaw Convention did not permit the
recovery of punitive damages either under Article 17
alone or when read in conjunction with Article 24. More-
over, the Second Circuit stated this is true even in the
presence of wilful misconduct, regardless of the law of the
state in which it is brought. 160
In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King,'6 ' the Florida Supreme
Court discussed the circumstances under which a plaintiff
may recover for emotional distress under the Warsaw
Convention. The court held that under the Warsaw Con-
vention a plaintiff can recover for mental suffering and
emotional distress, even in the absence of any physical in-
jury. The court expressly adopted the reasoning of the
Eleventh Circuit in Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 162
Like Floyd, this suit involved engine failure. On May 5,
1983, three engines on board Eastern Airlines Flight 855
from Miami, Florida, to Nassau, Bahamas, malfunctioned.
The passengers and crew of the L- 1011 prepared to ditch
into the ocean, but, just before ditching, one engine was
restarted, and the plane returned safely to Miami.
King, a passenger on board the flight, sued Eastern for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and for dam-
ages under the Convention. Following the reasoning of
the federal district court in In re Eastern Airlines, Inc. Engine
Failure, Miami International Airport on May 5, 1983,163 the
Florida court entered a judgment for Eastern. A Florida
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the claim for
emotional distress under the Warsaw Convention.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed as to the availabil-
ity of claims for emotional distress under the Warsaw
1- Lockerbie, No. 90-7388 at 7.
16, 557 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1990).
162 872 F.2d 1462, 1472 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 1489 (1990).
163 629 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Fla. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines,
872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 1489 (1990).
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Convention. It agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in Floyd
that Article 17 of the Convention provides for any dam-
age, whether material or moral, including mental suffer-
ing unaccompanied by physical injury. The Court
concluded by noting that the plaintiff's damages would be
limited to $75,000.1> 4
In Morgan v. United Air Lines, Inc., 165 a federal district
court in Colorado held that a plaintiff can recover for
purely emotional injuries under the Warsaw Convention.
The case arose in the aftermath of ill-fated Flight 811
from Honolulu, Hawaii to Auckland, New Zealand, on
February 24, 1989. While the plane was en route, it ex-
perienced sudden decompression at 23,000 feet. The de-
compression occurred after the right forward lower lobe
cargo door and part of the fuselage separated from the
airplane. Five double-seat units in the lower business sec-
tion were lost. The plane returned to Honolulu within
twenty minutes of the decompression and the remaining
passengers were evacuated. The plaintiffs, although not
alleging any physical injuries, alleged mental distress due
to their harrowing experience on board the aircraft.
Defendants moved to preclude the plaintiff's right to
seek damages purely for emotional distress under the
Warsaw Convention. In denying the motion, the court re-
lied on the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the same ques-
tion in Floyd v. Eastern Airlines 166 which held that the term
"lesion corporelle" of Article 17 of the Convention en-
compassed emotional injuries. The court echoed Floyd in
holding that although the literal French translation to "le-
sion corporelle" was bodily injury, the French legal mean-
ing for those words encompassed mental injury as well as
bodily injury and, therefore, mental and emotional inju-
ries were to be recoverable for under the Warsaw Con-
vention. The court concluded its discussion of this issue
by noting that there was no evidence that the drafters of
104 Id.
165 750 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Colo. 1990).
1- 872 F.2d at 1466.
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the Convention intended to preclude recovery for any
particular type of injury.
The district court then considered what law should be
used to determine whether any such mental or emotional
injuries had occurred. Plaintiff first argued that under the
Convention, "federal common law" governed this case
and preempted any state law concerning mental injuries.
Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that federal maritime law
or the substantive law of Colorado should apply. Failing
that, plaintiff argued that the substantive law of Colorado
should be applied. Under Colorado law as stated in
Kimelman v. City of Colorado Springs,1 6 7 if there was no physi-
cal contact between the plaintiff and the alleged tortfeasor
in an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
then physical manifestations of the emotional injury must
be proven in order to establish mental distress.
Plaintiff initially claimed that contact with insulation
dust and loud noise after the decompression provided
sufficient physical contact to preclude the need to prove
any physical manifestation.
United Airlines took the position that if mental injuries
are compensable under the Warsaw Convention, then, be-
cause jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship,
the court should apply Colorado's choice of law rules.
United Airlines further contended that plaintiff did not
have any physical contact and that plaintiff had not as-
serted any physical manifestation of emotional distress.
The court held that federal maritime law did not apply,
and that the choice of law determination in proving plain-
tiff's injuries would be governed by the Colorado rules
for conflicts of law. Under Colorado's choice of law rules,
the law of the state with the most significant relationship
to the claims controls. As was noted in Dorr v. Briggs,'68
the court must consider the relevant factors included in
section 6 of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws.
167 775 P.2d 51, 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
- 709 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Colo. 1989).
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Using the Restatement analysis, the court found that Col-
orado bore the most significant relationship to the litiga-
tion since the plaintiff was a domiciliary of Colorado and
the defendant had a place of business there. Therefore,
the substantive law of Colorado governed the case.
In another case arising out of the same crash, In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Honolulu Hawaii, On February 24,
1989, 169 the district court discussed:
1. Whether the plaintiffs have a right to a jury trial under
the Warsaw Convention or the Death on the High Seas
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 ("DOHSA");
2. Whether damages for emotional distress are recover-
able under the Warsaw Convention in the absence of
physical injury;
3. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest
pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, maritime law, or
DOHSA, and, if so, what is the proper rate of interest and
the effect of the damages limitation of the Warsaw Con-
vention; and
4. Whether the jury should be informed of the $75,000
Warsaw Convention limit.
The court noted that the torts alleged by plaintiffs were
maritime torts governed by general maritime law. Ac-
cording to Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen 170 however, the
"savings to suitors" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 allows
plaintiffs with claims cognizable both in law and in admi-
ralty to invoke whichever jurisdiction the plaintiff chooses.
When a plaintiff elects to bring a cause of action in law
rather than admiralty, the plaintiff is entitled to a jury
trial. Finally, under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a claim that could be brought in law or in ad-
miralty will be deemed a law claim unless the plaintiff
elects otherwise. Since none of the complaints before the
court invoked its admiralty jurisdiction, the court con-
cluded that the cases would be tried before a jury.
-9 No. MDL-807 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 27, 1990).
170 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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As to the availability of emotional distress damages in
the absence of physical injuries, the court noted that the
Supreme Court's granting of certiorari in Floyd would ulti-
mately resolve the issue. Until such time as a decision is
rendered, the district court felt obligated to render a deci-
sion that would allow the Floyd litigation to proceed.
The district court, therefore, decided that it would ask
the jury to make special findings regarding (1) the plain-
tiffs' damages from physical injury and emotional distress
due to physical injury, and (2) emotional distress unac-
companied by physical injury. This would enable the par-
ties to evaluate their position in light of the verdict. If
Floyd is not reversed, the information produced as to the
jury's valuation of the plaintiffs' physical and emotional
injuries would, hopefully, assist the parties in any future
settlement negotiations.
The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to pre-
judgment interest on any damages awarded to them. The
interest rate will be determined by United Airline's cost of
funds during the pendency of the litigation. The court
concluded that, even though damages will be limited to
$75,000, the addition of prejudgment interest may result
in an award exceeding that figure. The court noted that
there is a split among the circuit courts as to whether pre-
judgment interest may be awarded over the $75,000 War-
saw limit. The court established the approach adopted by
the Fifth Circuit in Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 171. The
Fifth Circuit in Domangue held that one purpose of the
Convention is to ensure the speedy resolution of claims.
The denial of prejudgment interest would give carriers an
incentive to delay cases involving large amounts of
money. The court concluded that prejudgment interest
does not compensate for injuries but for the failure of a
defendant to promptly pay for the damages it inflicted.
Finally, the court decided not to advise the jury of the
Convention's $75,000 limit. The court stated that under
17, 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Federal Rules Evidence 402, the prejudicial impact of the
limit would significantly outweigh any probative value
which it might have.
D. Cargo and Baggage
In Hatzlachh Supply, Inc. v. Tradewinds Airways, Ltd. ,172 the
District Court for the Southern District of New York ad-
dressed the scope of Article 18 of the Convention. The
plaintiff brought suit against the air carrier after the
buyer/consignee failed to pay the seller/shipper for
goods travelling under two air waybills issued by
Tradewinds. The air waybills, evincing shipment of goods
from New York to Kano, Nigeria, were consigned to the
Savannah Bank of Nigeria. The air waybills stated that the
goods were not to be released by the carrier until the bank
guaranteed payment of a draft submitted to it for collec-
tion. The carrier allegedly failed to follow these instruc-
tions, the goods were released, and the shipper did not
receive payment.
In denying the plaintiff's motion to dismiss
Tradewind's affirmative defense that its liability was lim-
ited by the Warsaw Convention, the district court held
that the loss took place during "transportation by air"
within the meaning of Article 18 of the Convention. On
the facts before it, the court concluded that "transporta-
tion by air" did not terminate until the goods left the car-
rier's custody and were released to the buyer. Even if the
carrier acted wrongly in releasing the goods, the goods
were released during the period of transport by air, and,
as such, the Convention and its limitation of liability for
cargo loss were applicable.
In Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc.,175 a district court in Massachusetts held that
an insurance company, the subrogee of a shipper, was not
entitled to recover damages for a cargo shipment that was
172 738 F. Supp. 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
173 739 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1990).
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delayed 130 days. The shipper had arranged for the ship-
ment of a lighting system from Tel Aviv to Connecticut.
In the 130 days that it took Pan Am to deliver the lighting
system, the shipper notified Pan Am that it would be seek-
ing damages for non-delivery. After the actual delivery of
the cargo, neither the shipper nor the plaintiff gave Pan
Am written notice of a claim for delay damages. The
court, in granting Pan Am's motion for summary judg-
ment, cited Article 26(2) as mandating that in "the case of
delay the complaint must be made at least within fourteen
days from the date on which the . . . goods had been
placed at his disposal." According to the court, the ear-
lier correspondence from the shipper spoke only in terms
of damages for non-delivery. Pan Am, therefore, was not
properly notified under the terms of the Convention.
In Hill v. American Airlines, Inc. ,1I" American Airlines was
not able to avail itself of the $9.07 per lbs limitation of
liability provided by the Convention when it failed to in-
clude the weight of the lost luggage on the claim check.
The plaintiffs' luggage was lost en route from New York
to Montego Bay, Jamaica. American claimed that, since
the plaintiffs did not know the weight of their luggage,
there was no basis on which to calculate damages and
asked for the claim to be dismissed.
The plaintiffs, appearing pro se, produced their claim
checks in opposition to the motion. The court cited Arti-
cle 4(4) of the Warsaw Convention, which states that, if a
baggage check does not contain the number and weight of
packages, it cannot avail itself of those provisions of the
Convention that limit or exclude his liability. The court,
as a result, denied American's motion for summary
judgment.
In Arkin v. New York Helicopter Corp.,1 a New York ap-
pellate court reached a similar conclusion. In Arkin, the
plaintiff, an attorney, checked two pieces of luggage at a
New York heliport while on his way to board a British Air-
74 239 N.J. Super. 105, 570 A.2d 1040 (1989).
175 149 A.D.2d 5, 544 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
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ways flight from New York to London. The defendants
provided the plaintiff with a baggage check that did not
include the number and weight of the plaintiff's baggage.
As sometimes happens, the luggage was lost. The plain-
tiff brought suit, and the defendants moved for summary
judgment to the extent that the damages sought exceeded
the limitations provided for in the Convention.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and the
plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed the trial
court's finding and granted the plaintiff's motion to dis-
miss the affirmative defenses arising from the Warsaw
Convention.
In so holding, the court noted that Article 4 (4) requires
an international air carrier to provide a passenger with a
baggage check that includes the number and weight of
luggage checked. Failure to do so precludes the carrier
from limiting its liability to the $20.00 per kilogram pro-
vided for in the Warsaw Convention. It was not overly
demanding, said the court, to require a carrier to note the
number and weight of a passenger's bags. Given that the
Convention, by limiting the carrier's liability, shifts a
greater part of the responsibility and risk of loss to the
passenger, these minimal requirements should be strictly
construed.
This strict construction of the wording of the Conven-
tion was said to be in accord with the Supreme Court's
decision in Chan v. Korean Air Lines.176 " The Supreme
Court in Chan held that the Warsaw Convention liability
limitation for passenger death or injury was not voided by
the failure to provide at least 10-point type for passenger
tickets. The court compared Article 3's lack of a sanction
with Article 4's inclusion of a sanction - the loss of the
limitation of liability. The text of Article 4 was said to be
unambiguous, and as such it was to be strictly construed.
In Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, Inc. ,'77 the Sec-
- 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
177 917 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990).
DEVELOPMENTS
ond Circuit held that the provisions of the Warsaw Con-
vention do not apply to a loss of cargo occurring in a
carrier's warehouse not located at an airport. The case
involved a shipment from Amsterdam to J.F.K. in New
York. The consolidated cargo was off-loaded at the air-
port and then taken to Emery's off-airport warehouse.
When one consignee arrived at the warehouse to claim its
goods, the goods could not be found.
At trial the district court held that liability limitations of
the Warsaw Convention governed Victoria's recovery of
money damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that because Emery had stipulated that the loss occurred
at its warehouse outside the airport, any presumption
favoring Convention coverage was rebutted and the Con-
vention did not apply to the claim.17 8
E. Limitations of Actions
In Halmos v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. , the dis-
trict court discussed Article 29 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's two-year statute of limitation as it applied under
both federal and New York law. The plaintiff, Halmos,
while travelling on Pan Am flight 119 from New York to
Paris on July 29, 1987 became ill after eating an inflight
meal.
Article 29(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides that
an action must be brought within two years of the air-
craft's arrival at its destination. Article 29(2) expressly
leaves the calculation of the limitations period to the
court in which the case is filed.
On July 27, 1989, the plaintiff filed an action against
Pan Am in the district court. Service of process upon Pan
Am was not accomplished until October 10, 1989. Under
the federal rules, "a civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court". 8 0 Under New York law an ac-
tion is not commenced until service of process upon the
178 Id. at 707-08.
179 727 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
-a FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
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defendant is completed.' 8 ' Plaintiff, then, would be time
barred if the New York rule applied but could go forward
under the federal rule.
The district court concluded that, as a matter of federal
law, state statutes of limitation govern the timeliness of
claims brought under federal diversity jurisdiction. State
law also determines when an action is commenced and
when the statute of limitations is tolled. The plaintiff's
action, therefore, was dismissed on the ground that the
action was not commenced until October 10, 1989, more
than two years after the incident at issue.
In Eggink v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,182 the plaintiff had
commenced his action for cargo damage after the Con-
vention's two-year limitation period had expired but
within the three-year limitation period of New York
law.' 8 The plaintiff contended that, since his claims were
based only on state law, the state's three-year period
should be applicable. The court held that the Convention
provided the applicable framework for these claims be-
cause all of the plaintiff's causes of action were deemed to
have occurred during the "transportation by air" of the
damaged goods. The court granted TWA's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's claims
were time-barred.
III. LIABILITY OF OPERATORS OF AIRCRAFT IN NON-
WARSAW CARRIAGE
A. General Airline Liability
In Aboujdid v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd.,184 a case arising
from the "Entebbe Affair," a New York Supreme Court
held that Gulf Aviation did not breach a duty owed to pas-
sengers on an Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Paris.
The plaintiffs alleged that Gulf failed to identify and pre-
18, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 304 (McKinney 1988).
,82 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,731 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
,8- N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 214 (3) (McKinney 1990).
- 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,707 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
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vent skyjackers from boarding and subsequently skyjack-
ing the Air France flight.
The skyjackers flew on Gulf from Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates to Bahrain and then on Singapore Airlines
from Bahrain to Athens. On July 4, 1976, they boarded
the ill-fated Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Paris dur-
ing its stopover in Athens. They then skyjacked the plane
and diverted it to Entebbe airport in Uganda, where al-
most all of the passengers were later rescued by Israeli
troops.
The court held that Gulf had no legal duty to intercept
the skyjackers because the governments of Bahrain,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates had exclusive re-
sponsibility and control of aviation security at the airports
from which the skyjackers began their journey to
Athens. 185
The court further found that if any security lapse was
the proximate cause of the skyjacking, it was due to the
failure of either Athens or Air France authorities, or both,
to properly screen passengers and their belongings.
Moreover, any such negligence would be independent, in-
tervening acts that would supercede any alleged negli-
gence claims against Gulf.186
The passengers' actions against Air France had been
dismissed much earlier in Karfunkel v. Air France,187 be-
cause they did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. Subsequent claims
against Singapore Airlines had been dismissed pursuant
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.'
In United States v. American Airlines, Inc. ,189 a district court
in Massachusetts upheld an FAA fine of $25,000 against
185 Id. at 17,708.
'" Id. at 17,709-10.
187 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
- Aboujdid v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd., 108 A.D.2d 330, 489 N.Y.S.2d 171
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 450, 494 N.E.2d 1055, 503 N.Y.S.2d 555
(1986).
89 739 F. Supp. 52 (D. Mass. 1990).
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American Airlines for failing to implement a security sys-
tem to screen pasenger's carry-on luggage for weapons.
In June of 1987, special agents of the FAA observed 25
instances where individuals, with carry-on luggage, passed
through a security checkpoint without their luggage being
monitored. On the same day, the agents passed two
pieces of luggage through the monitor. One piece con-
tained a pipe bomb and a hand grenade, and the other an
encapsulated gun.
The U.S. then filed a complaint against American Air-
lines seeking $1,000 for each separate and distinct viola-
tion of § 901(a)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
which states that "any person who violates [the regulation
requiring a security program] shall be subject to a civil
penalty not to exceed $1,000 for each such
violation .... 190
American admitted the violation but argued that, since
the passengers not checked were boarding a single flight,
there was only one violation and not twenty-five. The
court concluded that, if American's position were
adopted, it would only serve to undermine Congress' in-
tent in promulgating federal safety regulations. The reg-
ulation at issue specifically mandated the inspection of
each person, and to hold otherwise would contravene
Congress' intent.19'
In Haley v. United Airlines, 92 a district court addressed
the issue of whether a carrier is liable when a passenger
ignores an announcement to remain seated, opens the
overhead storage bin, and allows a briefcase to fall out
and injure another passenger. The plaintiff, a passenger
on United Flight 899 from Chicago to Kansas City, was
sitting one row in front of the over-eager passenger. The
plaintiff charged United with four counts of negligence.
The court, in granting United's motion for summary judg-
ment, noted that, although as a common carrier United
:- 49 U.S.C. § 1471(a)(1) (1987)
,91 739 F. Supp. at 53.
192 728 F. Supp. 374 (D. Md. 1989).
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was responsible for exercising the highest degree of care
toward its passengers, it was not an insurer of its passen-
gers' safety. Consequently, United should not be liable
for personal injuries of a passenger resulting from an acci-
dent absent any fault on the part of United.
United's duty of care was satisfied when its employees
made all the standard safety announcements warning pas-
sengers to remain seated. The court observed that a flight
attendant attempted to prevent the offending passenger
from opening the storage bin. The court also took exten-
sive note of assistance United provided to the plaintiff af-
ter the accident. °
In a similar case, a New York appellate court in Ginter v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. 193 affirmed a trial court's decision
to set aside a plaintiff's jury verdict and order judgment in
favor of the defendant. In that case, the lead plaintiff suf-
fered injuries when a fellow passenger opened the over-
head storage compartment, striking the plaintiff on the
head with falling bags. The plaintiff, along with her hus-
band, commenced this action asserting that TWA was
negligent in permitting the storage of this type of luggage
in an overhead compartment, failing to warn passengers
of the potential danger of suitcases falling on their heads,
and violating their own regulations and industry custom
in the carriage of baggage. At trial, a jury awarded both
plaintiffs money damages. Upon defendant's motion, the
trial court set the verdict aside on the ground that plain-
tiffs had failed to prove any negligence on the part of de-
fendant that was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs'
injuries. The plaintiffs appealed.
The appellate court affirmed, based in part on plaintiffs'
failure to prove that there was a custom in the industry as
to what is permitted to be stored in the overhead com-
partments of planes. 94 The only regulations adduced
were FAA regulations as to the dimensions and total
19- Ginter v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 148 A.D.2d 787, 538 N.Y.S.2d 638
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
- 538 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
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weight of packages or baggage stored in the compart-
ments. As an example, the court noted that bowling balls
would not be permitted.
Furthermore, TWA presented evidence that an an-
nouncement was made about proper storage prior to
every flight and that the flight attendants checked to en-
sure that all overhead racks were closed prior to take off.
The court could not find any breach of duty owed to the
plaintiffs by the defendant. The court concluded by not-
ing that the trial court was correct in its conclusion that,
as a matter of law, plaintiffs had failed to establish negli-
gence on the part of the defendant and that there was no
valid line of reasoning or permissible inference which
could possibly lead rational people to the conclusion
reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented
at trial.' 95
In yet another case involving overhead storage com-
partments, Plagianos v. American Airlines, Inc. ,l96 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals considered the appropriateness
of a jury instruction providing that the defendant, a com-
mon carrier, should be held to a "high standard of care,
requiring the exercise of the highest or utmost caution for
the safety of the passengers."'' 97 In that case, the plaintiff
injured his knee during the takeoff of an American flight
from New York to Puerto Rico. The injury occurred when
an overhead storage compartment opened on takeoff.
The plaintiff, who was wearing a seat belt, quickly stood
up to push luggage back into the compartment. Accord-
ing to the plaintiff, the act of standing up against the seat
belt caused him to suffer a complete avulsion of the ante-
rior cruciate ligament and a tear of the medial meniscus in
his left knee, requiring surgery. 98
Ruling that the case would have to be remanded for a
new trial, the court stated that a common carrier is held to
1I5 Id. 558 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
- 912 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1990).
111 Id. at 59.
19 Id. at 58-59.
DEVELOPMENTS
the same standard of care as any other alleged tort feasor:
ordinary care commensurate with the existing circum-
stances.'" Furthermore, the court held that the instruc-
tion was prejudicial insofar as it may have confused the
jury and caused them to believe that American's propor-
tion of fault should be determined using a different stan-
dard than that applied to the plaintiff.20 0
In Kleiner v. Qantas Airways, Ltd. ,2o1 the Southern District
of New York dismissed an action brought against Qantas
Airways for injuries received by a plaintiff who suffered an
adverse reaction when the cabin of the plane was sprayed
with an aerosol intended to prevent the introduction of
harmful insects into Australia. 2  The plaintiff alleged
that she slept through an announcement that, in accord-
ance with Australian health and agriculture requirements,
the cabin was to be sprayed with a non-toxic insecticide.
Passengers were told to remain seated and place a hand-
kerchief over their mouth and nose if aerosol spray caused
them discomfort. The plaintiff experienced some discom-
fort that caused her to be confined to her hotel room for a
number of days. The plaintiff then flew on to New Zea-
land, where she was sprayed again. Her reaction this time
was more severe and required a trip to a local hospital.
When told that they would be sprayed again upon arrival
in Tahiti, the plaintiff cut short her trip and returned to
the United States, where she was not sprayed upon
arrival.
In dismissing the case, the district court noted that
Qantas was merely observing government regulations and
used a spray that had been approved by the World Health
Organization, which states in its publications that the
compound was safe for use on aircraft. According to the
court, whatever affirmative duty Qantas had towards its
passengers was satisfied by its announcement prior to
'-' Id. at 59.
200 Id.
o, No. 88 8642 RO (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1990) (LEXIS Genfed Library, Dist file).
202 Id.
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spraying. 0
In an action that apparently inspired an episode of L.A.
Law, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Abourezk v. New York Airlines, Inc. 204 affirmed the decision of
the district court granting summary judgment in favor of
an airline that had allegedly falsely imprisoned a former
United States Senator who insisted on leaving the plane
after it sat on the taxiway at Washington National Airport
for over three hours.
Abourezk, a former U.S. Senator from South Dakota,
boarded New York Air Flight 30, which was scheduled to
depart at 4:30 p.m. from Washington, D.C., to New York.
The airplane left the gate at 4:30 but sat on the runway for
three hours. The plane finally arrived in New York at 8:35
p.m. As a result, Mr. Abourezk missed a reception at the
United Nations being given in honor of one of his clients.
While sitting on the taxiway in Washington D.C.,
Abourezk asked the pilot three times to allow him to
deplane. The request was denied each time. Abourezk
filed suit, asserting that New York Air was liable to him for
false imprisonment and infliction of emotional distress.
The district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. Abourezk appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court. The decision is noteworthy more for the con-
curring opinion of Justice Harry Edwards than the
majority's discussion of the proper application of District
of Columbia law. Justice Edwards noted that the district
court and the majority had failed to address the federal
preemption issue. Justice Edwards contended that section
1305(a)(1) of Title 49 of the United States Code, which
provides that no State shall enforce any law which has the
force and effect of law relating to "rates, routes, or serv-
ices of any air carrier", preempted any suit such as the
one before it.20 5
203 Id.
2- 895 F.2d 1456, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
203 Id. at 1459.
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In Vantassell-Matin v. Nelson,2°6 a district court in Illinois
dismissed a complaint by two airline passengers against
two other passengers and the airline for slander, libel, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress after a defend-
ant passenger complained that plaintiffs were engaged in
oral sex and other indecent activities in view of her 13-
year old daughter.
The court, appropriately enough, noted that the facts of
this case were "bizarre" but "simple.' 20 7 On March 14,
1988, the Matins and Nelsons were fellow passengers on
an American Airline flight from Munich, West Germany,
to San Diego, California, with a stop-over in Chicago, Illi-
nois. During the movie portion of the flight, Jeannie Nel-
son complained to crew members that the Matins were
engaged in oral sex and other indecent activities in the
view of her 13-year old daughter. The lead flight attend-
ant moved the Nelsons to a different part of the plane and
notified the Captain. The Captain consulted with an off-
duty FBI agent and husband of one of the other flight at-
tendants on board the flight. The agent advised the cap-
tain and crew to make a discreet investigation. The in-
flight investigation apparently turned up nothing unusual.
The court, however, in a footnote added that this would
seem to be a matter of interpretation since one flight at-
tendant did say in her incident report that she had seen a
blanket over the lap of the plaintiff-husband and that "I
thought I saw him zip up his fly underneath the
blanket." 20 8
When the plane landed in Chicago, the plaintiffs were
arrested by the police and the FBI. Two other non-par-
ties were arrested on charges stemming from a fracas that
erupted when a flight attendant tried to stop the plaintiffs.
They were described by police as "voyeurs", and they had
become incensed when a flight attendant tried to stop the
- 741 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
207 Id.
2os id. at 701 n.3.
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couple and had pelted her with food and drink.20 9 The
incident was reported by the wire services and local news-
papers. One police officer was quoted as saying this was
not an unprecedented incident on the airline whose slo-
gan is "something special in the air."1210
As a result of the publicity, the plaintiffs brought ac-
tions against the complaining passengers and the airlines.
In dismissing the action, the court, held that: (1) Illinois
law applied to claims of privilege; (2) statements by de-
fendant passengers to police upon landing of the aircraft
were subject to absolute privilege; (3) statements to flight
attendants and to off-duty FBI agent during flight were
subject to, at least, qualified privilege; (4) factual allega-
tions that the alleged sexual conduct did not occur were
insufficient pleading of specific facts to show existence of
actual malice; and (5) statements by airline which did not
identify plaintiffs were not "of and concerning" plaintiffs
so as to support libel action by reason of the fact that, in
newspaper reports of those statements, plaintiffs were
identified by information which reporters obtained from
other sources.21
In Morris v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. ,212 a Michigan federal
district court held that, under federal common law, an ex-
culpatory clause contained in an employee's free airline
pass was valid. The suit grew out of the crash of North-
west Flight 255 just after take-off from Detroit Metropoli-
tan Airport on August 16, 1987. The decedent, an off-
duty flight attendant, was travelling from her work base in
Detroit to her home in Phoenix. The decedent was travel-
ling on a free travel pass issued by the airline. The pass
contained a clause that stated that the holder assumed all
risks incidental to the flight and exonerated the airline
from liability for any loss, damage, injury, or death. The
personal representative of the decedent's estate moved to
2 Id. at 701 n.4.
210 Id. at 712.
211 Id. at 703-07.
212 737 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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invalidate the clause to the extent that it exonerated
Northwest from liability for any ordinary negligence that
caused decedent's death.
In making its decision, the court first noted that the va-
lidity of the exculpatory clause would be governed by fed-
eral law.213 The court noted that the deregulation of the
airlines has not modified a long line of pre-deregulation
cases that established that federal law preempted state law
in this area. 4
The court then held the clause in question valid as a
matter of federal common law.215 Passes such as this, said
the court, are gratuitous and inure to the employee's ben-
efit. An employee using such a pass is, therefore, a gratui-
tous licensee, and the sole duty of the airline was to
neither wantonly nor willfully injure her. After citing to a
long line of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit cases, the
court stated that it would decline "to ignore forty years of
precedent" and would not invalidate the exculpatory
clause, as requested. 1 6
In another action arising out of the crash of Northwest
Flight 255, the district court held that the Michigan
Wrongful Death Act did not allow the husband of an air-
line employee to recover damages for the death of a fetus
in the crash.21 7 Roberta Rademacher died while working
as a flight attendant on Flight 255. The facts established
that she was pregnant and had a due date of January, 3,
1988. The decedent's husband brought an action as the
personal representative of the unborn child under the
Michigan Wrongful Death Statute. 1 8 Northwest moved
to dismiss the claim on the theory that the Act did not
allow recovery in this case because the fetus was not via-
ble when it was fatally injured.
213 Id. at 428-29.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 424.
216 Id.
217 In re Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport on August 16, 1987, 737 F.
Supp. 427 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
2,8 MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2922 (West 1990).
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The case presented the court with the difficult task of
deciding the impact of the Supreme Court's recent abor-
tion decisions, Roe v. Wade219 and Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services 220 on wrongful fetal death actions. The
case was further complicated by the plaintiff's attempt to
admit evidence from a Dr. John C. Wilke, the President of
the National Right to Life Committee, on the viability of a
fetus. 22 1
The court noted that Roe established that a fetus is via-
ble when it is "potentially able to live outside the mother's
womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability is usually placed
at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier,
even at 24 weeks. ' 222 The Supreme Court in Webster,
however, noted that a state regulation that required via-
bility testing at twenty weeks was not unreasonable. 2
What Webster did not do was overturn Roe with respect to
viability, nor did it find as a matter of law that viability
occurs at twenty weeks.
The plaintiff's attempted submission of a letter from
Dr. Wilke that he knew of "twenty tiny survivors" whose
chronological age fell into the twentieth, twenty-first,
twenty-second and twenty-third weeks of gestational age
was not sufficient to create genuine issues of fact sufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Expert evidence offered in support of a motion for sum-
mary judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
56(e) must be admissible as evidence at trial. The court
found that Dr. Wilke's proffered evidence was "so lacking
in probative value and reliability that no reasonable ex-
pert could base an opinion on the data.... Further, when
an expert becomes an advocate for a cause, he therefore
departs from the ranks of an objective expert witness, and
any resulting testimony would be unfairly prejudicial and
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2- 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
221 In re Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport on August 16, 1987, 737 F.
Supp. at 430.
222 Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
223 Webster, 109 S.Ct. at 3057.
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misleading. "224 The court therefore accepted the Roe
proposition that a fetus does not become viable until it
reaches twenty-five weeks. Since the evidence of a so-
nogram taken of Mrs. Rademacher shortly before her
death indicated that the fetus could not be more than 22.8
weeks old, the court ruled the fetus was non-viable as a
matter of law. The court therefore granted defendants
motion for summary judgment.22 5
The Fifth Circuit, in Douglas v. Delta Airlines, applied a
Texas common-law rule that allows the families of air-
crash victims to recover for loss of future inheritance.2 2 6
The court held that such damages are permissible only
upon a showing that the decedent would have managed
the family's assets in such a way as to create a "premium"
value over and above that which the family could create
themselves through conservative financial investments.
Under the Texas rule, the damages available for the loss
of future inheritance are to be calculated by noting the
difference between what the decedent's estate would have
been worth in the future if the passenger was a talented
and aggressive investor and the estate's future worth is
calculated by estimating growth gained through risk-free
investments. The court added, however, that this was not
simply a matter of subtracting one interest rate from an-
other but also involved a calculation of the effects of com-
pounding the higher rate of return that an aggressive
investor was likely to generate.
The district court awarded future inheritance damages
based on a finding that the decedent possessed remarka-
ble financial skill, but the court of appeals reversed the
method the district court used in calculating those dam-
ages because that court failed to subtract the rate of re-
turn likely to be generated by the survivors. The court
2" In re Air Crash at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 737 F. Supp 427, 430 (E. D.
Mich. 1989), aff'd mem., 917 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1990).
22- 737 F. Supp. at 430.
226 No. 89-5545 (5th Cir. April 9, 1990), reported in Air Safety Wk., Volume 4,
Number 30, July 30, 1990.
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concluded by upholding the district court's award of
$3,531,615 for loss of future earnings. In upholding the
district court on this point, the court of appeals rejected
the defendants' contention that the decedent would have
received no promotions for the rest of his professional
life.
In a motion for summary judgment, the court in
Charnalia v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. 227 was faced with the is-
sue of whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be in-
voked by a passenger on a Piedmont Airways flight to
sustain his claim of negligence against the airline.
The plaintiff was a passenger on a Piedmont flight from
Washington, D.C. to Kalamazoo, Michigan, via Dayton,
Ohio. After takeoff, the Boeing 737-200 aircraft exper-
ienced rudder difficulty, causing the aircraft to yaw vio-
lently from side to side. The plaintiff, who was not in his
seat at the time of the event, alleged that he was injured
when he was thrown to the floor as a result of the yaw.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Piedmont. A key requirement of res ipsa loquitur is that the
event causing the plaintiff's injuries be "of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negli-
gence. '228 The court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to
sustain his negligence claim on the basis of res ipsa loquitur
because the plaintiff could offer no proof that the cause or
causes of the aircraft's mid-air yaw was most likely the re-
sult of negligence on the part of the defendant.
B. Denied Boarding, Exclusion, or Removal from Aircraft
In Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc. ,229 a quadriplegic, re-
turning to Jackson, Mississippi, from a trip to the White
House as the National Easter Seals representative, missed
a connecting flight from Nashville to Jackson when an
American Airlines flight crew would not allow him to
leave the plane until every other passenger had departed.
227 No. 89-1620-Z, slip op. at 5 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1990).
228 Id. slip op. at 6.
2- 738 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
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Prior to landing in Nashville the plaintiff, Walt Shinault,
had advised the flight crew that it was important that he
make his connecting flight since he had a press confer-
ence scheduled in Jackson regarding his efforts on behalf
of the National Easter Seals campaign for the medically
disadvantaged. The flight crew explained that it was the
policy of the airline to not allow "handicapped" passen-
gers to deplane until all of the plane's "able bodied" pas-
sengers had left. He was then denied permission to board
the connecting flight even though that flight had not yet
departed. As a result, the plaintiff spent five hours in a
strapless, backless wheelchair provided by the airline, with
his neck propped against a wall since his personal wheel-
chair had been forwarded with the connecting flight. The
plaintiff complained to the carrier's executive office with-
out satisfactory results, and therefore, filed suit.
A Mississippi district court held that monetary damages
were not available to the plaintiff for American Airline's
alleged violations of the Air Carrier Access Act
(ACAA) 230 The court noted that the ACAA states that:
(1) No air carrier may discriminate against any otherwise
qualified handicapped individual, by reason of such handi-
cap, in the provision of air transportation. (2) For the pur-
pose of paragraph (1) of this subsection the term
"handicapped individual" means any individual who has a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities, has a record of such imrpair-
ment, or is regarded as having such an impairment.
When the Act was passed in 1986, the Secretary of Trans-
portation intended to promulgated specific regulations
for airlines.
The court pointed out that Congress intended to pro-
vide the same remedies under the ACAA as were available
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.232 Case law under
the Rehabilitation Act provides that compensatory, emo-
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tional distress, and punitive damages are not available and
hence will not be available under the ACAA. 3
The court, however, denied plaintiff's demand for equi-
table relief under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
This doctrine applies where the enforcement of a claim
requires the resolution of issues under a regulatory
scheme and where Congress has made an administrative
body responsible for developing that regulatory scheme.
The court found that it would be improper to draft its
own regulations to govern American Airline's dealings
with physically challenged people when the Secretary of
Transportation is in the process of drafting those same
regulations. Accordingly, the district court granted the
defendants motion to dismiss the complaint.
A passenger who was bumped from an overbooked
flight to Cancun brought an action against the airline
seeking compensatory and punitive damages in Semrod v.
Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A. Corp..234 The plaintiff
and his teenage children were booked on a flight from
Philadelphia to Cancun, Mexico. The flight on which they
were booked was late, and the plaintiff was forced to stand
on a long line at the terminal for hours before being told
that he and his family were being bumped. Following its
own priority rules for boarding, the airline asked each
passenger if they would volunteer to take another flight
and compensated each bumped passenger for denied
seating, thus adhering to all D.O.T. regulations pertain-
ing to overbooking.
The court found that the carrier did not violate its pri-
ority rules or fail to offer compensation to the plaintiff. It
further found that the defendant airline did not engage in
misrepresentation by failing to provide a flight pursuant
to a confirmed representation. The court did find, as de-
fendant had conceded, that defendant breached its con-
tract to transport the plaintiff to his destination. 235  The
2" Id. at 197.
2-4 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,747 (D.N.J. 1990).
235 Id.
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court awarded compensatory damages to the plaintiff but
found that the plaintiff did not establish any wantonly
reckless or malicious conduct on the part of the defend-
ant. The court awarded the plaintiff $3,000 for the intan-
gible pleasure of a lost vacation day in Cancun, a food
allowance of $300, and a room allowance of $250.
In West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. ,236 a case that may have
a somewhat more significant impact upon the airlines, the
Ninth Circuit held that a passenger may sue a carrier
under state law after being bumped from an overbooked
flight.
On September 3, 1986, plaintiff West had purchased a
non-refundable, non-changeable ticket from Great Falls,
Montana, to Arlington, Virginia, on a Northwest flight
scheduled to depart at 1:30 p.m. on October 7, 1986.
West confirmed his flight with his travel agent on October
6, 1990. Northwest, in the meantime, substituted a DC-9,
with a 78-passenger capacity, for a Boeing 727, which
seats 146 passengers. Apparently, there was an almost
unanimous desire on the part of the 146 passengers to
leave Great Falls immediately, for only 3 passengers vol-
unteered to deplane. Mr. West was bumped from the
flight. Northwest offered West a later flight to Dulles, in-
stead of Arlington, that would arrive at 3:00 a.m. the fol-
lowing morning, six hours later than originally scheduled.
Mr. West declined the offer and flew to Arlington two
weeks later.
West filed suit, claiming that Northwest breached its
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Montana
law, alleging unjust discrimination under § 404(b) of the
Federal Aviation Act. The district court granted North-
west's summary judgment motion on the grounds that
§ 404(b) was no longer in force and that West's state law
claim was preempted by federal law. West appealed on
the latter ground. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the
district court's grant of summary judgment, held that
2-6 No. 89-35820 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, App. file).
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West's claim was neither explicitly nor implicitly pre-
empted by federal law. In addition, West's state law claim
did not conflict with federal law. As to the lack of any ex-
plicit preemption, the court noted that in the "instant case
state law simply imposes a duty on all persons entering
into contracts to act with good faith and fair dealing. The
fact that this duty is applicable to airlines as well as the
general public does not invoke federal preemption. 2 37
The court went on to note that there was no indication
that Congress intended that federal law occupy the spe-
cific field covered by state law. As to any conflict with fed-
eral law, the court stated that Northwest had offered no
reason to believe that requiring it to conform to Mon-
tana's duty of good faith would prevent it from following
federal regulations. The case was reversed and
remanded.
C. Cargo and Baggage
In Reece v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. ,238 a bereaved family initi-
ated an action against Delta for negligent infliction of
emotional distress brought on by the mishandling of a
corpse flown from Maine to North Carolina. The airline
delivered the corpse 15 hours late, and both the corpse
and casket were in a damaged condition when finally de-
livered to the consignee.
The district court granted Delta's motion for summary
judgment limiting Delta's liability to fifty cents per pound
as noted by the contract terms in the air waybill. There
was no evidence as to the decedent's weight at the time of
shipment. Under the "released value doctrine", an air car-
rier may limit its liability if the shipper has reasonable no-
tice of the rate structure and is given the option of paying
a higher freight rate upon a greater declaration of value.
A plaintiff who has been properly notified of the opportu-
nity to declare a higher value cannot avoid having the de-
237 Id.
238 731 F. Supp. 1131 (D. Me. 1990).
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fendant's liability limited merely by bringing an action
that sounds in tort rather than in contract. The limitation
provisions in the air waybill cover all cargo shipments, in-
cluding shipments of human remains. The notice provi-
sion in the air waybill was deemed to provide reasonable
notice to the plaintiffs, particularly inview of the fact that
their agent, the Maine funeral home, was experienced in
the shipping of human remains.
In Hampton v. Federal Express Corp. ,259 the survivors of a
13-year-old cancer patient who died while awaiting a
bone-marrow transplant operation sued Federal Express
for negligent failure to deliver blood samples required for
matching her with a potential bone-marrow donor. The
sample was lost, the infant cancer patient never obtained
a bone-marrow transplant, and she subsequently died.
The pertinent air waybill contained a clause limiting liabil-
ity for loss or damage to $100. The child's family sued,
seeking damages in the amount of $3,081,000. The trial
court granted Federal Express' motion for partial sum-
mary judgment on the basis of the released value doctrine
and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $100.
The court of appeals affirmed. In so holding the court
noted that the "released value doctrine" of federal com-
mon law requires that in order to successfully limit its lia-
bility the carrier must present the shipper with a
reasonable opportunity to declare a value for the ship-
ment above the maximum value set by the carrier, to pay
an additional fee, and thereby to be insured at a higher
rate should the shipment go awry.24 ° In this case, the
contract of carriage between the shipper, the patient's
hospital, and Federal Express, clearly limited the liability
of the carrier to $100 and provided the shipper with an
opportunity to declare a higher value. The court of ap-
peals then turned to the question of whether the released
value doctrine applies in a suit brought by a plaintiff who
was not a party to the contract of carriage. The court held
2-914 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1990).
240 Id. at 1121.
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that the plaintiff failed to cite any authority that supported
his position that the released value doctrine did not
apply.2 41
In addition, since the carrier had no knowledge that the
packages shipped contained blood samples of a cancer pa-
tient in need of a bone-marrow transplant, the nature and
extent of the damages to be suffered by the patient due to
the carrier's failure to deliver the packages were not rea-
sonably foreseeable and, hence, were not recoverable in a
breach-of-contract action.242 Moreover, the plaintiff could
not recover on a negligence theory since the lack of fore-
seeability precluded any finding that Federal Express
owed a duty to the patient.2 43
In Feature Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental Airlines, Inc. ,244
the district court granted summary judgment limiting
Continental's liability to $1,250 for the loss of a suitcase
allegedly containing jewelry worth $175,000. The plain-
tiff, a national jewelry manufacturer based in New York,
sent out its sales force with suitcases full of jewelry to be
delivered to stores in other cities. It was the standard
practice of the plaintiff to transport all its jewelry as regu-
lar luggage without notifying the airline of the value of the
luggage. It was also the practice of the plaintiff not to
have its employees send its jewelry by air freight and not
to pay a fee to increase the airline's liability limitation.
The plaintiff's salesman arrived at Newark airport,
checked his bags at curbside, turned around, and then
turned back to find the jewelry missing.
The applicable Continental tariff provided that it would
not be liable for jewelry loss and its liability would be lim-
ited to $1,250 for all other cargo. The court rejected de-
fendant's contention that the exculpatory clause as to the
jewelry was enforceable but held that Continental's liabil-
24 Id. at 1122.
24 Id. at 1124.
21 Id. at 1126.
244 745 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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ity could effectively be limited to $1,250.245 In addition,
specific notice of the carrier's limitation was provided in
large print on the sales person's ticket. The court found
that the ticket's language and type size provided reason-
able notice to the passenger of the limitation. In addition,
the plaintiff provided no evidence that the carrier appro-
priated the jewelry for its own use, which could have been
another ground for not enforcing the limitation.246
In Welliver v. Federal Express Corp. ,247 a shipper brought
an action against Federal Express to recover for the loss
of goods entrusted to the carrier. Finding that Federal
Express did not give the shipper adequate notice of limi-
tation of liability in its air waybill, the district court dis-
missed defendant's motion to limit plaintiffs' damages to
$500.248
In 1987, the plaintiff, an artist, had his printer ship two
original watercolors from Philadelphia to New York. The
printer contacted Federal Express to arrange for ship-
ment of the paintings. When the Federal Express courier
arrived at the printer's office, he advised the printer that
he did not have time to wait for the printer to fill out the
appropriate waybills. The printer agreed to let the cou-
rier fill out the waybill and provided the courier with the
necessary particulars on a separate piece of paper. When
the printer requested a receipt, the courier provided her
with a blank shipper's copy of the air waybill. The front of
the waybill limited Federal Express' liability to $100. The
back of the waybill provided that the shipper could de-
clare a higher value and have his/her freight rate in-
creased accordingly. In the case of items of
"extraordinary" value, such higher declaration could not
exceed $500.249
The paintings were lost in transit. Plaintiffs (the printer
245 Id. at 199-202.
246 Id. at 200.
247 737 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
248 Id. at 208.
249 Id. at 206.
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and the artist) sought to recover the full value of the art-
work. In their complaint, the plaintiffs stated four causes
of actions alleging (1) a breach of the contract of carriage;
(2) negligence based on the loss of the package; (3) negli-
gence based on the courier's promise to fill out the way-
bill and his failure to do so; and (4) fraud based on the
courier's knowledge that his promise to fill out the waybill
was false when he made it. Federal Express sought to
limit its damages to $500.250
The district court began its discussion by noting that
the declared-value limitation has survived the deregula-
tion of the airline industry and has become established as
part of the federal common law of air carrier liability. The
court then went on to note that the declared-value limita-
tion applies whether the action sounds in tort or cow.
tract.2 5' Defendant had argued that shipper had
reasonable notice of the limitation provision of its waybill
because she had requested that the package be shipped
pursuant to a waybill and had received a copy of it. Fur-
ther, the shipper had shipped with Federal Express previ-
ously using waybills with identical language.
The court explained that the enforceability of any such
limitation of liability depends on whether the limitation
represents a fair, open, just, and reasonable agreement
between the carrier and the shipper for the purpose of
obtaining shipments at rates proportional to the degree of
risk involved. Further, the shipper must be given an op-
portunity to increase liability limits in return for the pay-
ment of higher freight charges. In deciding whether these
threshold requirements are met, the court will consider
whether the carrier has given the shipper adequate notice
of any limitation, the commercial sophistication of the
parties, and the availability of 'spot' insurance for the in-
creased coverage.2 52
Based on the facts, the court found that the shipper did
250 Id.
251 Id. at 207.
252 /d
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not have adequate notice. The facts indicated that the
courier never did give the shipper the opportunity to fill
out or review the waybill. In addition, the shipper was not
even given a chance to read the terms of the blank waybill
until after the departure of the courier, who absolutely,
positively had to be somewhere else. The shipper there-
fore did not have the opportunity to declare a higher
value. The district court remanded the proceedings to
the Magistrate for an inquest on the value of the lost
watercolors. 5 3
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Federal Express
Corp. , 254 the court denied a defendant air cargo company's
motion for summary judgment to limit its liability to $100
where cargo was lost due to its failure to provide constant
surveillance services. Although the shipper did not de-
clare value for the parcel, the shipper had insured the
package with the plaintiff insurance company and had
purchased the "constant surveillance service" from the
defendant cargo company for an additional fee.255
The court found that a provision limiting liability of the
cargo company that appeared on the air waybill and in the
Federal Express Service Guide did not operate to limit lia-
bility because the limitation of liability did not appear
under the heading of "Constant Surveillance Services",
and, thus, no language in the Federal Express Service
Guide limited the defendant's liability with regard to such
services. The court also held that the breach of defend-
ant's promise to provide surveillance and the frustration it
caused the plaintiff in its efforts to recover the merchan-
dise created a separate cause of action not limited by the
contractual agreement to limit defendant's general liabil-
ity to $100.00.256 In Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency v.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,2 57 the Civil Court for the City of
253 Id. at 207-08.
2- 145 Misc. 2d 801, 548 N.Y.S.2d 422 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1989).
255 Id.
26 Id.
257 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,143 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1990).
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New York granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the
ground that the KLM Cargo Rules Tariff barred plaintiff's
recovery. Plaintiff sought to recover $11,388.69 for loss
allegedly caused by defendant's failure to ship in a timely
fashion and to care for flowers sent from Holland to the
United States.
In reaching its decision to dismiss the case, the court
noted that a shipper is deemed to have notice of tariffs
filed with the Department of Transportation (DOT) even
in the wake of deregulation. Because KLM's tariff con-
tained a provision that placed the risk for damage to per-
ishable shipments on the shipper, the court held that
KLM was not liable.
In United States Gold Corp. v. Federal Express Corp. ,258 the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted defendant's motion for partial summary judg-
ment to limit its liability for lost cargo to $100.00. Plain-
tiff had shipped a package containing gold valued at
$101,761.16 that was never received at its final destina-
tion. Federal Express paid plaintiff $100.00 plus $18.50
as a freight reimbursement. The shipper instituted suit
for the remainder of its damages.
In assessing whether defendant's liability limitation was
enforceable, the court considered (1) whether the limita-
tion of liability was the result of a fair, open, just, and rea-
sonable agreement between the carrier and the shipper,
entered into by the shipper for the purpose of obtaining
the lower of two or more rates of charges proportional to
the risk, and (2) whether the shipper was given the option
of a higher recovery upon payment of a higher rate. 59
The court found that the first test was satisfied because
both the shipper and the carrier were sophisticated com-
mercial entities that had done business together in the
past. Further, the court noted that, because the defend-
ant had previously lost a package shipped by plaintiff,
plaintiff was well aware of defendant's liability limitation.
2- 719 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
259 id. at 1224.
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The court also recognized that plaintiff had obtained in-
surance for the shipment from an outside insurer. The
second test was also satisfied because plaintiff had a clear
opportunity to obtain full loss coverage from defendant
by declaring value.2 °
In Gin v. Wackenhut Corp. ,261 the federal district court in
Hawaii held that an airport security company, which was
sued for negligent bailment following the loss of a trav-
eler's bag at a security checkpoint, was not protected by
the limitation of liability found on the back of the trav-
eler's airline ticket. The court held that the ticket tariff
applied only to an airline's liability and not to the liability
of an agent of the airline.
D. Limitation of Actions
In Ocasio-Jurabe v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 2 62 the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, acting pursuant to responses
to certified questions presented to the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico, held that an action brought against Eastern
Airlines sounded in tort rather than in contract and that
Puerto Rico's one year statute of limitations governed the
action.
The plaintiff was travelling on a San Juan-to- California
round-trip ticket purchased from Eastern. During the
Miami-to-San Juan leg of the return journey on August 4,
1985, Eastern received a telephone call indicating that a
bomb had been placed on board the plane. In response
to this call, the plane was ordered to make an emergency
landing on Caicos Island. Upon landing, the passengers
were evacuated from the plane using the plane's emer-
gency chutes. The plaintiff was injured during the evacua-
tion procedure.
Plaintiff filed suit against Eastern on August 20, 1987,
two years after the incident, in the United States District
2 Id. at 1225.
26, No. 89-00-0097-SPR (opinion published in the Advance Sheets at 741 F.
Supp. 1454 but withdrawn from bound volume at the court's request).
262 902 F.2d 117 (1st Cir. 1990).
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Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The court granted
Eastern's motion to dismiss on the ground that the action
was time barred under Puerto Rico's one-year statute of
limitation for tort action. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal.
E. General Liability of Other Operators and Owners of Aircraft
The Eleventh Circuit, in Hiatt v. United States,2 63 held
that the United States' allegations of pilot negligence
were sufficient to state an indemnity or contribution claim
against the owner of an aircraft in a wrongful death ac-
tion. Shirley Hiatt brought an FFCA action against the
United States, alleging that air traffic controller negli-
gence was the proximate cause of a mid-air collision of a
Cessna 421 and Cessna 172 over Fort Lauderdale, Flor-
ida, that killed her husband. The United States filed a
third-party complaint seeking indemnity or contribution
from the owner and from the personal representative of
the pilot of the airplane in which Mr. Hiatt was a
passenger.26
At trial, the pilot in question was found to be 75% at
fault for the collision and the controllers 25%. The court,
therefore, granted contribution to the U.S. from the pilot
but refused to grant contribution against the airplane's
owner. The trial court rejected the government's position
that Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine should
hold the owner vicariously liable for the negligence of the
pilot on the ground that the government never properly
briefed the issue. 65
The court of appeals reversed the holding that the gov-
ernment failed to allege or brief the dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine and therefore, remanded for
reconsideration.266 The doctrine, the court noted, im-
putes an operator's negligence to the owner when the op-
263 910 F.2d 737 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
2- Id. at 739-40.
265 Id.
2- Id. at 740.
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erator is using an inherently dangerous product with the
consent of the owner.
IV. LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS
A. General
In Commander Properties Corp. v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,267 the
dispute arose between the plaintiff, an owner/purchaser
of a Beech King-Air Model 90, and its manfacturer Beech
Aircraft, over the airworthiness of the design of the air-
craft. The defendant's answer contained an affirmative
defense that the question of airworthiness was a question
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the FAA. The U.S.
District Court in Kansas held that this was not a valid de-
fense but noted that the FAA had primary jurisdiction
over many of the issues before the court, including
whether the design was defective and whether a proposed
modification would correct the defect.
Based on United States v. Western Pacific R. R. ,268 the court
stated that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies in
cases "where a claim, originally cognizable in the courts,
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed in the hands of an administra-
tive body. '2 69 In cases where the doctrine of primary ju-
risdiction applies, the judicial process must be suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body
for its views.
To determine whether the doctrine applies in a given
case, the court must decide whether the reasons for the
existence of the doctrine are present and whether the pur-
poses it serves will be aided by its application in the par-
ticular litigation. The primary purpose of the doctrine is
to attain uniformity in decisions regarding administrative
and technical issues by an agency having expertise and
specialized knowledge in the area. The court determined
267 745 F. Supp. 650 (D. Kan. 1990).
2- 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956).
29 745 F. Supp. at 652.
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that the questions of whether the wing design of the air-
craft was defective and whether a proposed wing modifi-
cation would correct the defect were particularly
appropriate for resolution by the FAA. Thus, the court
found that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applied to
this claim and placed the burden of pursuing an adminis-
trative remedy on the plaintiff.270
In Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp.,271 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that Alaska's two-year statute of limitations for
wrongful-death actions was not tolled pending an NTSB
investigation into the cause of the crash. The action
brought by the personal representative of a passenger
killed in an airplane crash against the manufacturer of the
aircraft was properly time-barred by the trial court.
The case arose in the aftermath of the crash of a Piper
aircraft in the Brooks Range of mountains in Alaska. Both
the pilot, Kenneth Swanson, and his passenger, Merrett
Palmer, were killed. The crash occurred on September 8,
1986. The plaintiff's widow was informed of her hus-
band's death on September 11, 1986. The NTSB re-
moved the aircraft's engine on October 1, 1986, and
commenced an investigation into the cause of the crash.
The NTSB issued its findings in July of 1987. The report
concluded that there was probable cause to believe the
crash occurred due to pilot error.
On July 30, 1987, the personal representative of
Palmer's estate filed a wrongful death action against the
estate of the pilot. On September 7, 1988, one day before
the second anniversary of the crash, the pilot's estate filed
suit against the plane's manufacturer, Borg-Warner. The
Palmer estate followed suit and filed an identical action
against Borg-Warner on September 20, 1988, two years
and nine days after having learned of the accident.
Borg-Warner moved for, and the trial court granted,
summary judgment on the ground that the action against
270 Id.
27 1 No. 3646 (Alaska Nov. 16, 1990) (LEXIS, All States library, Alaska file).
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the manufacturer was barred by the two-year statute of
limitations. The Alaska Supreme Court, in upholding the
trial court's decision, noted that the Alaskan statute of
limitations normally begins to run on the date the plaintiff
suffers the injury. Alaska has adopted the so-called dis-
covery rule, which tolls statutes of limitation in cases
where the plaintiff lacks immediate notice of a claim.
Under this rule, the trigger date for the limitation period
is the date when a reasonable person has enough informa-
tion to alert that person that he or she has a potential
cause of action or should begin an inquiry to protect his
or her rights.
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the trial court
rightfully decided that the trigger date was September 11,
1986, when the potential plaintiffs were notified of the
death as well as the discovery of the wreckage. The po-
tential plaintiffs had an obligation from that point in time
to investigate in a meaningful manner to determine
whether they had claims against any potential defendants.
The court, however, rejected plaintiff's contention that it
did not have reasonable notice of its claim against the
manufacturer until after the issuance of the NTSB report.
The NTSB investigation was not undertaken for the bene-
fit of the estate, and its purpose was not to identify poten-
tial tortfeasors.
Similarly, the court rejected the argument that, because
the estate did not have access to the wreckage, the statute
must have been tolled while the NTSB was conducting its
investigation. The court held that, even if the NTSB in-
vestigation precluded the estate's own investigation ef-
forts, the estate still had fourteen months after the NTSB
released the wreckage to conduct its own investigation
into the cause of the crash before the limitations period
expired.
InJ & B Co. v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp. ,272 the plaintiffs in-
stituted a product liability action against the defendant for
272 911 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1990).
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injuries arising out of a crash of an airplane owned by the
plaintiffs. The airplane had been manufactured in 1973
by the Bellanca Aircraft Corporation ("Bellanca") in
1973. Bellanca had undergone a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
reorganization in 1981, and a new company bearing the
same name was created. The plaintiff's airplane crash-
landed in Maryland in 1985, allegedly due to a design de-
fect that allowed water to collect in the fuel system. The
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on the
ground that under either Minnesota law or FAA regula-
tions the defendant was not liable as a successor corpora-
tion. The plaintiff appealed.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the dis-
trict court's decision, noted that the district court was ob-
ligated to follow the choice-of-law rules of the state of
Minnesota and that under Minnesota's choice-of-law rules
(a five-factor interest analysis) the substantive law of Min-
nesota was correctly applied. 73 Based on Minnesota law,
the court of appeals rejected plaintiff's argument that, be-
cause it had serviced the predecessor's product, the suc-
cessor corporation is obligated to a customer for defects
in that product of its predecessor. Summary judgment
was permissible since, on the evidence submitted, a rea-
sonable jury could not have found that Bellanca had suc-
ceeded to any of its predecessor's service contracts.274 In
closing, the court noted that the plaintiff had asserted that
FAA regulations preempted Minnesota law. The court
agreed with the trial court's analysis that there was noth-
ing within relevant FAA regulations that preempted Min-
nesota law.275
In Sapp v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,276 a pilot was killed when
an airplane he was piloting crashed at an airport after hit-
ting some tall pine trees on its approach to the runway.
27- Id. at 153.
274 Id. at 154.
275 Id.
26 564 So. 2d 418 (Ala. 1990).
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The crash also resulted in damage to the right wing and
right propeller of the aircraft. The co-pilot had stated
that, during the second impact of the plane with the trees,
the decedent pilot's seatbelt became unfastened. In the
opinion of an expert witness, the seatbelt would have had
to have failed since it would not have become unfastened
in the absence of a defect in the buckle.
The administrator of the estate brought an action
against the manufacturer, contending that the seat belt, a
component part manufactured by Beech, was defective
within the meaning of the Alabama Extended Manufac-
turer's Liability Doctrine. Under this doctrine, a plaintiff
must show that the injury was caused by one who sold a
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the plaintiff as the ultimate user.
The court stated that the fact of an injury does not es-
tablish the presence of a defect and that the test is met
only by showing that the product's failure to conform is
causally related in fact to the product's defective condi-
tion at the time of sale.277 The burden of proving that the
product was defective at the time it left the hands of the
seller is on the plaintiff. The evidence before the court
showed that, during the second impact, the decedent's
seatbelt failed. That did not show that the seatbelt was
defective at the time the airplane left the hands of Beech
Aircraft Corp. The court affirmed the lower court's sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant.278
In Karstetter v. Midstate Aviation, Inc. ,279 the court granted
summary judgment to a component-part manufacturer
who contended that the faulty part was not his product.
The action grew out of the crash of a Cessna 150 on Janu-
ary 8, 1987. During a preflight check immediately prior to
the flight, everything, including the faulty part, functioned
normally. Examination of the wreck revealed that a car-
277 Id. at 419 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So.
2d 991 (Ala. 1981)).
271 Id. at 420.
279 Av. L. Rep. (Andrews) 11,766 (May 8, 1990).
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buretor heat control lever was not securely fastened to the
shaft and that the lug nut was not tight. Both the lever and
the shaft showed excessive wear.
The component part manufacturer, Teledyne Conti-
nental Motors, asserted that the lever in question was not
its part but a replacement part. In granting Teledyne's
motion for summary judgment, the court noted that
[t]he only direct evidence the plaintiffs have is the control
lever and shaft. That is not sufficient where the manufac-
turer says it is not a control lever and shaft manufactured,
designed, or distributed by it, produces demonstrable evi-
dence showing the differences between its parts and the
subject parts, and there is evidence that such control
levers and shafts are manufactured, designed, and distrib-
uted by others.28 °
B. Allocating Fault
In Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,281 the court was faced
with questions regarding design negligence and "indivisi-
ble injuries." The plaintiff had attempted to take off from
a local New Mexico airport in a Piper Super Cub aircraft
while towing a glider attached to the tail of the aircraft.
The plaintiff was piloting the aircraft from the rear seat
and was secured in the seat by a seatbelt but not a shoul-
der harness. The front seat had been removed and re-
placed by a camera and camera mount.
During its takeoff run, the aircraft collided head-on with
a van. The van had been deliberately parked at the end of
the runway by the airport owner to prevent the plaintiff
from taking off. The airport owner had blocked the run-
way after numerous warnings to the plaintiff's employer
that the glider operations were being conducted in viola-
tion of numerous FAA regulations. In fact, the owner had
notified the FAA the day before the accident that he was
closing the airport. A hearing had been scheduled for the
2- Id. at 11,771.
28, 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989).
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morning of the flight. On impact, the fuselage broke in
two, and plaintiff's head struck the camera. The plaintiff
received serious head and brain injuries.
The plaintiff (the pilot's conservator) brought suit
against Piper alleging inadequate rear-seat visibility,
which allegedly caused the collision with the van, and a
lack of a rear-seat shoulder harness, which allegedly
caused the injuries. The district court characterized the
first claim as one sounding in "design negligence," while
the second one was characterized as one sounding in
"crashworthiness negligence." The district court entered
a judgment on a jury verdict that found that (1) Piper's
design negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's in-
juries and damages; (2) Piper's crashworthiness negli-
gence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries; and (3)
100% of plaintiff's injuries could be attributed to the
crashworthiness negligence.
In establishing the percentage of fault for the design
negligence claim, the court compared the negligence of
four parties to the suit. In establishing the percentage of
fault for the crashworthiness claim, the court only com-
pared the plaintiff's actions to Piper's. Both parties
appealed.
The Court of Appeals, applying New Mexico law, held
that "crashworthiness liability with its attendant burden of
proximate cause ... necessarily precludes a cause of ac-
tion for crashworthiness liability based upon an indivisible
injury. 2 8 2 The court noted that the standard of proof of
crashworthiness causation requires a plaintiff to prove (1)
that the design caused injuries over and above those
which otherwise would have been sustained, absent the
defect, and (2) the degree of enhancement of injuries by
proof of what injuries, if any, would have resulted had an
alternative, safer design been used.28 3
As to the district court's decision to compare the fault
202 Id. at 1546.
283 Id.
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of only Piper and the plaintiff in the crashworthiness
claim, the Court of Appeals ruled that New Mexico's pure
comparative negligence system requires that the fault of
all concurrent tort-feasors be apportioned, including any
and all original tort-feasors and crashworthiness tort-
feasors. 284 Further, both the original tort-feasors and
crashworthiness tort-feasors may be found liable for any
enhanced injuries suffered by the plaintiff.285
In Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. ,286 the Tenth Circuit
held that in product liability cases, the term "fault" in
Colorado's Comparative Fault Statute was not restricted
to assumption of risk and/or product misuse. 8 7 A widow
instituted a product liability action for the death of her
husband, who had been killed while operating a pipe-lay-
ing machine. The accident had occurred when the de-
ceased was operating the pipe-layer on a ski slope. A
colleague shouted something to him, and unable to hear,
he turned off the engine. The machine began to roll
down the slope. Unable to stop the machine as it rolled
down the slope and began to pick up speed, Hoffman rose
from his seat and tried to climb off. He became tangled in
the cable works of the machine, fell on the tracks, and was
crushed to death.
After entry ofjudgment in favor of plaintiff, the plaintiff
appealed, arguing that the court erred when it instructed
the jury that under Colorado law ordinary negligence
constitutes "fault." Plaintiff contended that under the
correct interpretation of the term "fault" her damages
would be increased by 100%. Plaintiff urged that the
term "fault" as used in the comparative fault statute
should not subsume ordinary negligence. Instead, she ar-
gued ajury should consider only plaintiff's assumption of
risk and/or product misuse in deciding the extent to
which a judgment should be reduced after a finding of 1ia-
284 Id. at 1549-50.
285 Id.
286 908 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1990).
287 Id. at 1475.
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bility on the part of the manufacturer. The court found
that the term "fault" is a general term encompassing a
broad range of comparable behavior including, but not
limited to, negligence. 88
In Mendez v. Honda Motor Co. ,289 a district court in Flor-
ida held that a manufacturer's failure to make it impossi-
ble for an untrained, inexperienced person to mount
shock absorbers on a motorcycle incorrectly is not, as a
matter of law, a design defect.
The plaintiff sued Honda for injuries received as a re-
sul of an accident on a third-hand Honda motorcycle.
The accident occurred because the shock absorbers frac-
tured while plaintiff was riding at high speed along a dirt
trail. Prior owners of the bike had removed the factory
shocks, and when the plaintiff re-installed them he posi-
tioned them upside down. The plaintiff did not consult
the owner's manual before installing the shocks. At trial,
plaintiff advanced four theories of liability: (1) Honda
negligently manufactured or designed the motorcycle so
that the shocks could be installed upside down. (2)
Honda negligently manufactured or designed the shocks.
(3) As a distributor, Honda was strictly liable for the de-
sign defect or manufacture of the motorcycle that allowed
the shock to be installed upside down. (4) As a distribu-
tor, Honda was strictly liable for defects in the shock
absorbers.
In response to defendant's motion to dismiss and to
move for partial summary judgment, the district court
held that a distributor need not inspect for latent defects
unless the product is inherently dangerous. 290 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court has defined inherently dangerous
products as those products burdened with a latent danger
that derives from the very nature of the article itself. The
district court did not believe that a shock absorber was
burdened, by its very nature, with danger.
288 Id.
289 738 F. Supp. 481 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
290 Id. at 483.
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The court also found that the manufacturer's failure to
make it possible for an untrained, inexperienced person
to mount shock absorbers correctly is, as a matter of law,
not a design defect. Further, knowlingly misusing a prod-
uct is clearly an affirmative defense to strict liability, but
the burden of proof is on the defendant to show such mis-
use. Since the plaintiff misused the shock absorbers by
reinstalling them without referring to the owner's manual,
the court granted defendant's summary judgment motion
regarding the plaintiff's first three theories of liability.
In Craigie v. General Motors Corp. ,291 the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania held that a vehicle manufacturer, that
plaintiffs sought to hold liable on a theory of strict liabil-
ity, was entitled to seek contribution from the driver. The
manufacturer could implead the driver as a third-party de-
fendant, notwithstanding the fact that claims against the
driver arose out of his alleged negligence as opposed to
strict liability.
The case arose out of an accident that occurred when
seven young men driving in a 1973 Chevy collided with
another vehicle. The driver was injured, and four passen-
gers were ejected from the car upon impact and killed.
Tests showed that the blood alcohol level of the driver
and the decedent passengers well exceeded the legal
limit.
Representatives of the estates of the dead passengers
brought suit against General Motors (GM), claiming that
the design of the vehicle was defective and that GM was
negligent in designing the vehicle. Plaintiffs alleged that
had the occupants remained inside the vehicle they would
have received only minor injuries; claiming that the vehi-
cle was not crashworthy. GM filed a third-party complaint
against the intoxicated driver.
The court stated that in a crashworthiness case under
Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff must show that the design
of the vehicle was defective and that, when the design was
-' 740 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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made, an alternative, safer design practicable under the
circumstances existed.292 Plaintiff must also show what in-
juries, if any, would have resulted to the plaintiff had the
alternative design been used.293 Finally, there must be
some method available to establish the extent of the plain-
tiff's enhanced injuries attributable to the defective de-
sign.294 The law requires that a designer take reasonable
steps to design and produce a vehicle that will minimize
unavoidable danger, but it does not require the designer
to design an accident-proof or fool-proof vehicle or one
that would withstand even the most bizarre of
accidents.295
Regarding the question of whether the negligent driver
may be impleaded in a strict liability crashworthiness case,
the court stated that in a normal product-liability case the
defendant has the right to implead a negligent defendant,
and this right is not altered by the fact that a crashworthi-
ness claim is being made. 96
C. Disclaimers
Several recent cases involve the interpretation of con-
tractual exculpatory clauses limiting remedies available to
purchasers of aircraft. In Continental Airlines v. McDonnell
Douglas,29 7 the California Court of Appeals held that Mc-
Donnell Douglas (MDC) was liable for fraud in the sale of
a DC-10 aircraft despite an exculpatory clause in the
purchase agreement. MDC filed a complaint in federal
court seeking a declaration that the exculpatory provision
of the Purchase Agreement with Continental Airlines
(Continental) barred a cause of action by Continental for
negligent misrepresentation.
Continental's claim arose from an accident that oc-
292 Id. at 358.
293 Id.
1Id.
29. Id. at 361.
2 Id.
297 216 Cal. App. 3d 388, 264 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1989).
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curred on March 1, 1978, at Los Angeles International
Airport. During a takeoff, the aircraft ran off the end of
the runway at 85 miles per hour. During the abort, the
landing gear broke through the tarmac, and was ripped
from the wing, making a hole which allowed fuel to pour
from the wing tanks. Subsequently, the fuel ignited, de-
stroying the aircraft.
Continental claimed that in sales brochures and brief-
ings MDC misrepresented to the airline the design of the
landing gear and the wing. Apparently, MDC sales
brochures and statements by sales personnel indicated
that the landing gear of the DC-10 in question was
designed to "wipe-off without rupturing the wing fuel
tank." The Detail Specification ultimately incorporated
into the Purchase Agreement used more qualified lan-
guage with respect to the landing gear breakaway charac-
teristic, stating that the landing gear "shall be designed"
so that, under certain specified load conditions failure of
the gear "is not likely" to rupture the wing fuel tanks or
fuel lines.
MDC argued that Continental's cause of action for neg-
ligent misrepresentation was barred by the Purchase
Agreement in which Continental expressly agreed to
waive all claims for negligence. The California Court of
Appeals rejected MDC's argument. According to the
court, California Civil Code § 1668, which prohibits all
contracts exempting anyone from responsibility for his
own fraud, also applies to contracts purporting to exempt
a party from negligent misrepresentation. 98 Specifically
disagreeing with the holding of the Second Circuit in To-
kio Marine and Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,299 the
California Court of Appeals ruled that under California
law, negligent misrepresentation is a form of fraud and
deceit and is included within the meaning of the word
"fraud" in Section 1668.300
298 Id. at 786.
2- 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980).
s- 264 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
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In Velasquez v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. , an action arising
from the air crash disaster at Detroit Metropolitan Airport
on August 16, 1987, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan was called upon to construe an excul-
patory clause contained in the Purchase Agreement be-
tween Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and McDonnell
Douglas Corporation (MDC). The exculpatory clause
provided that:
THE WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY PRO-
VIDED IN PART I. OF EXHIBIT "C" AND THE OBLI-
GATIONS AND LIABILITIES OF SELLER UNDER
SAID WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE POLICY ARE
EXCLUSIVE AND IN LIEU OF, AND BUYER HEREBY
WAIVES, ALL OTHER REMEDIES WARRANTIES,
GUARANTEES OR LIABILITIES, EXPRESS OR IM-
PLIED, WITH RESPECT TO EACH AIRCRAFT, PROD-
UCT AND ARTICLE DELIVERED HEREUNDER OR
ACQUIRED OR OBTAINED IN ANY MANNER FROM
ANY OTHER OPERATOR OR SOURCE, ARISING BY
LAW OR OTHERWISE (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMI-
TATION, ANY OBLIGATION OR LIABILITY OF THE
SELLER ARISING FROM NEGLIGENCE OR WITH RE-
SPECT TO FITNESS, MERCHANTABILITY, LOSS OF
USE, REVENUE OR PROFIT OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES). THE WARRANTY AND SERVICE LIFE
POLICY SHALL NOT BE EXTENDED, ALTERED OR
VARIED, EXCEPT BY A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT
SIGNED BY THE SELLER AND BUYER. 0 2
In connection with the plaintiff's claim for damages
arising from injuries sustained in the accident, Northwest
asserted cross-claims against MDC claiming contribution
or indemnity based upon MDC's negligence, violation of
law, negligent misrepresentation, gross negligence,
breach of warranty and strict liability in tort. Applying
California law, the court held that under Philippine Airlines,
Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.303 the exculpatory clause
22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,063 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Id. at 18,065 n.4.
-3 189 Cal. App. 3d 234, 234 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1987).
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barred Northwest's right to recover indemnity from MDC
under a theory of negligent conduct.3 °4 The Michigan
court also went on to hold that, under the Philippine deci-
sion, California courts would also interpret the exculpa-
tory clause to preclude contribution for claims sounding
in negligence, breach of warranty or strict liability.305 The
court stated "[w]hile there are important legal distinctions
between the concepts of contribution and indemnity,
these differences are insignificant to the determination of
the legal effect of the exculpatory clause at issue. 3 0 6
Northwest also claimed that MDC violated FAA regula-
tions in connection with its design of the accident aircraft.
Relying on California Civil Code section 1668, which pre-
cludes a party from creating a contractual provision that
protects it from "responsibility for his ... own violation of
law."'3 0 7 Northwest argued that its claims for contribution
arising from violations of FARs could not be barred by the
exculpatory clause. Rejecting this argument, the court
held, "To the extent that MDC violated any federal avia-
tion regulations, it may be held accountable in the form of
civil judgments and/or FAA sanctions. The mere fact that
Northwest is contractually precluded from similarly pur-
suing MDC does not violate the spirit of Section 1668. '308
Northwest further argued that the disclaimer language
of the contract would not preclude its claim of negligent
misrepresentation against MDC. Once again the court re-
jected Northwest's argument, ruling that a claim for negli-
gent misrepresentation is based upon negligent conduct
and that the literal terms of the exculpatory clause barred
claims based upon the negligence of MDC.3 9 According
to the court, Northwest's claim of negligent misrepresen-
tation, like other claims of misfeasance or malfeasance
- Valesquez, 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,068.
305 Id.
s0 Id.
M7 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1668 (West 1989).
- Valesquez, at 18,069.
3- Id. at 18,070.
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sounding in negligence, was barred by the exculpatory
clause contained within the purchase agreement.
Finally, Northwest argued that its claims based on gross
negligence would not be barred by the disclaimer. Simi-
larly rejecting this argument, the court ruled that Califor-
nia courts had abolished the distinction between gross
negligence and ordinary negligence. The claims of gross
negligence would be subsumed within the terms of the
clause that preclude claims of negligence.31°
The issue in Leajet Corp. v. Spenlinhauer31 1 was whether
the plaintiff purchaser of an aircraft could maintain an ac-
tion for fraudulent misrepresentation when he relied indi-
rectly on the misrepresentations of the defendant
although actual words were never conveyed directly to the
plaintiff. The defendant purchased a Lear 24F from the
manufacturer in 1977. In 1981, the FAA issued an airwor-
thiness directive reducing the permissible ceiling of the
aircraft from 51,000 to 45,000 feet. In 1983, the directive
was revised to permit use at altitudes up to 51,000 feet
provided that certain modifications were made to the air-
craft. Subsequently, the FAA issued an airworthiness di-
rective in 1984 which required that the modifications be
made to all Model 24F aircraft.
In July, 1986, the defendant had the necessary modifi-
cations performed on his aircraft by the plaintiff-manufac-
turer to comply with the FAA's 1984 airworthiness
directive. After completing the modifications, the plaintiff
billed the defendant $39,253.00 for the work. The de-
fendant refused to pay. In 1988 Learjet initiated an action
against the defendant to recover the amounts charged for
the modification of the aircraft along with interest. The
defendant denied that he was liable for the modification
fees and asserted a counterclaim alleging negligence,
breach of warranty, fraudulent and negligent misrepre-
sentation, and violation of FAA regulations. The defend-
ant sought a judgment against Learjet for the cost of
10 Id.
"1 901 F.2d 198 (1st Cir. 1990).
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complying with the FAA directive. The district court
granted Learjet's motion for summary judgment on its
claim and on all of the defendant's counterclaims. The
district court held that the defendant could not recover on
the theory of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation
because he had not personally relied on misrepresenta-
tions allegedly made by Learjet to the FAA in connection
with the certification of the aircraft. 1 2 In reversing the
district court holding, the First Circuit ruled that a de-
frauded party need not rely on direct misrepresentations
where he is within the class of persons that the defrauding
party had reason to expect would be influenced by the
misrepresentations. l
The First Circuit held that it is not necessary that the
fraudulent statement be communicated to the defrauded
party by an intended intermediary. 1 4 Instead, the court
stated it is enough that the person to whom the state-
ments were made is one whom the defrauded party
would be expected to rely. 15 In this case, the First Circuit
found that the defendant was within the class of persons
whom Learjet would have reason to expect would act in
reliance on any misrepresentations made to the FAA in
obtaining certification for Model 24F.3 ' 6 The defendant
can recover if he can demonstrate at trial that (1) Learjet
made fraudulent misstatements or concealments to the
FAA; (2) the FAA relied on these in certifying the Model
24F aircraft; (3) the defendant could not or would not
have purchased the aircraft absent FAA certification; and
(4) that the repairs mandated by the airworthiness direc-
tive would not have been required had the Model 24F
been as Learjet represented it to be to the FAA. 1 7
In Appalachian Insurance Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.318
312 Id. at 200.
sis Id. at 201.
,,4 Id. at 202.
15Id.
16 Learjet, 901 F.2d at 202.
31 Id. at 203.
-,8 214 Cal. App. 3d 1, 262 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1989).
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a subrogation action led by Applachian Insurance Com-
pany was initiated by several insurers against the McDon-
nel Douglas Corporation, Morton Thiokol, and Hitco in a
California state court. This action arose out of an unsuc-
cessful launch of the Westar VI communications satellite
into geosynchronous orbit from the payload bay of the
Space Shuttle Challenger in February, 1984. Shortly after
deployment of the satellite from the Challenger's cargo
bay, a malfunction in the exit cone attached to the solid
rocket motor of the satellite's payload assist module. This
caused the satellite to remain in a low-earth orbit, thereby
rendering it useless.
After paying Western Union (the insured) approxi-
mately $5,000,000 (out of a total claim for $105,000,000)
for their share of the loss of the satellite, the insurers
sought to recover this amount from the defendants on the
basis of negligence and strict product liability. The trial
court initially granted summary judgment against the in-
surers on their strict liability claim and thereafter granted
summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants on the
negligence claim because of exculpatory clauses con-
tained in the contract between McDonnell Douglas and
Western Union. The insurers appealed the dismissal of
their claims.5 19
A California appellate court affirmed the granting of
summary judgment for the defendants. The court deter-
mined that the exculpatory clauses at issue contained in
the contract between McDonnell Douglas and Western
Union were not ambiguous 3 20 in their disclaimer of all lia-
bility, were conscionable,3 2 ' and were not contrary to the
public interest.3 2 2 Moreover, the court held that, in light
of the specific language used, the exculpatory clauses also
barred the insurers' claims against Morton Thiokol and
319 Id.
3 Id. at 725.
321 Id. at 731.
322 Id. at 734.
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Hitco, subcontractors of McDonnell Douglas. s
The court applied California law to the strict liability
claim and held that strict tort liability may be disclaimed
in a commercial contract setting.3 2 4 Since strict liability
was properly disclaimed in this contract, the court dis-
missed the strict liability claims.
In a related action involving the unsuccessful deploy-
ment of the Indonesian Palapa B-2 communications satel-
lite during the same Space Shuttle mission, Lexington
Insurance Co. v. McDonnell Douglas, Corp.,325 a California
jury returned a verdict in favor of several other insurers in
May 1990 against Morton Thiokol for breach of war-
ranty3 2 6 but limited the insurers' damages to their propor-
tionate share of the value of the solid rocket motor
($39,000 plus interest).
D. Government Contractor Defense
The Fourth Circuit analyzed the government contractor
defense in Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 327 In that
case, the surviving spouse and children of a Navy pilot
who died in the crash of an F-18 fighter aircraft brought
suit against McDonnell Douglas, the plane's designer and
manufacturer. Plaintiff alleged that the accident had been
the result of a defectively designed landing gear. McDon-
nell Douglas moved for summary judgment, asserting the
government contractor defense. 2
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the government had ap-
proved reasonably precise specifications for the aircraft.
Beginning with the bidding process, the court found that
teams of Navy engineers met with contractors for ex-
tended discussions regarding their submissions. When
32 Id. at 727.
324 McDonnell, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
32, No. 48173 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1990).
326 A verdict was rendered in favor of all three defendants on a negligence
claim. Id.
327 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2219 (1990).
s28 Id. at 700.
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McDonnell Douglas was awarded the project, the contract
incorporated McDonnell's original proposals as modified
by the government during extensive negotiations between
the parties. Thereafter, McDonnell was required to sub-
mit detailed drawings as well as all changes to the Navy
for approval. In addition, an extensive staff of Navy engi-
neers were stationed at McDonnell Douglas' plant in St.
Louis.329 All of these facts constituted government ap-
proval of the design.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also held that a
product conforms to reasonably precise specifications if it
satisfies an intended configuration, even if it produces un-
intended or unwanted results. 330 Failure of a product to
perform does not constitute failure to conform to specifi-
cations. 33 ' The court found that the alleged defect was
inherent in the unique design of the landing gear itself,
and not as a result of any deviation from the military spec-
ifications.3 3 The court also recognized that the govern-
ment had a very active role in the design of the aircraft
and had maintained an extensive staff of aircraft engineers
at the McDonnell Douglas facility in St. Louis. Thus, gov-
ernmental participation, involving the reservation of
power to approve or disapprove design modifications, en-
hanced the likelihood of product conformity. 333
In Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co. ,34 the Fourth Cir-
cuit faced the applicability of the government contractor
defense with respect to military contractors. In that case,
the plaintiff, a civilian maintenance employee, sued Mar-
tin-Baker, the manufacturer of the ejection seat on an F-
18 fighter aircraft, which was manufactured by McDonnell
Douglas pursuant to a government contract. Plaintiff
claimed that he was injured when the seat inadvertently
329 Id. at 701-02.
-30 Id. at 703.
"' Id. at 700.
932 Kleeman, 890 F.2d at 703.
3s Id. at 701.
, 874 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1989).
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fired while he performed maintenance.3 3 5 Martin-Baker
asserted the military contractor defense as a subcontrac-
tor to McDonnell Douglas.
In affirming the District Court's dismissal of Martin-
Baker, the Fourth Circuit examined the three elements of
the government contractor defense.3 3 6 With respect to
the first prong of the test, the Court found that, indeed,
the government had approved reasonably precise specifi-
cations. The court held that Martin-Baker could satisfy
the first prong of the Boyle test by demonstrating that the
military had used the product for an extensive period of
time or by demonstrating that the government's approval
of the product consisted of more than a mere "rubber
stamp. ' 3 7
The court found that Martin-Baker demonstrated that
the Navy's participation in the design of the weapon sys-
tem amounted to more than a mere rubber stamp. Ac-
cording to the record, the Navy issued the original
performance design specifications for the ejection seat,
tested its components, and examined a mock-up of the
seat displaying the components in question. In addition,
the court found that the Navy had become aware of possi-
ble hazards the seat posed to maintenance personnel well
before the plaintiff's accident, but the Navy continued to
use it. The court concluded that, based on previous deci-
sions, the evidence clearly established the requisite Navy
approval of the design. 3 '
In Smith v. Xerox Corp. ,s9 an injured soldier brought suit
against Xerox Corporation, the manufacturer of a weapon
simulator that malfunctioned and burned his arm and up-
per chest. Defendant manufacturer filed a motion for
summary judgment on the basis of the government con-
tractor defense. In affirming the decision of the lower
35 Id. at 947.
- Id. at 950 (citing Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)).
"7 Id. at 950.
"3' Id.
,9 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989).
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court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found approval
of reasonably precise specification in the unrebutted dep-
osition testimony of a Xerox employee. The employee
testified that the government reviewed and approved
Xerox' final drawings and specifications for the weapons
system. In addition, the Court found that the product was
manufactured in accordance with the reasonably precise
specifications because government inspectors were pres-
ent on the assembly line to inspect the final product.
Every product was given a functional test. If it did not
pass the test, the product would not be used. Moreover,
the product worked for many years without any problems.
Finally, the Court noted that no evidence was produced
demonstrating that Xerox knew or had reason to know
that corrosion might cause the weapon system to fire in-
advertently, thereby satisfying its duty to warn under the
defense. 4 °
In Galik v. Lockheed Shipbuilding Co.,341 the plaintiff was
the administratrix of the estate of a Coast Guardsman who
died from injuries he sustained when his ship encoun-
tered a violent storm. The vessel rolled approximately fif-
teen degrees and caused the decedent to be thrown down
into the pilot house, fatally injuring him. Plaintiff brought
suit against Lockheed, the designers of the ship, alleging
that the handrails adjacent to the fathometer were im-
properly designed. Defendant Lockheed moved for sum-
mary judgment on the basis of the government contractor
defense. In granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the court found that the Coast Guard had for-
mulated and drawn up the plans and specifications for the
ship. In addition, a full scale mock-up was constructed
before the contract was awarded to Lockheed. The court
also found that the ship conformed in every way to the
specifications approved by the government and that the
Coast Guard had accepted the ship as being in conform-
ance upon delivery. The court also held that there was no
340 Id. at 139.
14 727 F. Supp. 1433 (S.D. Ala. 1989).
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aberrational manufacturing defect as the plaintiff charged
nor were there any hidden or latent manufacturing de-
fects that the Coast Guard could discover when inspecting
and accepting the ship for service. Finally, the court held
that a government contractor does not have a duty to
warn the government of any product-related dangers of
which the government already has knowledge. 42
In Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft Corp. ,34 plaintiff, a helicop-
ter pilot in the Army National Guard, brought suit seeking
damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained dur-
ing the forced landing of his helicopter after the aircraft
experienced engine failure. Plaintiff sued Hughes, Al-
lison, and MPB, the respective manufacturers of the heli-
copter, engine, and a component bearing. Plaintiff
claimed that the engine failure was caused by a defect in
the bearing design. The bearing had not been part of the
original engine, but had been incorporated at a later
stage. Because the engine was developed by Allison
under contract with the United States Army, Allison and
MPB moved for summary judgment, asserting the govern-
ment contractor defense. Plaintiff challenged all three el-
ements of the defense.
In affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, the Third Circuit held that no material is-
sues of fact existed with respect to the first and third
prongs of the defense. The court focused on the fact that,
during the construction of the original engine, Allison
worked closely with Air Force officials. The Air Force's
senior project engineers reviewed and approved every el-
ement of the proposed design and every proposed as-
signed change. Similarly, the court found that the
interaction between Allison and the Army at the time of
the engine modification showed that the government ap-
proved reasonably precise specifications. The plaintiff
failed to meet his burden to establish that the defendants
did not disclose safety risks to the Army regarding the
342 Id. at 1435.
- 912 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1990).
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modification to the engine. Interestingly, the decision of
the court below expressly stated that, although MPB was a
subcontractor and dealt with Allison, rather than directly
with the government, it was nevertheless entitled to the
government contractor defense.
In Deniston v. Boeing Co.,344 plaintiffs brought suit to re-
cover wrongful death damages arising out of the crash of
a Marine helicopter manufactured by Boeing and other
co-defendants. Plaintiffs asserted that a failed potentiom-
eter that was part of the helicopter's stabilizing system
caused the crash. Boeing moved for summary judgment,
contending that plaintiffs could not demonstrate that any
wrongful act of Boeing proximately caused the accident
and that Boeing did not install the defective potentiome-
ter. Boeing also argued, in the alternative, application of
the government contractor defense. Although the district
court granted Boeing partial summary judgment because
it did not install the potentiometer that allegedly failed,
the court denied application of the government contrac-
tor defense. 4 5
The court addressed the issue of "approval" under the
Boyle test and found that Boeing had failed to meet its bur-
den. More specifically, the Court found that the Boyle346
test is satisfied if the defendant demonstrates "back and
forth" communications between the government and the
contractor.34 7 In addition, the "reasonably precise specifi-
cations" referred to in the first element of the test refer to
only the detailed, quantitative specifications, not to gen-
eral performance specifications relied upon by Boeing.
The court observed that little or no indication of the size
or shape of the elements to be employed in the helicopter
was contained in the portions of the record cited by Boe-
ing. The record presented was not sufficient for the court
to hold the defense applicable as a matter of law. Finally,
-4 No. 87-CV-1205 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
345 Id.
346 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
47 Id.
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the court held that the mere fact that a contract provision
requires government approval of subsequent modifica-
tions does not mean that approval was actually given. Ac-
tual government approval is required, and "constructive
notice will not suffice." 348 In Skyline Air Serv. v. G.L.
Capps Co. 349 the insurer of a helicopter brought a subro-
gation action against Bell to recover insurance proceeds it
paid on the hull of a helicopter. In August of 1985, a mili-
tary surplus Bell model UH- 1 B helicopter owned by Sky-
line Air Service, Inc. crashed during a log-hauling
operation. Bell had built the helicopter for the United
States government pursuant to a government contract in
1963. Consequently, Bell moved for summary judgment,
asserting the government contractor defense. Although
Bell produced evidence supporting application of the de-
fense, it failed to produce the actual contract for construc-
tion of the helicopter. Plaintiffs argued that the
government contractor defense was not available in in-
stances where the defendant fails to produce the actual
contract pursuant to which the product is manufactured.
In affirming the district court's decision granting sum-
mary judgment to Bell, the court found that Bell had de-
livered the helicopter to the Air Force in 1963 and that
upon delivery a military inspector inspected the aircraft
and certified that the helicopter complied with all military
specifications. In addition, the court found that the gov-
ernment contracts required Bell to adhere strictly to pre-
viously established, government-approved detailed
specifications for helicopters and that Bell strictly fol-
lowed these procedures. The government closely re-
viewed, revised, and approved each of the detailed
specifications for the subject helicopters, and no devia-
tions were allowed without specific written governmental
approval. The court further found that plaintiffs' sole re-
liance upon the fact that the actual contract had not been
produced was misplaced. Bell had presented sufficient ev-
4 Id.
- 916 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1990).
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idence to demonstrate that the equipment conformed to
government-approved specifications, that the product
conformed to those specifications, and that there was no
issue as to whether Bell warned of any dangers unknown
to the government.
In Dorse v. Eagle-Picher Industries,3 0 an asbestos case, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question
of whether the government contractor defense under
Boyle applied to a "failure to warn case." The facts estab-
lished that during World War II Eagle-Picher had manu-
factured and sold asbestos to the Navy pursuant to a
government contract and in "strict compliance with
mandatory government contract specifications. ' 351 The
defense was held inapplicable in this particular case be-
cause there was no conflict between the "state tort duty"
to warn and the "federal contract duty."
On the one hand, the court agreed with the defendant
that Boyle is not strictly limited to design defect cases. On
the other hand, the court agreed with the plaintiff that the
three-part test of McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.,552
required a " 'significant interest' of federal policy" suffi-
cient to justify displacement of state tort law.353 In apply-
ing Boyle to a failure to warn case, the court applied Boyle's
two-pronged analysis.
First, the court found that the procurement of asbestos
in World War II for naval ships was an area of unique fed-
eral interest. Second, the court had to determine whether
a significant conflict existed between a federal law and the
operation of state law. The court found that the "state
imposed duty of care" (to warn of a danger) was not "pre-
cisely contrary" to the duty imposed on the contractor by
the government contract. The court found that no con-
flict existed between state tort duty and the federal con-
tract duty because the contract did not contain any
3- 898 F.2d 1487 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
35, Dorse v. Armstrong, World Indus., 798 F.2d 1372, 1374 (11th Cir. 1986).
352 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
35 Dorse v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 898 F.2d at 1489.
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prohibition against health warnings on the product. Ac-
cordingly, the court granted summary judgment for the
plaintiff on the government contractor defense issue.
In Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co. ,35 the Ninth
Circuit held that the government contractor defense
under federal law did not significantly conflict with and
did not displace Idaho law in a products liability action
brought by a civilian painter for the Army Corps of Engi-
neers (ACE) seeking to recover for injuries received from
exposure to paint products at a Corps work site. The
plaintiff had been employed by the ACE as a painter for
eight years was later diagnosed as having solvent-induced
brain damage resulting from the inhalation of toxic paint
fumes used at a dam project in Idaho on which he worked
exclusively.
The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant paint company on the ground that under Idaho
law any design defects of the paint were attributable to
government specifications and that the manufacturer
would not be liable on either negligence or strict liability
principles. The plaintiffs appealed. The defendants, on
appeal, argued that the Supreme Court's intervening de-
cision in Boyle entitled them to summary judgment as a
matter of federal law because the paint used at the site
was produced in accordance with government-approved
specifications.
The Ninth Circuit examined the facts in light of the
Boyle decision. The court noted that the uniquely federal
interest in all federal government contracts is a starting
point in examining whether state law should be displaced
by federal law. Such displacement, however, will only oc-
cur when "a significant conflict exists between an identifi-
able federal policy or interest and the [operation] of
law."'3 56 The court noted that the policy behind the gov-
ernment contractor defense as delineated in Boyle is
' Id. at 1490.
892 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990).
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
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rooted in considerations peculiar to the military. The
case at bar involved a civilian worker injured in the course
of a civilian job involving the painting of a dam rather
than the construction of military equipment. The applica-
tion of Idaho law on these facts would not significantly
interfere with any uniquely federal interest.3 57
The court then went on to affirm the district court's de-
cision that under Idaho law a government contractor is
not liable in negligence or in strict liability if the contrac-
tor follows plans and specifications prepared by the gov-
ernment. The case was remanded, however, because
questions of fact precluded summary judgment on the
plaintiff's claim that defendant failed to warn of the dan-
gers of using the paint.
In In rejoint Eastern and Southern District New York Asbestos
Litigation,358 former Brooklyn Navy Yard workers brought
suit to recover for alleged injuries they sustained from ex-
posure to asbestos-based cement during their years of ser-
vice. The action was brought against Eagle-Picher, the
company that manufactured the cement for the Navy. Ac-
cording to the record, "the Navy subjected the cement to
fairly precise design and testing specifications, with the
most important such specification mandating that the
product contain a substantial concentration of asbes-
tos. .... ',359 The Navy also provided specific guidelines
regarding the product's packaging, packing, and labeling,
although it did not require warnings on the bags of ce-
ment to alert the user of the effects of inhaling asbes-
tos.36 ° Defendant Eagle-Picher moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the military contractor defense
recognized in Boyle precluded recovery by the workers in
this case. The workers cross-moved for summary judg-
ment striking the defense, and the District Court granted
it.
... Neilson, 892 F.2d. at 1455.
- 897 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990).
359 Id at 627.
o Id.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit focused on the fact that a
state law requirement existed that such warnings had to
be placed on the packages of cement. Although the con-
tract with the U.S. government did not require these
warnings, it did not expressly preclude them. Under the
circumstances, state law could not be displaced or set
aside pursuant to the Boyle defense. The court further
held that in order for the defense to apply, state law duties
must be in conflict with the duties imposed by the military
contract.3 6 ' The Second Circuit found that although the
Boyle defense applies to failure to warn cases as well as to
design defect cases, the record established below did not
warrant application of the government contractor de-
fense. In order for a state law requirement regarding
warnings to be displaced, the language of the contract
must be in conflict with the state requirements. The de-
fendant must demonstrate that the government had full
control or dictated the nature and content of the product
warnings; otherwise, the Boyle defense does not preempt a
state law duty to warn. 62
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
denying Eagle-Picher's motion for summary judgment on
the government contractor defense but vacated the
court's ruling granting the workers' motion for summary
judgment striking the defense. The case was remanded to
the district court for reconsideration of whether the vari-
ous Navy packaging and labeling requirements might
have precluded Eagle-Picher from including any product
warnings with the goods alleged to have injured the
workers.
In In re Aircraft Crash Litigation, Frederick Maryland,363
plaintiffs brought suit against several aircraft and compo-
nent manufacturers to recover wrongful death damages
arising out of the crash of a U.S. Air Force EC-135 air-
craft. On board the aircraft was a crew of seventeen and
36, Id. at 630.
362 Id.
363 752 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
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four authorized observers, including two wives of crew
members. At the time of the crash, the left pilot seat was
occupied by one of the participant's spouses and the right
seat was occupied by the woman's husband, the pilot.
The Air Force's analysis of possible causes for the crash
led them to conclude that for undetermined reasons, the
aircraft pitch trim moved to the full nosedown position,
which resulted in loss of control of the aircraft. Plaintiffs
contended that the aircraft's sudden pitch-over was the
result of a flight control system malfunction that most
probably was initiated in the autopilot. Defendants con-
tended, on the other hand, that the aircraft's pitch-over
was caused by the spouse sitting in the left pilot seat, who
inadvertently activated the trim stabilizer switch, thus
causing the accident. All three defendants, Boeing, Mc-
Donnell Douglas, and Lear, moved for summary judg-
ment on the basis of the government contractor defense.
In granting summary judgment to all of the defendants,
the District Court engaged in a thorough analysis of the
underpinnings of the government contractor defense and
the subsequent cases following the Boyle decision. The
court then analyzed the record with respect to each de-
fendant and methodically applied the government con-
tractor defense as set forth in Boyle to each. Among the
many arguments raised by the plaintiffs was that the de-
fense was inapplicable because the Air Force relied upon
the defendants' expertise and higher knowledge as air-
craft designers and manufacturers. The court rejected
this argument, however, by holding that such an assertion
is irrelevant to the Boyle defense and cannot be used to
raise a material issue of fact to defeat a motion for sum-
mary judgment. "The Air Force's reliance is in fact be-
sides the point for Boyle fully contemplates such reliance
as necessary to the military procurement process.' '3 Ac-
cording to the district court, Boyle sought to "encourage
the active involvement of military contractors in the de-
' Id. at 1341.
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sign process, and held that such contractors are immune
from suit under state tort law, as long as the design fea-
tures at issue had been considered by the government and
not solely by the contractor. 3 65 The court further held
that the record demonstrated the required "back and
forth" between the Air Force and the defendants to estab-
lish the requisite approval of reasonably precise
specifications.
With respect to conformity, the court also held that the
contractual provisions to which the plaintiffs pointed to
demonstrate nonconformity were not the specifications
relevant to the Boyle defense. Citing Kleeman, the court
found that the specifications with which a military contrac-
tor's product must conform under Boyle are not the gen-
eral qualitative specifications emanating from the initial
stages of the procurement process, but rather the precise
quantitative specifications that evolve out of the continu-
ous exchange between the government and the
contractor.36
E. Damages
In Germanio v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,367 a federal
district court in New Jersey has held that provisions in the
New Jersey Products Liability Act, permitting punitive
damages are not unconstitutionally void for vagueness
and that punitive damage awards were not subject to the
New Jersey Constitution's prohibition on excessive fines.
Further, the statutory scheme allowing punitive damages
does not deny a defendant's due process rights, nor is the
consideration of a defendant's financial status a denial of
equal protection.
The statute in question, the punitive damages section of
the NewJersey Products Liability Act of 1987,368 provides
35Id.
Id. at 1369.
732 F. Supp. 1297 (D. N.J. 1990).
NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-5(a) (West 1987).
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that punitive damages may be awarded to a claimant upon
proof, by a preponderance of the evidence:
that the harm suffered was the result of the product manu-
facturer's or seller's acts or omissions, and such acts or
omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied
by a wanton and willful disregard of the safety of product
users, consumers, or others who foreseeably might be
harmed by the product.3 69
This action was instituted after the explosive separation of
a truck-tire rim manufactured by the defendant caused se-
rious injuries to the plaintiffs. At trial the defendant
moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' puni-
tive damages claim; defendant argued that New Jersey's
statutory provision allowing punitive damages in product
liability cases violated both the state and federal
constitution.
In rejecting defendants' claim that the law should be
held void for vagueness, the court noted that under the
Act a jury may award punitive damages only where the
defendant's conduct is found not to have met a defined
standard and only after a jury weighed several mitigating
and aggravating factors. These factors are more specific
than those previously approved by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Smith v. Wade3 70 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.3 7 1 .
Further, the fact that the Act does not provide for maxi-
mum awards does not, standing alone, cause the statute to
be impermissibly vague.
The court rejected the defendant's due process claim by
noting that it saw no reason to extend protections gener-
ally enjoyed only by criminal defendants to defendants in
tort actions merely because punitive damages are in-
volved. Moreover, the court rejected the defendant's
claim that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
equal protection should preclude a jury from examining
the financial status of a defendant before making an award
369 Id.
,0 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
1, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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of punitive damages. The court could find no case law
indicating that damage awards against the wealthy should
be subject to heightened levels of scrutiny.
In National Consumer Co-Op. Bank v. Madden, 72 a federal
district court in Hawaii concluded that, under Hawaii state
law, punitive damages may be awarded in product liability
actions, even in cases based on strict liability. In so hold-
ing, the court recapped the guidelines for punitive dam-
ages under Hawaiian law. In order to recover punitive
damages, a plaintiff must:
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
has acted wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as
implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil
obligations, or where there has been some wilful miscon-
duct or that entire want of care which would raise the pre-
sumption of a conscious indifference to consequences. 7 3
The district court went on to explain that "clear and con-
vincing evidence" is that degree of proof that will produce
in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction
as to the truth of the allegations sought to be estab-
lished.374 The finders of fact must focus upon the defend-
ant's mental state and, to a lesser degree, the nature of his
or her conduct. Further, there must be some positive ele-
ment of conscious wrongdoing and a showing of aggra-
vated or outrageous conduct. Punitive damages are not
awarded, in Hawaii for mere inadvertence, mistake, or er-
rors of judgment.375
Since these issues are to be determined by the finders
of fact, the defendant's pre-trial summary judgment mo-
tion on the issue of the availability of punitive damages
was denied.
372 737 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Haw. 1990).
."7 Id. at 1114 (citing Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566,
575 (1989)).
3,4 737 F. Supp. at 1114.
37 Id. at 1115.
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V. LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. General
In Tijffany v. United States, 76 the United States was held
liable for a coastal interception and collision that killed
seven people. Negligence on the part of military control-
lers and the interceptor pilot was the proximate cause of
the collision between a McDonnell Douglas F-4C and a
Beech Baron, which had penetrated the Air Defense Iden-
tification Zone off Cherry Point, North Carolina. The case
was brought under the Death on the High Seas Act.377
The deceased pilot had submitted a flight plan at the
Nassau, Bahamas Airport on January 9, 1983, calling for a
flight to Norfolk, Virginia, via Wilmington, North Caro-
lina. The flight plan was then amended to list Fort Pierre,
Florida, as his initial touchdown point. The pilot never
activated the plan after departing Nassau. Instead of
heading for Florida, he turned north and was detected by
a government radar tracking system based in Virginia and
known as FERTILE. Two F-4C Phantoms were scram-
bled. The Baron pilot then contacted Washington Air
Route Traffic Control Center, identified himself, and re-
quested radar assistance in avoiding weather cells. Dur-
ing the intercept that followed, the Baron and one of the
fighters collided.
The district court held that FERTILE had sufficient in-
formation, within ample time, to have terminated the in-
tercept. The F-4C continued a mission designed for
visual identification in weather effectively precluding such
an identification. The F-4C pilot misidentified the posi-
tion of the Baron, failed to follow proper procedures, and
failed to maintain the proper amount of vertical separa-
tion. According to the court, the Baron pilot's knowledge
that his actions would lead to an intercept did not serve to
protect the government from liability. While decedent
376 726 F. Supp. 129 (W.D. Va. 1989).
-1, 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 761 (1991).
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should have anticipated the intercept, he should not have
been expected to have foreseen the inappropriate actions
of FERTILE control and the F-4C crew. 78
In Budden v. United States,379 a federal court found that
the failure of a FAA flight service station employee to in-
form a helicopter pilot of a forecast calling for light, occa-
sionally moderate rime icing was not the proximate cause
of the subsequent fatal accident.
The action arose from the crash of a helicopter ambu-
lance travelling from Kearney to Ainsworth, Nebraska.
The pilot requested reported weather for Broken Bow
and Ainsworth, Nebraska. The parties to the action
agreed that the station specialist's response to this request
was sufficient. At issue was the FAA Flight Service Station
specialist's failure to include information of a rime icing
condition that appeared on an older area forecast that had
not been requested by the pilot.
The court found that the specialist was negligent in fail-
ing to provide information as to the icing condition, and
that the specialist's failure to inform the pilot of the con-
dition contributed to the pilot's decision to commence the
flight. The court held that this failure was not, however,
the proximate cause of the crash. The facts indicated that
the helicopter was not weighed down with ice and that the
rotor was operating at normal speed upon impact. The
court found that the proximate cause of the accident was
the pilot's decision to continue to fly into deteriorating
weather conditions that consisted of sharply decreasing
cloud ceilings and visibility.3 80
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed
the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, by
holding that Aviation Medical Examiners (AMEs) are not
employees of the federal government for purposes of the
FTCA. In Leone v United States,38' the plaintiffs argued that
378 726 F. Supp. at 137.
379 748 F.Supp. 1374 (D. Neb. 1990).
Id. at 1385-88.
910 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the federal government could be held liable for an AME's
failure to detect a pilot's heart disease and other medical
conditions. Some three months after having undergone a
flight physical, Irwin Small had a heart attack while pilot-
ing his personal aircraft. The aircraft crashed, killing all
of the passengers on board.
In concluding that the AME was not an employee of the
federal government, the Second Circuit held that to be an
employee for purposes of the FTCA, the alleged em-
ployee's day-to-day operations must come under the di-
rect supervision and control of the federal government.
Although the federal government issues detailed guide-
lines for the performance of AMEs' duties, the govern-
ment does not maintain control over the AMEs' detailed
physical performance of these duties. The court also em-
phasized that most AMEs are licensed physicians engaged
in private practice. Furthermore, AMEs schedule their
own appointments, set their own fees, collect their fees
directly from applicants, and provide their own instru-
ments, tools, and workplace. Finally, the Second Circuit
noted that the federal government provides neither insur-
ance nor workers' compensation payments on behalf of
the AMEs. 8 2
The plaintiffs also argued that the AMEs should be con-
sidered government employees because they act "on be-
half of" the FAA. Section 2671 of the FTCA provides
that "persons acting on behalf of" a federal agency in an
official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service
of the United States, whether with or without compensa-
tion, are to be considered employees of the government.
The court held, however, that this language was intended
to cover special situations such as government officials
who serve without pay, or an employee of one govern-
ment agency who is loaned to and works under the direct
supervision of another government agency. The court
held that to uphold this language which provides for
382 Id. at 50.
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FTCA liability would seriously undermine the independ-
ent contractor exemption. 83
In Largent v. United States,384 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that, under the Comparative Negli-
gence Statute of South Dakota, the estate of the decedent
pilot could not recover for the negligence of two Flight
Service Station specialists employed by the United States.
The estate's action arose from the crash of the dece-
dent's aircraft shortly after take-off from the Hot Springs
Airport in Hot Springs, North Dakota. After a bench trial
and several appeals, it was determined that although both
FSS specialists had been negligent in failing to warn the
decedent about icing conditions on the morning of his
flight, the negligence of the decedent was more than
"slight" compared to that of the FSS specialists. There-
fore, under the South Dakota Statute, the decedent's re-
covery would be barred.
In reaching this conclusion, the district court held that
the decedent was negligent in (1) failing to equip his air-
craft with deicing equipment; (2) failing to anticipate icing
conditions and to inquire about cloud ceilings and tem-
peratures aloft; (3) failing to plan for an alternative flight
path should an emergency strike; and (4) flying without
the necessary IFR recency of flight experience. 85
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff's
argument that, where it had been previously determined
that spacial disorientation did not contribute to the acci-
dent, the pilot's lack of IFR currency could not be consid-
ered in determining whether the pilot's negligence was
"slight." The court of appeals affirmed the decision of
the district court, however, on the ground that the error
had been harmless. According to the court of appeals,
even if the district court had not considered the dece-
dent's decision to fly without the appropriate level of IFR
experience, it still would have determined that the dece-
sss Id. at 51.
384 910 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1990).
38 Id. at 499.
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dent's negligence was more than "slight" in comparison
to that of the defendants. 38 6
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held
that a claim against the government for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress is not excluded as a matter of
law by the FTCA. In Sheehan v. United States, 3 7 the plain-
tiff, an army civilian employee, claimed that she was sexu-
ally harassed and slandered by her supervisor, also a
government employee. The plaintiff sued the United
States under the FTCA alleging that the supervisor
caused the plaintiff humiliation and emotional distress.
The district court granted summary judgment against the
plaintiff, holding that her cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress fell within the express ex-
clusion in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) of "any claim arising out of
assault.' '388
In reversing the lower court, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that the district court had erroneously relied on the Ninth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Hambleton, 89 which
held that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress was found to be precluded by § 2680(h). Accord-
ing to the court, the Supreme Court decisions of Block v.
Neal 390 and United States v. Neustadt3 9 ' direct courts to in-
quire whether the conduct upon which the plaintiff's
claim is based constitutes one of the torts accepted by
§ 2680(h). The appellate court reversed and remanded
the case to the district court to determine whether the
plaintiff's allegations would permit proof of conduct that
is not within the definition of the excluded torts and that
would support the plaintiff's claim that she suffered injury
from the intentional infliction of emotional distress inde-
pendently of injury suffered from excluded conduct.392
s86 Id. at 500.
387 896 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1990).
:88 Id.
s8 185 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950).
39 460 U.S. 289 (1983).
: 1 363 U.S. 696 (1961).
9 2 896 F. 2d at 1173-74.
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In In re Air Crash Disaster at Dallas/Fort Worth on August 2,
1985,393 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court decision resulting from one of the
longest trials in the history of aviation litigation.394 The
case arose from the crash of an airplane during final ap-
proach. The flight crew attempted landing despite their
knowledge of the presence of a thunderstorm between
their aircraft and the runway on final approach. The air-
plane crashed when it encountered windshear while pass-
ing through a thunderstorm cell.
The widows of the pilot and the second officer brought
separate actions against the United States under the
Texas Wrongful Death Act and Texas Survivors Act. The
widows' actions were consolidated with personal injury
suits that were brought against the airline. In addition,
the airline sued the United States, alleging negligence on
the part of FAA employees and the National Weather Ser-
vice arising from their failure to relay weather information
to the crew. All actions against the United States were
brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The Fifth Circuit applied the "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard to affirm the district court's holding that the crew's
attempt to land in a thunderstorm and its failure to exe-
cute a missed approach proximately caused the aircraft ac-
cident.3 95 Although the district court had found that the
air traffic controllers and weather personnel breached
their duties to provide the accident aircraft with adequate
weather information, it held that their negligent acts were
not the proximate cause of the crash because the pilot had
possessed substantially all of the weather information po-
tentially available from the government employees. In
this connection, the court of appeals also recognized the
district court's determination that the crew was aware of
additional conditions unknown by the government
sources. The appellate court rejected the claimants' argu-
919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1991).
720 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
315 In re Air Crash Dallas/Fort Worth, 919 F.2d at 1085.
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ment that, in reaching this decision, the district court had
applied the "last clear chance" doctrine, which is inappli-
cable in Texas. 96
B. Discretionary Function Exception
The Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of the District
Court for the Western District of Texas that a FAA avia-
tion flight safety inspector was negligent for ordering an
applicant seeking certification to try a failed maneuver
again. When the maneuver was attempted a second time,
the plane crashed. In Hayes v. United States, 97 the Court
rejected the FAA's defense that the FTCA's discretionary
function exception applied to the facts before it.
Although the FAA inspector's decision to have the appli-
cant retry the maneuver implied some discretion on the
inspector's part, his actions were part of his day-to-day
operational functions and were not policy-related. 398
In Sewell v. United States,3 99 a federal district court in
Colorado held that the decision as to whether to include
power lines on sectional navigational charts was a discre-
tionary function of the National Oceanic Atmosphere Ad-
ministration (NOAA).400 This holding immunized the
agency from suit for the death of Christopher Sewell, who
was killed in 1986 when the plane in which he was a pas-
senger hit a power line near Redcliffe, Colorado. The
power line did not appear on the navigational chart for
the area. The decedent's widow sued the United States,
basing her claim on the negligence of NOAA in omitting
the power line from the chart.
The chart had been prepared by the NOAA under
guidelines issued by the Inter-Agency Air Cartography
Committee. The general guidelines stated that any fea-
ture more than 200 feet above the ground should be con-
"- Id. at 1087.
397 899 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1990).
'o Id. at 451.
s 732 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Colo. 1990).
4- Id. at 1108.
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sidered a vertical obstruction. The specific guidelines,
however, called for the omission of transmission lines in
built-up areas since they lose whatever landmark value
they have and serve to clutter the chart.40  The parties
stipulated that the line in question extended more than
200 feet above the ground in a built-up area, did not serve
any navigational purpose, and had not been determined
by the FAA to pose a hazard to navigation. The plaintiff
stated that the part of the guidelines pertaining to general
obstructions called for the line's inclusion on the chart.
The government argued in rebuttal that the specific
power line guidelines were applicable.
If the general guidelines applied, the government
would have been negligent for failing to chart the power
lines. If the specific power line guidelines applied, the de-
cision to chart the power lines would be deemed discre-
tionary. The district court held that the "NOAA's
interpretation that the specific power-line section tran-
scends the ground obstruction section is not clearly erro-
neous". 402 NOAA's decision not to include the power
lines on the chart was, therefore, a discretionary act. The
court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment. °5
C. Procedural Requirements
In Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States,4°4 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that an administrative claim form submitted by
the executor of a deceased pilot's estate satisfied the
FTCA's jurisdictional notice requirements.0 5 The case
arose out of a midair collision between two private air-
planes near Addison, Texas, in 1982. The two airplanes,
one a Piper Navaho approaching Dallas's Love Field and
the other a Cessna Skymaster taking off from Addison Air-
401 Id. at 1105.
402 Id. at 1106.
403 Id. at 1108.
4- 896 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1990).
405 Id. at 1444.
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port, collided shortly after a Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW)
controller misunderstood the Cessna's position and al-
lowed the pilot to enter DFW's Terminal Control Area.
A number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, and
third-party complaints for contribution and indemnity
were asserted by the various parties. The district court
granted summary judgment motions, finding that (1)
there was no evidence of contributory negligence on the
part of the two pilots, and (2) the wrongful death claim
asserted by one of the decedent's estate did not satisfy the
jurisdictional notice requirements of the FTCA.4 °6 Both
the government and the estate appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's sum-
mary judgment dismissal of the claims of the estate. The
government contended on appeal that the administrative
claim form, which had been submitted by a bank as the
duly appointed executor of the late pilot's estate, was de-
fective in that it did not encompass the claims of the pi-
lot's surviving wife and child. The government's claim
was based on its interpretation of 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(e),
which provides:
"[a] claim presented by an agent or legal representative
shall be presented in the name of the claimant, be signed
by the agent or legal representative, show the title or legal
capacity of the person signing, and be accompanied by evi-
dence of his authority to present a claim on behalf of the
claimant as agent, executor, administrator, parent, guard-
ian or other representative." 40 7
The form submitted by the bank was not presented in the
name of the claimant.
The court of appeals noted that, under the Texas
Wrongful Death Act, an action for wrongful death is re-
served for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse,
children, and parents of the deceased. 40 8 Although the
Act provides that any of those individuals may pursue a
4 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2675(a) (1988).
407 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(e) (repealed 1987).
4os Transco, 896 F.2d at 1443.
1991] 133
134 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
wrongful death claim, the executor or administrator of the
estate is also authorized to pursue a wrongful death ac-
tion. Further, under Texas law, the actual claimants are
the statutory beneficiaries even though the executor has
authority to pursue a claim. Since 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(c) was
promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2672, which gives
an agency the power to settle claims, the failure to comply
with the strict letter of the regulation was not a jurisdic-
tional bar to the survivors' claims. The jurisdictional no-
tice requirement of § 2675(a) was independent of any
regulations issued under § 2672.409
The claim as submitted satisfied the FTCA's jurisdic-
tional notice requirement because the agency was given
sufficient written notice to commence an investigation and
a value was placed on the claim. 0
In Schmidt v. United States,4 ' the court affirmed a district
court's dismissal of the complaint under the FTCA for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The action was
brought by an Ozark Airline flight attendant who was in-
jured on December 20, 1983, when her plane struck a
snow removal vehicle that had been left on a runway in
Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The plaintiff filed an adminis-
trative claim for damages with the FAA on November 1,
1985. The FAA issued a final denial of the claim on No-
vember 19, 1986. The plaintiff's attorney received the let-
ter on November 24, 1986. The plaintiff then filed the
FTCA complaint on May 21, 1987.
The United States moved to dismiss on the ground that
the plaintiff had failed to commence the action within six
months of the mailing of the FAA's final denial as re-
quired by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The plaintiff contended
that the denial was not posted until November 21, 1986,
and that she thus avoided default by commencing the ac-
409 Id.
410 Id. at 1444.
411 901 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S.Ct. 944 (1991) (judgment va-
cated and remanded for further consideration in light of Irwin v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 111 S. Ct. 453 (1990)).
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tion by May 21, 1987. Neither party produced direct evi-
dence establishing the actual date the final denial was
mailed. The district court granted the government's sum-
mary judgment motion on the ground that the plaintiff
failed to satisfy the burden of establishing the date of
mailing.4 12
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's find-
ing that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of estab-
lishing facts necessary to support subject matter
jurisdiction."' The court rejected the plaintiff's alterna-
tive claim that the failure of the FAA to procure a sender's
receipt indicated that it failed to comply with the statute's
requirement that denial letters be sent by certified or reg-
istered mail. The court noted that the private contractor
who handled the FAA's outgoing mail kept logbooks.
The pages of the logbook thus became sender's receipts
under U.S. Postal Service regulations, and, therefore, the
statutory requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) was
satisfied.
In Hiatt v. United States, 414 the Eleventh Circuit con-
strued § 2675(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which
requires that:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the
United States for money damages ... unless the claimant
shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Fed-
eral agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by
the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered
mail.4 I5
Hiatt involved a wrongful death action brought by Shirley
Hiatt as personal representative of the Estate of Dale Hi-
att, her husband, who was killed in a midair collision. The
issue presented was whether John Hiatt, the minor son of
the decedent, would be permitted to pursue his claim for
non-economic damages even though he had failed to
412 Id. at 682.
-, id. at 683.
414 910 F.2d 737 (11 th Cir. 1990).
415 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1988).
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present his claim to the FAA pursuant to § 2675(a). The
district court ruled that, since no administrative claim had
been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to award damages for John's
loss. 4 16
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
it was clear in the administrative claim filed by the dece-
dent's personal representative, Shirley Hiatt, that dam-
ages would be sought for all beneficiaries of the estate.4 1 7
The court distinguished the holding of the D.C. Circuit in
Jackson v. United States4"". According to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, the Jackson case involved an administrative claim filed
by the decedent's parents alleging wrongful death and
seeking $100,000 in damages. After that claim was de-
nied, the decedent's widow filed a wrongful death and
survival claim. The district court dismissed the widow's
suit, reasoning that the parents' administrative claim for
wrongful death could not be used by the widow to satisfy
the requirement that she file an administrative claim. Ac-
cording to the Eleventh Circuit, the administrative claim
and the FTCA suit in Hiatt involved virtually the same
claims - wrongful death - while the claim sought in Jack-
son was different.4 9
In Allgeier v. United States, 420 the Sixth Circuit held that a
complaint, amended to name the United States after the
limitations period had run, would not relate back to the
original complaint that incorrectly named the United
States Post Office and an individual mail carrier as
defendants42
The claim in Allgeier arose from an automobile accident
involving a truck driven by a United States Postal Service
carrier and a truck driven by the plaintiff, Richard All-
geier. The plaintiff filed a timely administrative claim with
4 Hiatt, 910 F.2d at 739.
417 Id. at 741-42.
4 8 730 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
419 Hiatt, 910 F.2d at 742.
420 909 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1990).
42, Allgeier, 909 F.2d at 874.
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the postal service seeking compensation for damage to his
truck. The postal service denied the claim on January 18,
1985. On July 17, 1985, two days prior to the end of the
six-month limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401(b) for initiation of tort actions against the United
States, Allgeier filed a complaint in the district court. The
complaint, which erroneously named the United States
Post Office and the postal carrier as defendants, was
served on the defendants as well as on the United States
Attorney by certified mail. The United States Attorney's
office did not receive a copy of the complaint until July 22,
1985, four days after the end of the six-month limitation
period.
Under the FTCA, the United States is the only proper
defendant in a suit alleging negligence by a federal em-
ployee.4 2 Apparently realizing this oversight, the plaintiff
amended his complaint on September 27, 1985, to name
the United States as the sole defendant. The United
States moved to dismiss the action. According to the gov-
ernment, the United States was not named as a party to
the suit until well after the six-month limitations period
had past. The government also argued that the amended
complaint did not "relate back" to the timely but flawed
original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). The dis-
trict court held that the amended complaint did relate
back to the original complaint and, after a trial, entered a
final judgment for the plaintiff against the United States in
the amount of $1,360.425 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit re-
versed the district court, holding that the amended com-
plaint did not relate back.424  The court of appeals
observed that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), where an
amendment seeks to change the party against whom the
claim is asserted, the new party must have had sufficient
notice of the institution of the action for the amended
complaint to relate back. The court of appeals further ob-
422 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a) (1988).
423 A1geier, 909 F.2d at 871.
424 Id. at 870-71.
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served that, with respect to the United States, sufficient
notice would require, in the words of Rule 15(c), "[t]he
delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attor-
ney, or the United States Attorney's designee, or the At-
torney General of the United States, or an agency or
officer who would have been a proper defendant if
named.... ." According to the court, a common-sense in-
terpretation of the notice requirements for the United
States contained in Rule 15(c) would seem to permit de-
livery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney,
which apparently was accomplished in this case. The
court went on, however, to consider the Advisory Com-
mittee Note on the rule, which observes that the notice
requirement is satisfied when the government has been
notified in the manner set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d).425
Rule 4 provides that service on a federal officer or agency
is accomplished only by serving the United States and by
sending processed documents by registered or certified
mail.
While conceding that the common-sense reading of
Rule 15 would permit relation back in situations where
service by mail upon the United States Attorney was ac-
complished, and that the "consequences of imprecise
drafting should not fall upon "hapless" claimants against
the government," the court ruled that such considerations
were insufficient to override its duty to strictly construe
any waiver by the United States of its sovereign immu-
nity.426 The court held that, where an amendment nam-
ing the United States as the proper party seeks to relate
back under Rule 15(c), the United States is deemed to
have been properly notified where, within the statutory
limitation, there has been either (1) delivery of process to
and receipt by the United States Attorney or (2) mailing
of process to the Attorney General. Merely mailing pro-
cess to the United States Attorney within the statutory pe-
riod, as occurred in this case, does not suffice.
425 Id. at 872-73.
426 Id. at 873.
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D. Liability of States of the United States
The Supreme Court of Hawaii discussed the State's dis-
cretionary function exception to the State Tort Liability
Act in Nakahira v. State.427 The plaintiff, while on National
Guard duty, was injured by a helicopter that went out of
control on the ground while being "run-up" for mainte-
nance purposes. The "run-up" was conducted by a non-
aviator under a Hawaii program that certified non-avia-
tors to conduct such maintenance.
The Hawaii Army National Guard is an agency of the
State of Hawaii. The plaintiff filed suit against the State,
alleging negligence in the implementation of the program
that authorized non-aviators to "run-up" helicopters.
The State moved to dismiss plaintiff's claim against it on
the ground that the Hawaii Tort Liability Act precluded
the action. The lower court granted the motion and the
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of Hawaii
reversed.
The court, in reversing, held that the State retained im-
munity from any claim that is based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a state officer or
employee, whether or not the discretion involved was
abused.428 The Court noted that, normally, only aviator
personnel were authorized to operate helicopters both on
the ground and in the air. In recognition of the fact that
there are often shortages of aviator personnel, the federal
Bureau of the National Guard authorizes state National
Guard units to adopt a program allowing non-aviator per-
sonnel to be certified to conduct ground "run-ups" of
helicopters. Although the decision to adopt such a pro-
gram is discretionary, the court held that once that deci-
sion has been made, the implementation of such program
was an operational and not a discretionary function. 429
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VI. LIABILITY OF FOREIGN STATES: THE FOREIGN
SSOVERIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A. General
In Filus v. LOT Polish Airlines,45 0 the Second Circuit held
that a plaintiff was entitled to have a defendant answer in-
terrogatories that might establish whether the defendant
came within the commercial activity exception to the
FSIA. The case arose from the crash of an Ilyushin 62-M
aircraft, owned by LOT airlines, shortly after takeoff from
Warsaw on a flight to the United States. Survivors of pas-
sengers killed in the crash brought suit in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York against the airline and against the
U.S.S.R., alleging that the U.S.S.R. negligently designed,
manufactured, assembled, sold, inspected, overhauled,
and serviced the airplane.43 '
The plaintiffs asserted subject matter jurisdiction over
the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the commercial activity excep-
tion to the FSIA, which provides that a foreign state shall
not be immune in any case "in which the action is based
on a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the for-
eign state elsewhere....
The Soviet Union defended on two grounds. First, they
asserted that the U.S.S.R. did not manufacture, service, or
sell the aircraft in question, but that the aircraft was man-
ufactured by organizations that are juridical persons dis-
tinct and separate from the State and its Ministries.
Second, the U.S.S.R. argued that there was not a sufficient
nexus between any commercial activity in the United
States and the plaintiff's cause of action to justify the
commercial activity exception.43 3 The district court
4- 907 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1990).
4 Id. at 1330.
4312 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
433 Filus, 907 F.2d at 1331.
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granted the U.S.S.R.'s motion to dismiss on the grounds
of sovereign immunity.
The court of appeals reversed the dismissal, noting
that, in general, a plaintiff may be allowed limited discov-
ery in order to establish a jurisdictional basis. The fact
that the FSIA was involved did not change the availability
of limited discovery.
In Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp. ,4 John For-
sythe, an airline pilot, brought a wrongful discharge ac-
tion in a Texas state court against the Saudi Arabian
Airlines Corporation (SAAC), which was "an agency or in-
strumentality" of Saudi Arabia under section 1603(b) of
the FSIA.
Forsythe was an American citizen who entered into an
employment agreement with the SAAC to provide serv-
ices as a commercial airline pilot. The agreement con-
tained a provision specifying that all disputes would be
governed by the laws of Saudi Arabia and resolved by the
Saudi Arabia Labor and Settlement of Disputes Commit-
tee. After less than a year, the SAAC discharged Forsythe
for allegedly failing proficiency and evaluation checks.
Forsythe did not contest the discharge in the manner per-
mitted by his employment agreement but returned to the
United States and brought suit in the State of Texas.
SAAC removed the case to federal court based on its
status as a "foreign state" under the FSIA. Following re-
moval, SAAC moved to dismiss, claiming failure to state a
claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA. SAAC added an alternative ground of forum non
conveniens. In a supplemental motion, Forsythe did not
challenge SAAC's FSIA immunity. In December, 1988,
the district court granted SAAC's motion to dismiss, find-
ing that SAAC was a "foreign state" and that none of the
exceptions to immunity provided in the FSIA applied. Al-
ternatively, the court concluded that the doctrine of for-
4- 885 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1989).
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eign non conveniens required that the suit be prosecuted
in Saudi Arabia.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit chose not to review the dis-
trict court's determination that it lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction under the FSIA. That court disposed of the
case on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In Barkanic v. The General Administration of Civil Aviation of
the Peoples' Republic of China (CAA C),435 plaintiffs brought
suit to recover wrongful death damages for two American
passengers who perished in an airline crash in the Peo-
ples' Republic of China. The lawsuit arose from the crash
of an Antonov 24 aircraft operated by CAAC, the state-
owned carrier, on a purely internal flight between Nanj-
ing and Beijing on January 18, 1985. The suit was origi-
nally dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under the FSIA. That decision was later reversed by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which found a suffi-
ciently significant nexus for exercising jurisdiction. On
remand to the Eastern District of New York, defendants
moved for application of the $20,000 per passenger limi-
tation under Chinese law, pursuant to the choice of law
provision found in § 1606 of the FSIA. Defendants' mo-
tion was granted.
On appeal, plaintiffs sought to overturn the lower
court's decision and argued that the FSIA required appli-
cation of the choice-of-law rules of the forum state, New
York. Under New York choice-of-law analysis, the law of
the decedents domicile (District of Columbia and New
Hampshire) would govern the action. In opposition, de-
fendants/appellees argued for affirmance of the district
court's decision on the basis of the choice-of-law provi-
sion under the FSIA. In the alternative, defendants ar-
gued that, under federal common law choice-of-law rules
or New York choice-of-law rules, the law of China should
be applied to the case.
In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Second
4,5 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991).
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Circuit held that, unlike similar provisions of the FTCA
relating to choice-of-law rules, the FSIA did not dictate
application of the law of the place where the action or
omission occurs. It found that the intent of Congress in
holding foreign states to the same standards of liability as
private individuals is best carried out by applying the
choice-of-law rules of the forum state - in this instance,
New York choice of law rules. The court found also that,
under New York choice-of-law rules as set forth in the
landmark decision in Neumeier v. Kuehner,43 6 the law of
China limiting wrongful death damages in an air disaster
to $20,000 per passenger should be recognized and ap-
plied by United States courts.
Significantly, the Second Circuit also held that the semi-
nal decision rendered by the New York Court of Appeals
in Kilberg v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. ,4s7 which thirty years ago
had refused to recognize the damage limitations provi-
sions of Massachusetts law, is "no longer good law" and
that under current law New York courts would apply the
law of the place of the accident under the facts presented.
Similarly, the court overruled its prior decision rendered
in Rosenthal v. Warren,438 because it no longer reflected an
accurate interpretation of New York law. Finally, the
court held that application of the limitation of liability
under the laws of China did not contravene important
policies of the United States federal government. As an
example, the court observed that while some courts have
criticized limitations under the Warsaw Convention, the
Convention is a treaty to which the United States is bound
and the federal courts regularly enforce its damage
limitations.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Nolan v. Boeing Co. ,439 the Fifth Circuit addressed the
4 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
437 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
4s8 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
459 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1587 (1991).
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scope of removal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (FSIA). In that case, a British Mid-
land Airways B-737-400 crashed on January 1989 while
en route from London, England, to Belfast, Northern Ire-
land. The aircraft was on a domestic flight between these
two cities in the United Kingdom and contained no U.S.
passengers.
Relatives of persons injured and killed in the accident
filed personal injury and wrongful death actions in the
United States. 440 These actions were brought in a Louisi-
ana state court through non-diverse New York and Wash-
ington representative plaintiffs in an attempt to prevent
removal of the actions to federal court. Altogether, six-
teen individual lawsuits on behalf of a total of 207 claim-
ants were commenced in Louisiana state court against
The Boeing Company, the manufacturer of the aircraft;
the General Electric Company, a co-manufacturer of the
aircraft's engines; and CFM International, Inc., which
marketed the engines. Louisiana was chosen by the plain-
tiffs because it was one of the few jurisdictions in the
United States that supposedly did not recognize the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens. Moreover, the plaintiffs initi-
ated the actions just before the effective date of legislation
that amended the diversity jurisdiction statute,44 ' making
the citizenship of representative parties irrelevant in de-
termining diversity of citizenship.
The defendants removed the actions to a federal district
court in Louisiana. The plaintiffs successfully persuaded
the federal court to remand the cases to the state court
because complete federal diversity jurisdiction was lack-
ing among all of the representative plaintiffs and the de-
fendants. In reaching its decision to remand, the court
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Mecom v. Fitz-
simmons Drilling Co.,442 which interpreted the pre-amend-
ment diversity jurisdiction statute.
440 Id. at 1060.
4 1 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
442 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
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Following remand, defendant Boeing impleaded as a
third-party defendant the Societe Nationale d'Etude et de
Construction de Moteurs d'Aviation, S.A. (SNECMA), a
foreign corporation that is 97% owned by the govern-
ment of France. SNECMA, in turn, removed the cases to
the Louisiana federal district court, pursuant to the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976. 443
The plaintiffs again moved the federal district court to
remand the cases back to state court on the basis that
SNECMA's removal applied only to defendant Boeing's
third-party claims against SNECMA and not to the plain-
tiffs' claims against the main defendants. Relying on sev-
eral federal district court decisions narrowly interpreting
FSIA, the plaintiffs argued that when a foreign state is
sued as a third-party defendant, the language in the stat-
ute which permitted the removal of "civil actions" against
foreign states, applied only to the third-party claims
against the foreign state.
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and
held that removal by a third-party foreign state defendant
under FSIA removed the entire civil action involving the
foreign state defendant, including all claims made by all
parties. Following the denial of the plaintiffs' motion to
remand, the federal district court dismissed all sixteen
cases on the ground of forum non conveniens.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United
States,444 which narrowly construed the scope of federal
supplemental jurisdiction in cases brought under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, only Boeing's third-party claims
could be removed and not the main claims brought by the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also contended that the federal
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
main claims because they had been previously found to be
nonremovable.
44s 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988).
444 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court and rejected the plaintiffs' argument.445 First, the
court determined that at the time the actions were re-
moved by SNECMA there existed independent federal
subject-matter diversity jurisdiction over the main claims
because the amendment to the diversity jurisdiction stat-
ute had by then become effective. The court next re-
viewed the language contained in FSIA and its history and
determined that the statute "grants a foreign state de-
fendant, even if it is a third-party defendant, a broad right
of removal under section 1441(d)."1446 Thus, "when a
third party defendant avails itself of removal jurisdiction
under section 1441(d), at least where minimal diversity
exists between the parties to the main claims, it removes
not just the third-party claims but the main claims as
well." 447
In Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp.,448 the Ninth Circuit had
earlier addressed the issue of the scope of removal juris-
diction under the FSIA when the removing party was a
defendant rather than a third-party defendant. In 1980,
Teledyne Canada, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, entered
in an agreement with Kone Corporation, a Finnish com-
pany, granting Teledyne an exclusive distributorship in
the United States for hydraulic breakers manufactured by
Kone. In early 1986, shortly after the parties negotiated a
new exclusive distribution agreement, Kone sold its hy-
draulic breaker division to Rammer Oy, a subsidiary of
Outokumpu Oy, an 81% state-owned Finnish corpora-
tion. After Teledyne learned of the sale, Teledyne Can-
ada and an American subsidiary, Teledyne, Inc., brought
suit in a California state court alleging that Kone,
Outokumpu, and Rammer conspired to hide the details of
the sale during the negotiations leading to the new agree-
445 Nolan, 919 F.2d at 1066.
446 Id.
447 Id. at 1069.
448 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990).
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ment in order to prevent Teledyne from, inter alia, finding
an alternative supplier.
Outokumpu, as an instrumentality of a foreign state, re-
moved the case to federal court under the FSIA. The dis-
trict court later dismissed the claims against Kone on the
ground they were governed by an arbitration provision in
the distribution agreement. The court also dismissed the
claims against Outokumpu and Rammer, holding that
there was no personal jurisdiction and that California was
an inconvenient forum.
On appeal, Teledyne contended that the district court
erred in dismissing its claims against Kone because the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Although
there might be federal jurisdiction over Teledyne's claims
against Outokumpu under the FSIA, in light of the Finley
decision, Teledyne realized there was no subject-matter
jurisdiction over its claims against Kone because the par-
ties were not diverse and the FSIA did not provide for
federal jurisdiction over "pendent parties" such as Kone.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Teledyne's argument and
held that removal of a civil action by a foreign state de-
fendant under the FSIA effects removal of, and provides
federal jurisdiction over, the entire civil action and not
just the claims against the foreign state.449 The Ninth Cir-
cuit determined that the Finley decision, which limited fed-
eral jurisdiction over so-called "pendent parties", was
inapplicable because both the statutory language and leg-
islative history of the FSIA indicated that Congress in-
tended to grant "federal jurisdiction over entire cases
where a foreign state is a party. ' 450 The court reasoned
that the term "action" in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) was "broad
enough to cover the entire suit as brought by Teledyne
since it was an action brought, in part, against a foreign
state."' 45' After ruling that the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction, the court affirmed the district court's
44, Teledyne, 892 F.2d at 1407.
4- Id. at 1409.
4.1 Id
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determination that the claims against Kone should be dis-
missed in favor of arbitration.45 2
C. Forum Selection Clauses
In In re Delta America Re Insurance Co, 453 a state insurance
commissioner, as liquidator of an insolvent insurer,
brought a state court action against the insurer's parent
company for fraud and mismanagement in the operation
of the insurer and against foreign retrocessionaires who
entered into reinsurance contracts with the insolvent in-
surer. It was undisputed that each of the retrocessionaires
qualified as a "foreign state" as that term is defined under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, codified in part at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a) and (b).
After being joined as defendants in the state court ac-
tion, the retrocessionaires, with the exception of one,
Banco de Seguros del Estado (Seguros), removed the case
to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). Subsequently, Seguros
filed a petition joining in the removal based on its status
as foreign state under the FSIA. Seguros predicated re-
moval upon 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
Following removal, the liquidator moved to remand,
claiming that the retrocessionaires had waived their right
to remove by operation of a forum selection clause con-
tained in their reinsurance contracts with the insolvent in-
surer. The district court agreed and remanded the cases
to state court. The district court reasoned that
"[a]lthough the statutes make special concessions to
agencies of foreign governments with regard to removal,
the court does not see any reason why they should not be
able to waive that right, the same as any other litigant. 454
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit was required to decide
whether the forum selection clause constituted a waiver of
the right of removal by the retrocessionaires. The clause
452 Id. at 1410.
453 900 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 233 (1990).
4- Id. at 892.
at issue stated that the reinsurers "will submit to the juris-
diction of any court of competent jurisdiction within the
United States and will comply with all requirements nec-
essary to give such Court jurisdiction and all matters aris-
ing hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the
law and practice of such Court. 455
The Sixth Circuit, after considering the language of the
clause, as well as the language and purpose of the FSIA
held that the forum selection clause was ambiguous and,
therefore, did not constitute a waiver of the retrocession-
aires removal right under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).4 56 The
court stated that, in order for a forum selection clause to
result in a waiver of the right of removal by a foreign state
defendant, the claimed waiver "must be explicit. '45 7 The
court observed that more precise contract draftsmanship
would eliminate waiver issues altogether.
D. Jury Tial
In Urbanski v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. ,458the plaintiffs
filed a personal injury action in state court against several
defendants arising out of exposure to asbestos. One of
the defendants, Alliancewall Corporation, joined Atlas
Turner, Inc. pursuant to Pennsylvania law for contribu-
tion and indemnity. Atlas Turner, a corporation owned
by the Canadian government, removed the action to fed-
eral court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), asserting its
status as a "foreign state" under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.
The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court.
One argument in support of remand was that because
suits involving foreign states are tried before the court
and not a jury, the claims against Atlas Turner should be
severed and placed in the civil suspense file until plain-
tiffs' claims against other parties were resolved. Once At-
45 Id. at 892.
" Id. at 892-93.
437 Id. at 894.
4- No. 89-8310 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
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las Turner's claims were severed, plaintiffs further
argued, the claims against the other defendants should be
remanded to state court.
Atlas Turner opposed the motion to remand and ar-
gued that severing the case and remanding part of it to
state court would not promote judicial efficiency because
all the claims involved the same operative facts. Atlas
Turner also argued that plaintiffs would not be deprived
of their right to a jury trial in federal court because the
plaintiffs' claims against the other defendants could be
tried to a jury, and, if liability was established, then the
claims against Atlas Turner could be tried by the court.
The district court denied the motion to remand. The
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they would
lose their right to a jury trial if the case remained in fed-
eral court. The court stated that the plaintiffs' concern
about their loss of the right to trial by jury was "unwar-
ranted" because 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) requires only that
the claims against the foreign state be tried to the court.
E. Damages
In Cimino v. Raymark Industries,4 59 workers in Texas who
were exposed to asbestos-containing products during
their employment brought a class action suit against, inter
alia, ACL, a corporation owned in part by the government
of Quebec, Canada. The plaintiffs' claims included claims
for gross negligence, misrepresentation, and deceit.
Based on these claims, the plaintiffs sought punitive dam-
ages from all defendants, including ACL. The plaintiffs
sought punitive damages from ACL because "ACL knew
or should have known as early as 1935 that asbestos work-
ers and household members of asbestos workers were at
risk of getting an asbestos-related injury or disease from
the . . . use of [ACL's] asbestos-containing insulation
products. ' 460 After noting that ACL was an instrumental-
4- 739 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
4- Id. at 337.
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ity of a foreign sovereign and was thus entitled to have the
claims against it tried to the court pursuant to the FSIA,
the court found that the evidence supported a finding of
liability against ACL for compensatory damages. The
court, however, refused to find ACL liable for punitive
damages. The court declined to assess punitive damages
against ACL because "[u]nder the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, a foreign state and its instrumentalities are
immune from claims arising out of misrepresentation or
deceit.... As any claim for gross negligence against ACL
would necessarily involve misrepresentation or deceit, the
Court declines to assess punitive damages against ACL in
this action." 46'
VII. LIABILITY OF AIRPORTS
In Stryker v. City of Atlanta462 a federal district court held
that the City of Atlanta was not immune from suit as the
owner and operator of Hartsfield Atlanta International
Airport, for negligently failing to provide adequate police
service at the airport.
The plaintiff Stryker, en route from Florida to Mary-
land, was delayed at Hartsfield Airport due to inclement
weather conditions. He and two fellow passengers he met
on the flight decided to have a drink in one of the air-
port's lounges. The weather worsened and all flights
were canceled. Therefore, hotel vouchers were issued for
the night. While visiting another lounge at the airport,
the plaintiff and his companions were harassed by two
strangers, the Johnson brothers. At one point the John-
sons grabbed the breast of one of Stryker's companions.
Stryker came to the aid of his companion, but this only
escalated the abuse by the brothers Johnson. Stryker be-
gan yelling for help, but there were no policemen within
shouting distance. The Johnsons gave Stryker a severe
beating while holding rescuers at bay with a knife. As a
461 id. at 338.
462 738 F. Supp. 1423 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
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result of the beating, Stryker required two operations:
one to remove his right testicle and another to replace it
with an artificial transplant.
Stryker filed suit against the City of Atlanta and a
number of other defendants. All defendants agreed to a
settlement with Stryker except the City of Atlanta, which
claimed immunity from suit. At trial, the City of Atlanta
moved for summary judgment on that ground. The dis-
trict court denied the motion on the ground that the city
owned and operated the airport in its ministerial capacity
rather than its governmental capacity and that it could
therefore be held liable for compensatory damages for the
alleged negligent provision of adequate police services at
the airport.
The court, in so holding, looked to the essential charac-
ter of the airport to determine "whether the facility was
designed to 'maximize revenues' or to be operated pri-
marily for the general good of the public".463 The court
noted that the City of Atlanta had leased 100% of the ter-
minal building area to contracting airlines and outside
concessions. These leases were a source of revenue for
the municipality. The fact that this revenue was kept sep-
arate from the city's general fund was not important to
the court's decision.
In noting that the plaintiff went beyond the pleadings
and produced competent evidence that permitted a jury
to conclude that the level of police protection was insuffi-
cient, the court concluded that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether Atlanta breached its duty to
provide for the safety of the plaintiff. The court, in dis-
cussing the issue, noted that violations of federal laws or
regulations can provide evidence of both state law negli-
gence and negligence per se. 464 (The regulations require
an owner and operator of an airport to provide for the
protection of persons in the airport against acts of crimi-
I4 d. at 1426 (quoting Cleghorn v. City of Albany, 184 Ga. App. 732, 735, 362
S.W.2d 386 (1987)).
4- Id. at 1428 n.6.
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nal violence.)465
In Screaming Eagle, Ltd. v. Airport Commission of Forsyth
County,466 an aircraft owner sued the County Airport Com-
mission for negligence due to its failure to prevent dogs
from entering the runway area of the airport. This al-
leged negligence resulted in damage to the owner's air-
plane when the landing gear collapsed after striking a dog
during an attempted take-off.
The trial court found that the owner of the aircraft was,
as a matter of law, an invitee because the owner leased its
plane to a lessee who paid rent to the airport. The court
held that the Commission owed a duty to invitees to main-
tain the premises in reasonably safe condition and to give
warning of hidden dangers or unsafe conditions of which
the Commission had knowledge. The jury thus awarded
the plaintiff $109,000, the amount required to repair the
airplane.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict. Evidence of dog sightings by airport personnel and
of the insufficiency of the fencing around the airport pe-
rimeter was sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury.
The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that
the Commission's lack of prudent conduct in failing to
keep the dogs off the property was a proximate cause of
the damage to the plaintiff's aircraft.
In Nally v. City of Chicago,467 the appellate court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint seeking
damages for hearing loss due to exposure to ground air-
craft noise at Chicago's O'Hare airport. The plaintiff, a
telephone repairman, was on his way to an assignment on
airport premises when a large jet revved its engines on the
main taxi strip. The noise caused the repairman to suffer
a partial hearing loss. The court held that the city, as op-
erator, had no duty to warn of the danger to the repair-
465 14 C.F.R. § 107.3(a) (1988).
4 97 N.C. App. 30, 387 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1990).
467 190 I1. App. 3d 218, 546 N.E.2d 630, 633 (1989).
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man's hearing or to take steps to protect him from such
danger when he worked on or near the airport runways.
The noise constituted an obvious danger, and the city
could not anticipate that the repairman would not take
precautions to protect his hearing in light of the obvious
danger.
A California Court of Appeals, in Bethman v. City of
Ukiah,468 held that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 pre-
empted a state tort claim premised upon the allegedly
dangerous condition of airport navigational facilities.
The complaint stated that the airport's instrument ap-
proach system, by requiring pilots to switch from one fre-
quency to another when attempting an instrument
landing, created confusion and a dangerous condition.
This condition allegedly caused a small plane to crash
during an instrument landing at Ukiah Municipal Airport
that killed the pilot and the two passengers.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismis-
sal of the complaint, ruling that airport navigational facili-
ties are regulated, approved, and controlled by the FAA
and its corresponding regulations under the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, thus preempting the state tort action
against the city and county. The Court stated that naviga-
tional facilities found to be adequate under FAA stan-
dards could not be found inadequate under state
standards because such a holding would be inconsistent
with the FAA's exclusive authority to regulate airport
navigational facilities.
VIII. LIABILITY OF INSURERS
A. Coverage
In American Continental Insurance Co. v. Estate of Gerkins,469
the plaintiffs, American Continental Insurance Company
and Southern Aviation Insurance Group, instituted a de-
4- 216 Cal. App.3d 1395, 265 Cal. Rptr. 539, 547-48 (1989).
469 No. 11-88-15 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1990) (LEXIS, All States library, Ohio
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claratory judgment action requesting the court to declare
an aviation insurance policy issued to John Maxcy re-
scinded and void because of a misrepresentation of mate-
rial fact regarding the qualifications of pilot covered in the
policy.
In May 1985 John Maxcy contacted an insurance agent
seeking liability coverage for his Cessna 310 twin-engine
aircraft. During a telephone conversation with the agent,
Maxcy answered questions concerning the qualifications
and hours of flying time of his pilot, Marvin Gerkins.
Gerkins had told Maxcy, who in turn informed the agent,
that he was a twin-engine-rated pilot with 400 hours. On
the basis of these representations and others, American
Continental Insurance subsequently issued an insurance
policy containing a Pilot Clause Endorsement which
stated, in relevant part, that the pilot would be "Marvin
Gerkins, a Private Multi-Engine rated Pilot."
In January, 1986, the Cessna 310 crashed, killing
Gerkins and three passengers. The post-crash investiga-
tion revealed that Gerkins had never been issued a pilot
certificate of any type by the FAA. John Maxcy did not
know of Gerkins' misrepresentations concerning his
qualifications.
In April, 1988, an Ohio court refused to declare that
the policy did not cover the accident involving Gerkins.
The court held that, even though the insurers established
that they would not have extended coverage to the aircraft
had they known that Gerkins was not a certified pilot, they
failed to establish by preponderance of the evidence that
Gerkins' lack of appropriate certification and rating as a
pilot was a proximate cause of the crash. The insurers
appealed.
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
lower court and held that, since Gerkins' qualifications
were relevant and material to the issuance of insurance
coverage to Maxcy, and since Gerkins misrepresented his
qualifications to both Maxcy and the insurers, the insur-
ance policy was void. The Court of Appeals further held
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that the lower court erred in placing the burden on the
plaintiff insurers to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that a breach of the policy terms in the insurance
contract was the proximate cause of the accident.
In Certain Underwriters of Lloyds v. General Accounting Insur-
ance,470 Certain Underwriters of Lloyds (Underwriters) in-
stituted a federal diversity action against General
Accident Insurance Company of America (General Acci-
dent) to recover Underwriters' contribution to the settle-
ment of ajudgment entered against C.F.E. Air Cargo, Inc.
(CFE) in a personal injury action. General Accident pro-
vided primary liability insurance coverage to CFE, an air
cargo company operating out of Indianapolis Interna-
tional Airport, for CFE's potential liability to third parties
up to the policy limit of $300,000. Underwriters provided
CFE with excess insurance coverage for the same risk for
amounts in excess of the primary policy limit up to a total
of $5,000,000.
The accident out of which this lawsuit arose involved a
pilot who slipped and fell on an ice-covered aircraft ramp
under the control of CFE. After the pilot instituted a per-
sonal injury action against CFE, General Accident as-
sumed control of CFE's defense, and Underwriters
retained counsel to advise them as to their excess expo-
sure in the lawsuit. Despite repeated requests from Un-
derwriters' counsel to General Accident that they be kept
apprised of the case and receive all relevant documents,
Underwriters received little information from General Ac-
cident and its defense counsel. Finally, at the close of the
trial of the personal injury action, General Accident con-
tacted counsel for the Underwriters and stated that the
plaintiffs were demanding $450,000 to settle the case.
General Accident also stated that it believed the case
could be settled for the policy limits of $300,000. Coun-
sel for Underwriters demanded that General Accident
tender the policy limits to the plaintiff. This was never
470 909 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1990).
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done because General Accident only authorized its de-
fense counsel to make a settlement offer of $75,000,
which was refused by the plaintiff. A jury subsequently
returned in verdict against CFE for $818,000. After the
Underwriters learned of the verdict, they demanded that
General Accident settle the action without contribution
from Underwriters because of its failure to tender the pri-
mary policy limits to plaintiff. Eventually, the action was
settled for $650,000, of which Underwriters contributed
$332,000.
Underwriters subsequently sought to recover that por-
tion of the settlement that was in excess of the primary
policy limits from General Accident on the theory that
General Accident wrongfully, negligently, and in bad faith
failed to settle the personal injury action within the pri-
mary policy limits. After a jury trial, the district court re-
turned a verdict in favor of Underwriters, and General
Accident appealed.
On appeal, General Accident argued that, under the
doctrine of equitable subrogation, which governed the
rights and liabilities between General Accident and the
Underwriters in this case, Underwriters could not recover
against it. General Accident contended that, because the
insured, CFE, could not have recovered the excess judg-
ment from General Accident for negligence and bad faith
in handling the personal injury action, neither could Un-
derwriters, who were merely subrogated to the insured's
rights against it.
The Seventh Circuit rejected General Accident's argu-
ment and affirmed the judgment against it. The court
found that General Accident had failed to inform and mis-
informed not only Underwriters but also CFE about the
conduct of the litigation. As a result, the Court held that
Underwriters could recover from General Accident. The
court also affirmed the jury's determination that General
Accident was negligent in handling the case because
there was sufficient evidence to establish that the personal
injury plaintiff would have accepted a settlement within
1991]
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the primary policy limits. 47 1
In United States Aviation Underwriters v. Olympia Wings,
Inc.,472 United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. (USAU)
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to deter-
mine whether coverage existed under a policy that it had
issued to Olympia Wings, Inc. Olympia Wings owned and
operated a Merlin aircraft and procured a USAU liability
insurance policy covering the maintenance and operation
of the aircraft. In September 1983, Ronald Marney, one
of the owners of Olympia Wings, was flying in a Baron
aircraft when it crashed, killing Marney and the pilot. Mar-
ney's estate subsequently brought a wrongful death action
against Olympia Wings, and the pilot's estate. Olympia
Wings sought coverage for operation of the Baron aircraft
under a clause in the USAU policy covering any aircraft
temporarily used by Olympia Wings as a substitute air-
craft when the Merlin was in need of servicing or repair.
In late 1984, USAU received information suggesting
that the Merlin was operational at the time of the acci-
dent. Consequently, USAU notified Olympia Wings that
it would provide a defense in the wrongful death action
only under a reservation of its rights to challenge cover-
age after the conclusion of the wrongful death litigation.
Olympia Wings rejected USAU's offer, and USAU then in-
structed its counsel to withdraw from the representation
of Olympia Wings. USAU then filed the declaratory judg-
ment action.
Shortly after USAU's action was filed, Olympia Wings
settled the wrongful death actions and agreed to the entry
of a consent judgment against it for $25,000,000. USAU
was not a party to the consent judgment and later con-
tended during trial that it was not bound by the judgment
for this reason and also because the judgment was unrea-
sonable and collusive.
At the trial in the district court, a jury found that the
471 Id. at 235.
472 896 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990).
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Baron aircraft was being used as a replacement for the
out-of-service Merlin aircraft and that, therefore, cover-
age existed. The district court rejected USAU's conten-
tion that USAU was not bound by the consent judgment
and ruled that USAU could not collaterally attack the
judgment in the declaratory judgment action. The district
court entered judgment against USAU for $20,000,000,
the amount of USAU's policy limits. USAU appealed,
contending that the district court erred in finding that
USAU was bound by the amount of the consent judgment
and that USAU covered the operation of the Baron
aircraft.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's determi-
nation that USAU covered the Baron aircraft but con-
cluded that USAU was entitled to challenge the
reasonableness of the consent judgment. The Court, ap-
plying Texas law, held that an insurer that tenders a full
defense under a reservation of rights agreement, unlike
an insurer who flatly refuses to defend its insured, is not
bound by an unreasonable settlement that is reduced to a
consent judgment. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit remanded
for trial the question of whether Olympia Wings acted as
an prudent uninsured in settling the wrongful death
action.
In First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. v. National Union Fire In-
surance Co.,473 a Pennsylvania appellate court decided the
issue of which of two insurance policies covered an acci-
dent at a heliport on the roof of the First Pennsylvania
Bank in Philadelphia (Bank). The accident victim was in-
jured while standing in a rooftop doorway adjacent to the
heliport. At issue was the fact that the Bank had two po-
tentially applicable insurance policies. One, issued by
Aetna, covered the building but excluded the heliport on
the roof. The other, issued by National Fire Insurance
Company (National), covered the heliport but excluded
the building. Both insurance companies denied coverage
47- 580 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1990).
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to the Bank but later settled with both the accident victim
and the Bank.
Aetna subsequently commenced a declaratory judg-
ment action against National seeking a determination that
National's policy covered the accident in question. Aetna
also sought to recover its share of the settlement with the
victim and the Bank, as well as its attorney's fees. The
trial court granted summary judgment in Aetna's favor
and also awarded Aetna its attorney's fees. National
appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the granting of summary
judgment. The court held that the clear wording of the
National policy, which provided for coverage over a "way
adjoining" the helipad, covered the action in question.
The court also noted that Aetna, in its policy, specifically
excluded coverage for "liability arising out of the mainte-
nance, operation, or use of the heliport." However, the
court reversed and remanded on the issue of attorney's
fees because the lower court had not specifically found
that National "acted in bad faith" in denying coverage.
B. Exclusions
In Wilkins v. American Motorists Insurance Co.,474 an in-
sured under a homeowners' policy brought a declaratory
judgment action against his insurer, American Motorists
Insurance Company. The insured sought damages for
breach of contract based on the insurer's refusal to pro-
vide liability coverage, along with legal defense, in a law-
suit against the insured arising out of an aircraft accident.
Mountain Scenic Aero, Inc. owned the aircraft involved
in the accident. The plaintiff in this action, James Wilkins,
owned an interest in that corporation. In June 1985 the
aircraft crashed, killing two passengers and injuring the
pilot and a third passenger. In April 1986, an action was
commenced against Wilkins for the wrongful death of the
two passengers and for the injuries suffered by the third
4 97 N.C. App. 266, 388 S.E.2d 191 (1990).
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passenger. The complaint alleged that Wilkins was liable
because he: (i) negligently damaged the engine of the air-
craft; (2) failed to warn the pilot or passengers of such
damage; (3) negligently failed to maintain the aircraft; and
(4) negligently failed to properly instruct the pilot as to
the operation of the airplane.
Wilkins' homeowners' insurance policy, while providing
liability coverage for bodily injury and property damage
to third persons, contained an exclusion for bodily injury
or property damage "arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance, use, loading or unloading of. .. an aircraft."
Based on the language of this exclusion, the insurer de-
nied coverage for any liability and refused to provide Wil-
kins with a defense. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the insurer, and Wilkins appealed.
On appeal, Wilkins contended that, although the policy
excluded liability coverage for negligent damage to and
improper maintenance of the aircraft, the policy did not
clearly exclude coverage for liability based upon failure to
warn and negligent instruction and, that, therefore, the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the
insurer. The Court of Appeals cited two well-established
principles. First, that ambiguous terms and standards of
causation in exclusion provisions of homeowners' policies
must be strictly construed against the insurer and, and
second, that homeowners' policies provide coverage for
injuries so long as a non-excluded cause is either the sole
or concurrent cause of the injury giving rise to liability.
The court then held that the clause in Wilkins homeown-
ers' policy was not ambiguous and did not provide cover-
age for any liability that might result from the underlying
lawsuit.475 The Court reasoned that the injuries arose
solely from the use of aircraft, and, therefore, coverage
was clearly excluded under the terms of the policy.476
In Southern General Insurance Co. v. Boerste,4 7 the executor
47-1 Id. at 195.
476 Id.
477 195 Ga. App. 665, 394 S.E.2d 566 (1990).
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of the estate of a pilot killed in an aircraft accident
brought a declaratory judgment action against Southern
General Insurance Co. (Southern General), seeking to
have Southern General declared primarily responsible for
defending the estate in a personal injury suit arising out
the accident.
The pilot, Francis J. Boerste, was killed in June 1987
while operating an airplane owned by Allgood Health-
care, Inc. (Allgood). A passenger, Philip Clark, was in-
jured in the accident. Allgood had requested Boerste to
fly its business aircraft. Southern General had insured the
aircraft against liability for bodily injury and property
damage.
Following the accident, Clark brought a personal injury
action against Boerste's estate and Augusta Aviation.
Southern General refused to provide any defense to Boer-
ste's estate and denied liability for any judgment that
might be entered against the estate. Southern General
contended that Boerste was excluded from coverage by
the terms of its policy with Allgood because he was not an
employee of Allgood but was an employee of Augusta
Aviation, which was an independent contractor to All-
good. The insurance policy at issue excluded coverage to
''any person . . .other than an employee of the Named
Insured [Allgood] while acting within the course of his
employment for the Named Insured." The trial court
held that Boerste was an insured at the time of the acci-
dent and determined that Southern General had the pri-
mary obligation to defend his estate in Clark's personal
injury action. Southern General appealed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals was required to deter-
mine whether Boerste was an "employee" for purposes of
the Southern General coverage exclusion. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that
Boerste was an insured under the policy. The Court de-
termined that Boerste was an "employee" of Allgood and
was not excluded from coverage because "when Allgood
Healthcare obtained FrancisJ. Boerste's services as a pilot
DEVELOPMENTS
from Augusta Aviation it retained the right to control and
direct him in the accomplishment of his assigned task."47
The Court added that "[t]he fact that [Boerste] was also
an employee of [Augusta Aviation] is not controlling.
Under the common law of master and servant, a servant
can at one time be generally the employee of his general
employer and specially the employee of a special em-
ployer." The Court determined that the term "em-
ployee" must be liberally construed to extend coverage to
Boerste, who was serving as a temporary employee oper-
ating Allgood's aircraft at the time of the accident.479
In Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Evans,4 ° Certain Un-
derwriters at Lloyds of London (Underwriters) brought a
federal declaratory judgment action against Lee Ann Ev-
ans, the personal representative of the estate of Andrew
Evans, and Harvey Young Airport, Inc., seeking a declara-
tion that Evans' claim for the wrongful death of one An-
drew Evans was not covered under an insurance policy
issued by the Underwriters for the 42nd Annual Fly-In at
the Harvey Young Airport. The policy in question ex-
cluded coverage of "passengers" of aircraft "used di-
rectly" in the Fly-In. The district court granted summary
judgment in the Underwriters' favor.
Andrew Evans died as the result of a plane crash while
riding with Richard Hamm, the owner and pilot of the air-
craft and a participant in the Fly-In. Hamm was giving
rides to purchasers of tee shirts he sold at the show. The
decedent did not purchase a tee shirt for his ride in
Hamm's aircraft.
The issue on appeal was whether the decedent was a
"passenger" in Hamm's aircraft for purposes of the exclu-
sionary provision in the insurance policy. Evans con-
tended that the district court erred in ruling that the
unambiguous language of the insurance policy excluded
coverage for the decedent's death. Evans argued that the
478 Id. at 569.
479 Id.
4- 896 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1990).
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exclusory language in the policy did not apply because the
ride given to Andrew Evans by Hamm was gratuitous,
such that the decedent was a "guest" and not a
"passenger".
The Tenth Circuit rejected Evans' argiiment, stating
that "[w]hile it is clear that one who pays for his transpor-
tation is a 'passenger,' it does not necessarily follow that
one is a 'passenger' only if payment for the transportation
is made."148' Consequently, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court's determination that Andrew Evans was a
"passenger" in Hamm's aircraft; accordingly, the exclu-
sionary provision of the Underwriters' policy was
applicable.482
IX. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Airport Airspace and Eminent Domain
In Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Commission,483 the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals held that, in an action for inverse
condemnation, a state trial court properly had the jury de-
termine whether a direct and substantial invasion of prop-
erty had taken place.484 In Alienos, landowners alleged
that the noise from aircraft landing and departing was an
unreasonable invasion of their property rights and repre-
sented an unconstitutional taking of a navigational ease-
ment by the airport commission. The jury concluded that
there was no direct and substantial invasion of the
owner's property rights.
The appellants argued that whether a substantial inva-
sion of property had occurred was a question of law to be
determined by the court and not by a jury. The Court of
Appeals held that appellants had not only failed to object
to the submission of this issue to the jury, but had actually
affirmed the submission of questions to the jury. The
481 Id. at 1259.
482 Id.
4- 452 N.W.2d 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
4- Id. at 502.
DEVELOPMENTS
court further concluded that the evidence of record sup-
ported the jury's factual determination. The trial court's
ruling that evidence of noise control standards of the Min-
nesota Pollution Control Agency was not admissible was
upheld by the Court of Appeals because the evidence was
found to be irrelevant and because the state standards
were preempted by federal law.
In County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, Conn. ,485 a
district court held that § 104 of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958,486 which recognized a public right of freedom of
transit through the navigable airspace of the United
States, did not create a private right of action in favor of
the owner of an airport to bring suit to compel adjoining
landowners to trim trees that allegedly interfered with
takeoffs and landings at the airport.487
The County of Westchester, New York, operated the
Westchester County Airport (WCA). The airport has two
runways, but Runway 11/29 was an alternative that was
used only during certain prevailing wind conditions made
its use appropriate. In 1989, the FAA ordered a reduction
in the usable length of Runway 11/29 due to the incursion
of certain trees into the mandatory clear zone. These
trees grew in Connecticut and were not within its County
line. Neither the County, nor the State of New York,
could use powers of eminent domain to insure that the
requisite clear zone was available. The plaintiffs there-
upon instituted this action for injunctive and declaratory
relief against the Connecticut homeowners and the Town
of Greenwich, Connecticut.
The court held that Greenwich did not violate the com-
merce clause by growing trees in Connecticut that alleg-
edly interfered with commerce in New York. The court
also held that the Federal Aviation Act did not create a
private right of action for the WCA. The court, therefore
granted defendants' motions to dismiss these claims.
4s5 745 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
4s6 49 U.S.C. app. § 1304 (1988).
487 745 F.Supp. at 956-57.
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Moreover, the court declined to dismiss the airport's
claim that it had acquired a prescriptive easement under
Connecticut law.
In Harrison v. Schwartz,488 a federal preemption case, a
county zoning board had limited the frequency of take-
offs of glider-towing aircraft at a privately owned airport
which had established a curfew for the operation of such
aircraft. The frequency restriction and curfew, designed
to reduce aircraft noise near residential properties were
found to be invalid by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
The appellate court stated that these were intrusions into
a field that had been implicitly preempted by federal law
under City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal.489 The Fed-
eral Aviation Act, enacted by Congress pursuant to its
power to control air traffic under the commerce clause,
granted the FAA authority to adopt standards for the con-
trol and abatement of aircraft noise. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals held that the frequency of takeoffs and
the curfew fell directly within the preemption rule of City
of Burbank.
In Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. v. County of Wayne,49 °
the United States district court for the Eastern District of
Michigan held that a provision in the concession contract
between Budget and Wayne County, the operator of De-
troit Metropolitan Airport, which required Budget to pay
Wayne County 9.5% of its gross revenues derived from its
operations within three miles of the airport, violated
neither the United States Constitution nor Michigan
law.491
Budget brought an action seeking declaratory and equi-
table relief from this provision. The court granted the
county's motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the provision was rationally related to the state's le-
4s, 319 Md. 360, 572 A.2d 528 (1990).
489 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
4- 742 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
40 Id. at 951.
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gitimate interest in discouraging in-terminal concession-
aires from diverting rentals to off-airport facilities.
The court also found that the 9.5% requirement did
not violate the plaintiff's substantive due process rights.
The County's system of access fees was not the functional
equivalent of a tax; the plaintiff therefore was not de-
prived of his property without due process of law.
The court, in conclusion, noted that the contract did
not violate a Michigan statute which prohibits political
subdivisions from discriminating in the grant of airport
concession stands. The court noted that the terms of the
statute did not apply to the case at bar. The plaintiff was
an in-terminal concessionaire. The statute applied only to
off-Airport rent-a-car companies.
In O'Connell Management Co. v. Massachusetts Port Author-
ity, 4 92 a federal district court held that the section of the
Federal Aviation Act which provides for federal preemp-
tion did not establish a private right of action or create a
federal right enforceable under § 1983 of the federal civil
rights statute.4 93 Nor did the Federal Aviation Act section
governing airspace and control of facilities provide a pri-
vate right of action. The Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, however, did provide private carriers
with a cause for monies wrongfully taken from them by
the Port Authority.
On March 16, 1988, the Massachusetts Port Authority
(Massport) announced a revised schedule of landing fees
for aircraft landing at Logan Airport in Boston. The new
fees increased the cost of landing aircraft at Logan and
had a drastic effect on small carriers using the airport.
The new fees were rescinded in December 1988 after the
First Circuit had held the new fees to be invalid. A small
group of carriers seeking to recover additional fees paid
to Massport subsequently commenced this action. Mass-
port sought to dismiss on the grounds that the aviation
192 744 F. Supp. 368 (D. Mass. 1990).
49., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1990).
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statutes upon which the carriers predicated their claims,
specifically 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305 and § 1348, did not
provide a private right of action. Second, it argued that
the civil rights laws, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does
not provide a remedy for violation of the aviation statutes.
Finally, Massport asserted that no cause of action existed
under the United States Constitution.
The district court agreed with defendants' contention
that the Federal Aviation Act did not create a private right
of action enforceable by air carriers adversely affected by
landing fees.494 It allowed the case to continue on the
ground that the plaintiffs did have a right of action under
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The
court found that Massport's refusal to delay implementa-
tion of the proposed fees pending an adjudication of their
validity by the DOT constituted a potential deprivation of
plaintiffs' procedural due process rights. Massport hin-
dered plaintiffs' ability to meaningfully challenge the va-
lidity of the new fees. The plaintiffs, therefore did not
have access to adequate pre-deprivation procedures
before the implementation of the new fees.4 95 The court
concluded by holding that, where challenges to the valid-
ity of an exaction plan have not yet run their full course, a
post-deprivation proceeding and remedy must be
provided.
In United States v. City of Berkeley,496 the district court
granted the government a permanent injunction en-
joining the City of Berkeley, Missouri, from interfering
with the construction of a radar system at an airport lo-
cated within the city limits. The court noted that
"[f]ederal regulation of airspace management, air naviga-
tion facilities and air safety is pervasive. ' 497 By virtue of
the nature of the regulations, federal law occupies the
field and preempts any local law that might thwart any
4-O'Connell, 744 F. Supp. at 371.
495 Id. at 378.
4- 735 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
497 Id. at 940.
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federal regulations on the subject.498
B. Drug and Alcohol Testing
The Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court's decision that
an FAA order requiring random, unannounced drug test-
ing of all airline personnel having responsibility for safety
did not violate those employees' fourth amendment rights
in Bluestein v. Skinner.4 99
In 1988, the FAA issued a final rule that provided for
the random drug testing of (a) flight crew members; (b)
flight attendants; (c) flight instructors or ground instruc-
tors; (d) flight testing personnel; (e) aircraft dispatchers;
(f) maintenance personnel; (g) aviation security or screen-
ing personnel; and (h) air traffic controllers. The tests
were to discover any use of marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
PCP, and amphetamines. °°
The rule provided that, in order to ensure that there
was no supervisory discretion in selecting those to be
tested, selection would be made by a computer at random
using an employee's social security, payroll, or other iden-
tification number used by the airline. However, various
groups representing the employees to be tested peti-
tioned for a review of the rule, asserting that the drug
tests constituted unreasonable searches in violation of the
fourth amendment.
The Ninth Circuit, relying on the guidelines established
by the Supreme Court in National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab 50 and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives As-
soc. ,502 upheld the FAA's ruling. The court held that the
special interest of the federal government in securing safe
airline travel for the American public overcame any viola-
tion of an employee's expectation of privacy in being sub-
498 Id.
4- 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990).
- 53 Fed. Reg. 47,058 (1988). See also 53 Fed. Reg. 47,024 (1988).
- 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
5-. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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jected to urine testing.5 0 3
C. Advertising
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether state
laws proscribing deceptive advertising by airlines are pre-
empted by the Federal Aviation Act in Trans World Airlines
v. Mattox.5°
In 1988, the Attorney General of Texas, and the attor-
ney generals of four other states notified TWA, Continen-
tal, and British Airways (BA) that their advertisements
violated both the guidelines adopted by the National As-
sociation of Attorneys General (NAAG) and Texas' false
advertising and deceptive practices law. The Texas Attor-
ney General charged that these airlines had attempted to
make their fares appear lower than their competitors by
prominently advertising the ticket prices while less promi-
nently disclosing taxes, surcharges, and fees. The Attor-
ney General threatened prosecution.
TWA, BA, and Continental filed suit to enjoin any pros-
ecution. The District Court for the Western District of
Texas granted the injunction. 50 - The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed. The Court noted that § 105(a)(1) of the Act, ad-
ded by the Deregulation Act in 1978, expressly preempts
state laws affecting the rates, routes, or services of any air
carrier authorized under the Act. 50 6  The Attorney Gen-
eral argued that Texas was merely attempting to affect ad-
vertising and not the underlying fare structure of the
carriers, but the Court held that state laws against decep-
tive advertising practices are sufficiently related to airline
rates and fares to warrant preemption.50 7
The Supreme Court of New York County agreed with
the Fifth Circuit's decision. The New York court, in People
53 Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457.
- 897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 1II S. Ct. 307 (1990).
5 Id.
- Id. at 779.
-7 Id. at 782-83.
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v. Tram World Airlines,508 held that Congress intended to
preempt and exclude state law in the field of deceptive
advertising, and, accordingly, the Court denied New
York's application for injunction relief against certain
TWA newspaper advertisements. 0 9
In State of Kansas v. Trans World 4irlines,51 0 a district court
in Kansas came to the conclusion that § 105(a)(1) of the
Act, relating to the preemption of any state's regulation of
"rates, routes or services" did not include advertising.
The facts in this action were similar to the facts before the
Fifth Circuit in Mattox. Here, the Attorney General of
Kansas filed suit alleging that TWA had engaged in "de-
ceptive and unconscionable acts and practices in violation
of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act." 5 11 The action
was originally filed in a Kansas state court. TWA removed
the action, and Kansas moved to remand to the state
court. The court, in granting the state's motion to re-
mand, rejected TWA's argument that the Federal Aviation
Act completely preempts actions of this type as part of the
"complete preemption" exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule. The court found that the language of the
preemption section does not, by its own terms, include
advertising. The case was remanded to the state courts.
D. Other
In Davila v. Banco Central Corp.,52 an action was insti-
tuted to foreclose on a security interest in four Aviocar
aircraft and to recover damages allegedly caused to the
aircraft. The district court held that the applicable federal
regulations determined whether the plaintiff had a valid
and enforceable security interest in the airplanes rather
than by California law as indicated by the security agree-
ments. In so holding, the court noted that, when an air-
-_ 147 Misc. 2d 697, 556 N.Y.S.2d 803 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
-o id. at 702-03.
510 730 F. Supp. 366 (D. Kan. 1990).
-, Id. at 367.
512 749 F. Supp. 28 (D. P.R. 1990).
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craft is registered in accordance with Section 501 of the
Federal Aviation Act, 5 13 all secured transactions which re-
late to that aircraft fall within FAA regulations. As a re-
sult, in order for the plaintiff to maintain a secured
interest in the aircraft, the security agreement must com-
ply with the relevant FAA regulations. 51 4
-s 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401 (1976).
514 Davila, 740 F. Supp. at 31.
